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ABSTRACT 
 
This project is motivated by the presence of eugenics in our dominant approaches 
to meaning-making: what does it look like, and why should we care? To begin to answer 
these questions, this dissertation works from two concepts: enfreakment – the 
identification of elements that are desirable or wanted – and eugenicist logics, the 
removal of what is not wanted or deemed necessary for the desired outcome, or 
alternatively, the replication of the elements that are considered useful. 
To observe the interaction between the logic of eugenics and enfreakment within 
ableist systems, this dissertation develops the enfreakment of language, a term that 
encompasses both the process of enfreakment and the heuristic that allows us to see that 
process in action. The enfreakment of language uncovers how particular modes of 
Western and Euro-American meaning-making depend on the logic of eugenics, a 
dependency that is detrimental to the bodies that become subjected to the power gained 
through this logic.  
Focusing on some of the implications of the overlap and interaction between the 
logics of eugenics and enfreakment within ableist systems, this project demonstrates the 
operation of eugenics as a logic that motivates discourses around human variation. I 
offer three examples of representations of disability and eugenics in America to illustrate 
reproductions of the freak show and eugenicist practices within the production and 
consumption of the “abnormal” body. I first show how a system based on eugenicist 
logic operates by examining how eugenicist logic in the language of U.S. Ugly Laws is 
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mirrored in Nazi euthanasia practices. Next, I illustrate the collapse of a system based on 
eradication through an examination of representations of Anne Frank, demonstrating 
how eugenicist logics of Nazi programs dis/able her as the “face of the Holocaust.” 
Finally, I look at the attempts to create an alternate, anti-eugenicist system in 
contemporary public rhetorics through an analysis of Lady Gaga’s references to Nazi 
eugenics and disability in her work. Ultimately, this dissertation argues that Disability 
Studies is essential if the academy is to account for the bodies and practices that have 
been erased in the attempt to define categories of “abnormal.”  
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CHAPTER I  
DERRIDA, DISABILITY, AND EUGENICS 
 
Joe Johnston’s 2011 Captain America: The First Avenger tells the story of Steve 
Rogers, a resolute young man whose small build and precarious health prevents him 
from enlisting for military service in the early days of World War II. Approached by 
German doctor Abraham Erskine, Rogers is asked to volunteer for a medical experiment 
developed by esteemed German and American doctors and military personnel called 
“Project Rebirth.” Rogers agrees, and his “weak” body is suddenly enhanced to the 
maximum human potential, turning him into the Super Solider known as Captain 
America. As Captain America, Rogers participates in war propaganda, specifically 
meant for young men to enlist, representing both America and the ideal American man – 
a hypermasculine, hyper-able soldier, used to show young American men what they 
were not and what they wanted to be. When the men in charge of this experiment are 
killed, Rogers makes it his mission to find and kill the man who is responsible – Rogers’ 
Nazi counterpart who also participated in the experiment in Germany, but suffered 
injuries during the procedure, most notably the disfigurement of his face that gave rise to 
his nickname, Red Skull.  
Yet Captain America’s mission extended beyond serving his country and getting 
revenge on Red Skull. As the successful result of combined efforts between Nazi 
scientists and American doctors, the story of Captain America depends on a very 
specific narrative about America’s relationship to eugenics, freakdom, and disability. 
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Captain America is a soldier who is, ultimately, the successful product of experimental 
medical treatments that sought to create a “superior man.” Once created, his duty was to 
be an example of both the extraordinary and the ordinary by performing his 
extraordinariness in order to promote a new idealized and expected version of 
“ordinary.” To protect and promote this new version of “ordinary” or “normal,” Captain 
America’s first real enemy is his disfigured counterpart – the version of himself that 
eugenicist practices failed, and consequently made disabled. Ultimately, what this story 
highlights is the interconnectivity between eugenics, freakdom, and disability and how 
this interconnectivity informs understandings of “normalcy,” “superiority,” and the 
various ways in which we make meaning.  
Indeed, the story of Captain America relies upon ideas of superiority in both 
body and mind as the path to success, and disability as the element that hinders that 
success. In this dissertation, I bring disability rhetorics to the forefront of rhetoric to 
examine the ways in which understandings of Western and EuroAmerican rhetorical 
practices and acts of meaning-making rely on conceptualizations of disability as 
hindrances to “successful” deployments of making meaning. These conceptualizations of 
disability are largely formed by ableism, the prejudice against people with disabilities, 
and the ableist systems that function to maintain it. In the context of this project, ableism 
is used to refer to the power structure designed to construct “ability” and “normalcy” 
through the manipulation and removal of what deviates from models of “normalcy.” 
Contextualizing disability as such allows me to interrogate and confront the ways in 
which ableism and eugenics are implicated in cultural, linguistic, and discursive 
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practices. This understanding opens up new ways of recognizing the assumed able body 
and privileged logics in rhetorical theories, practices, and models of meaning-making. 
Definitions  
Central to understanding ableist systems is understanding the ways that ableist 
discourses affect bodies – particularly disabled bodies – in an effort to maintain power. 
In order to interrogate the interaction between ableism and rhetoric, the larger definition 
of rhetoric from which I work primarily draws on Jay Dolmage’s definition of rhetoric 
as “the circulation of discourse through the body” that uncovers “the conflict and 
variation that impels any rhetorical endeavor” (114-5). In this way, rhetoric is the way 
that elements come together to make meaning, and the impact that meaning has on and is 
used against the body. Furthermore, I call on the definition of meaning-making that 
Casie C. Cobos provides, arguing that “rather than assuming rhetoric equals persuasion 
equals argument…meaning-making [is] a more nuanced understanding of rhetoric that 
includes material productions, embodied practices, and identity formations, often 
through the handing down of knowledge or the contestation of power through 
communication”(13). Throughout this project, then, meaning-making – the process of 
collecting elements within specific systems to assign a desired meaning to signs – 
always comes from the body. I work from this model of rhetoric to define disability 
rhetorics as the way that meaning-making comes from and is felt through the disabled 
body, and specifically the ways that the nondisabled body and experience is decentered 
in meaning-making. 
 4 
 
Practicing this definition attempts to answer Cynthia Lewicki-Wilson’s call for 
“an expanded understanding of rhetoricity as a potential, and a broadened concept of 
rhetoric to include collaborative and mediated rhetorics that work with the performative 
rhetoric of bodies that ‘speak’ with/out language” (157). In this way, rhetoric and 
“rhetoricity” itself depend on meaning-making as something that is not bound by 
language, and as such, depends on the context to determine meaning – including other 
ways of making meaning, as well as the rhetoricity of the body. Indeed, commenting on 
the translation of Aristotle’s use of the concept “potentiality,” Leweicki-Wilson 
continues, saying that “rhetoricity does not necessarily reside in, nor depend on, speech, 
text, or any particular technology of communication. Potentiality resides in a rhetorical 
situation (161). This echoes Scott Lunsford’s urge to become more sensitive to the use of 
language in meaning-making, “their kairotic natures, and the implications for using them 
rhetorically” (332). Privileging the body over language as the essential component to 
rhetoric, this project situates rhetoric through the disabled body, invoking the 
possibilities of thinking outside normalized bodies and terms.  
This privileging of the body invites a recognition of the multifaceted ways in 
which various peoples and bodies develop equally varying relationships with rhetorical 
systems and practices through cultural rhetorics. Cultural rhetorics can be understood in 
this context as the impact that discourses of power have on the body, specifically in the 
context of understanding how “culture” is constructed through language, rhetorical 
practices, and meaning-making. Cobos notes that using a cultural rhetorics approach 
requires the awareness and purposeful situating of how we understand both rhetoric and 
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culture, including our orientation to the field, our methods and methodological 
approaches, and the “epistemologies and subjecthood of the practices in our analyses” 
(14). Furthermore, Cobos argues that a cultural rhetorics approach “allows for an 
entrance into understanding why forcing all understandings of rhetoric into the canonical 
history not only eliminates certain practices as rhetorical but also silences those who 
would offer different views in our fields” (15). Along these lines, a cultural rhetorics 
approach opens up spaces that highlight the ways in which normalization and 
standardization eliminates practices or elements that do not contribute to a larger goal. In 
this context, then, a cultural rhetorics approach allows for the privileging of the body 
over language with regard to rhetorical practices and meaning-making. In doing so, this 
approach responds to Malea Powell’s call to remember the bodies that were, and 
continue to be, erased in the building of both the concept and field of rhetoric.
1
  
Contextualizing rhetoric and disability in this way allows me to interrogate the 
processes of designating and removing unwanted elements in pursuit of normalization in 
rhetorical practices. More importantly, this contextualization allows me to privilege the 
effects this normalization has on the body, as well as the normalization practices 
themselves. The normalization practice that this project is concerned with is that of 
eugenics. Although scholars such as Bernadette Baker concur that “primarily [eugenics] 
refers at the broadest level to a belief in the necessity of ‘racial’ or ‘national’ 
improvement through the control of populational reproduction,” (665) I wish to extend 
                                                 
1
 “Blood and Scholarship: One Mixed-Blood’s Story.” Race, Rhetoric, and Composition. Ed. Keith 
Gilyard. Portsmouth, NH: Boynton/Coook-Heinemann, 1999. 1-16. Print.  
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this conversation around eugenics to include the discursive practices of eugenics itself. 
In doing so, this project situates eugenics as a discursive practice that goes beyond racial 
improvement as Baker and others have suggested, and instead will conceptualize 
eugenics as a discursive practice that seeks to maintain power structures over unwanted 
bodies and practices in the name of reaching full “potential” or “normalcy.” These 
power structures include the removal, prevention, and assimilation of bodies that do not 
contribute to or reach the level required by practices of standardization and normalcy. 
While scholars such as V.J. Guihan, Stephen Jay Gould
2
 and Michelle Ballif in 
particular have all pointed to an understanding of eugenics as discourse that enforces 
power structures, this project extends that work by demonstrating the operation of 
eugenics as a logic that motivates discourses around human variation.  
Eugenicist logics refer to the removal of what is not wanted or deemed necessary 
for the desired outcome, or alternatively, the replication of the elements that are 
considered useful. The identification of elements that are desirable or wanted occurs 
through a process linked to the logic of the freak show, what I call throughout this 
project as “enfreakment.” This term was first used by Rosemarie Garland Thomson in 
her 1996 anthology, Freakery, and is used in this project to refer to the way that rejected 
elements are positioned as unwanted for the purposes of establishing what is wanted. 
Eugenicist logics thus do not operate or exist independent from other systems or logics 
                                                 
2
 Gould’s The Mismeasure of Man (2006) situates eugenics as a series of scientific discourses that 
structure the methods, practices, and motivations that underlie biological determinism: “This book, then, is 
about the abstraction of intelligence as a single entity, its location within the brain, its quantification as one 
number for each individual, and the use of these numbers to rank people in a single series of worthiness, 
invariably to find that oppressed and disadvantaged groups – races, classes, or sexes – are innately inferior 
and deserve their status” (21).  
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of normalization; for the purposes of this dissertation, I will primarily focus on some of 
the implications of the overlap and interaction between the logics of eugenics and 
enfreakment within ableist systems. 
To observe this interaction, I offer the “enfreakment of language,” a term that 
encompasses both the process of enfreakment and the heuristic that allows us to see that 
process in action. Using the enfreakment of language to look at selected American 
representations of disability, eugenics, and freakdom, this project argues that these 
modes of representation are inherently ableist because they function primarily through 
eugenicist and ableist logic. Because of this relationship to eugenicist logics, these 
representations of disability, eugenics, and freakdom are always in the process of 
“enfreakment,” producing a unique illusion of “accomplishment” that ableist systems 
can achieve by means of discouraging the reproduction of undesirable qualities or traits.  
This chapter will theorize the role of the body in dominant Western and Euro-American 
language and meaning-making systems to establish the relationship between language, 
bodies, and eugenics.  
Rhetoric and Eugenics 
The approach to the idealized “whole” body and the threat of fragmentation is 
situated through the able body, marking a distinction between a normalized body and the 
“abnormal” body. Despite the fact that reaching the desired “wholeness” is impossible, 
the body that deviates from the desirable “whole” body becomes rendered as abnormal 
or deviant regardless. Similarly, in many forms of Western linguistic organization and 
meaning-making, the quest for a “complete” meaning requires the distinction between 
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desirable meanings and “deviant” meanings, that is, those meanings that are unintended 
or unwanted in the process of creating meaning.  
Michelle Ballif’s interrogation of Socrates’ question to Gorgias in the Platonic 
dialogue, “Is Rhetoric a techné?” demonstrates an example of how rhetoric and 
meaning-making can be understood as a re-productive craft that exists to arrive at a 
meaning through the careful removal of elements not pertinent to the desired outcome. 
In the Phaedrus, Plato suggests that central to the techne of rhetoric – literally the art or 
craft of rhetoric – is the speakers’ ability to “discover the kind of speech that matches 
each type of nature” (72). In this way, techne is the art of adapting arguments to varying 
audiences and context, and Ballif notes that despite Socrates’ claim that rhetoric is not a 
techne, “rhetoric does indeed produce something” (7). Thus by extending Plato’s 
question in the context of eugenics, Ballif is questioning the degree to which Plato 
theorizes the reproductive methods of rhetoric:  
Plato, by interrogating rhetoric as a re-productive ‘art,’ subjects rhetorical 
practices to the same genealogic and eugenic demands to which those 
inhabiting Plato’s utopian Republic are likewise subject. Plato…sets 
about constructing a genealogy of rhetorical practices in order to establish 
a certain social/symbolic order by guaranteeing legitimacy to dialectic 
while denying the same to sophistry and writing (7).   
Understanding Plato’s interrogation in this way implies the presence of a relationship 
between eugenics – that is, eugenics as a means to re-produce desired practices – and a 
“social/symbolic order.” This hierarchy of “legitimacy” determines not only what 
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practices and acts of meaning-making are acceptable, but also what bodies are 
acceptable. Useful to understanding the distinction between “acceptable” and 
“unacceptable” bodies in this context is C. Stephen Byrum’s observation regarding the 
evolution of the term “techne”:  
Obsessed with wholeness and concerned with telos, or the "end" of a 
matter, [the Greeks] added an ethical and aesthetic dimension to their 
early definition. Techne came to mean not only understanding how to get 
the job done but also how the skill could be integrated with being a good 
citizen. (160) 
The movement towards a larger goal – conceptualized here as “wholeness” – renders the 
way rhetoric is achieved as something connected to ethics, namely how to achieve the 
desired outcome, but also how that achievement can be replicated in the name of “being 
a good citizen.” As such, rhetorical practices are directly associated with social orders 
that rely on what Ballif notes as the guarantee of legitimacy. Ballif defines this 
legitimacy in Platonic terms, arguing that  
for those who seek the reproduction of the proper, and all that that 
concept entails, it does “matter” if rhetoric is a techne – if it can father 
legitimate sons and can, therefore, properly bring forth the materialization 
of a body of knowledge that matters. Proper civic bodies reproduce 
legitimate offspring, who have ears only for proper civic discourses. (23) 
Indeed, Charles Kauffman further contextualizes this “legitimacy,” arguing that such an 
understanding of legitimacy ensures that “there will be very few rhetoricians in any state 
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and that all will be members of the philosophic ruling class, dedicated to the propagation 
of doctrine” (363). Because the nature of rhetoric and meaning-making rely on 
metaphors of the body, and by extension, reproduction, eugenics becomes an integral 
part of understanding the distinction between rhetorical practices that have value, and 
those that have none. Having rhetorical value, in this case, means having a legitimacy 
that contributes to the idea of “normalized” rhetoric, practices, and meaning-making. 
The meaning-making produced from “legitimate” rhetors will always, by extension, be 
legitimate. Thus the idea of “legitimate” rhetoric becomes synonymous with “normal” 
rhetoric, implying that only select bodies can engage in meaning-making and rhetorical 
practices of “value,” that is, those practices that achieve “wholeness.”   
Ableism as a System 
In language, the desire for wholeness is indicative of the desire to maintain 
control over what is meant when signs are used. Often, this control is deployed as 
attempts to exert control of the system or structure that governs language or other modes 
of meaning-making. Ferdinand de Saussure’s Course on General Linguistics provided 
the foundation for many approaches to language, most importantly, the concept of the 
sign (the word or the thing) and its relationship to the signifier (the meaning assigned to 
the word or the thing). For Saussure, the meaning that is assigned to words or things is 
arbitrary, and arrived at only through the context that surrounds the sign, including the 
signs that surround it. Language is thus comprised of a series of differences without 
positive terms and possesses no value outside of the linguistic system that produces 
“conceptual and phonic differences that have issued from the system” (120). Derrida 
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explores the space of such a system and the play of signs that make meaning within 
these systems in “Différance,” and argues that ideas operate as signs in language, 
wherein there are no value-identities, only differences. The meaning of any apparently 
present sign is only the relationship between all the absent meanings that the term is not. 
To interrogate this idea, Derrida introduces différance, a word used to designate the play 
of differences that make meaning. He explains,  
What is written as différance, then, will be the playing movement that 
“produces” – by means of something that is not simply an activity – these 
differences, these effects of difference. This does not mean that the 
différance that produces differences is somehow before them, in a simple 
and unmodified – in-different – present.  Différance is the non-full, non-
simple, structured and differentiating origin of differences. Thus, the 
name “origin” no longer suits it. (11) 
The movement between signs that, for Saussure, produces meaning, Derrida designates 
as différance, the passage of infinite and endless differentiation. Where Saussure argues 
that difference produces one meaning to the next, Derrida argues that the deferral of each 
difference renders each moment of value-assignment as infinite. More importantly, each 
difference is only an effect of difference; in other words, Saussure argues that value is 
placed on a sign once it is differentiated from other signs in the chain of signifiers. But 
because difference is determined by what a sign is not, it is simultaneously affirmed as 
what it can be. Thus the moment of difference that Saussure references as a moment of 
meaning-making is only an effect of identity, or what he believes is the consequence of 
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difference and value-assignment. Therefore if, as Derrida argues, meaning is endlessly 
deferred and differed from other signs, then the result of differing – identity – is only an 
illusion, because for Derrida, identity cannot ever be fixed because it is always in the 
process of differing from other signs. Simply put, the movement of difference has an 
ending point for Saussure, and that ending point occurs when value is assigned; for 
Derrida, that movement of difference will never end, therefore identity or “true” value 
will only ever be an illusion. Thus the meaning assigned to signs is infinite; at any given 
moment, a sign can have multiple assigned meanings, and privileged meanings can 
change depending on context. Because of this constant and infinite movement between 
what a thing is and what a thing is not, a sign cannot ever be “complete,” and meaning is 
arbitrary. 
Thus within models of ableism, the classification of “disabled” is arbitrary – that 
is, always responding to the classification of “nondisabled” or “normal” that is always in 
flux – but the values assigned to specific bodies within ableist contexts are nevertheless 
subject to the classifications that operate as social rules or norms. Saussure argues that 
the arbitrariness of value-assignments renders the individual unable to change the system 
or the elements that constitute that system due to the supposed fixed identity. Derrida, 
however, argues that this arbitrariness allows for natural alterations, opening up spaces 
for recognition of the oppositional values that bind the system together. For Derrida, the 
values assigned to bodies are arbitrary, and not bound to the classifications that place 
them within value-systems. Therefore while Saussure would consider the body as a 
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representation of original presence, Derrida’s model would consider the body as a site of 
neither presence nor absence, but rather the space between.   
Original Presence  
When bodies become regarded as signs within systems of power – ableist 
systems, specifically – their value is based on the relationship they have with the 
“original” and full presence. Within ableist systems, that original and full presence is the 
able (or nondisabled) body, that is, the fully present, normalized, and healthy body. 
Derrida’s "Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences" addresses 
this idea of an “original” presence, conceptualizing it as a fixed center. Derrida argues 
that much of Western philosophy has always disregarded the composition of the center, 
and indeed, the “structurality of structure,” by overlooking inherent contradictions and 
ambiguities that weaken it. To account for any potential weakness is the idea of a center 
or a fixed origin of the structure from which all meaning emanates. This fixed origin also 
limits the play within the structure, ensuring control over whatever occurs. This stable, 
immobile center in turn creates a stable structure, therefore the “structurality of the 
structure” has never been called into question. Understanding and accepting the role of a 
stable structure gives the illusion of control over whatever happens within that structure. 
Within an ableist system, the center holds that the nondisabled body is unchanging, and 
bodies can only be understood in terms of their relationship to nondisabled bodies, thus 
determining the level of participation and acceptance within that system. In other words, 
the nondisabled body is the center of an ableist system from which all understandings 
about bodies emanate. To be nondisabled in an ableist system, then, is to be the “right 
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kind” of human, a distinction that ableism relies on in the dehumanization of those 
whose bodies do not conform to what is normal. Thus the binary of able and disabled is 
both informed by, and extended to, the embodied binary of human/inhuman. 
Because ableism operates on the assumption of the able body as fully present and 
whole, all other bodies are regarded as representations of this wholeness, implying an 
impossibility of full presence. Yet within this type of ableist system, the able body also 
cannot achieve that presence because it assumes the able body as an origin from which 
all other bodies move away from. For Derrida, an origin is only an effect of the 
movement of difference that projects the supposedly original moment that a 
representation reflects. He writes, 
Representation mingles with what it represents, to the point where one 
speaks as one writes, one thinks as if the represented were nothing more 
than the shadow or reflection of the representer. A dangerous promiscuity 
and a nefarious complicity between the reflection and reflected which lets 
itself be seduced narcissistically.  In this play of representation, the point 
of origin becomes ungraspable. (Of Grammatology 36) 
The concept of origin operates in metaphysics as the truth from which all meaning 
simultaneously emerges moves towards. When the distinction between two binaries – in 
Derrida’s example, between speaking and writing – collapses and reveals how deeply 
“representation mingles with what it represents,” the identification of an origin becomes 
impossible. In other words, there cannot be an origin because, as Kip Canfield reminds 
us, a semantic purpose is ascribed to origins, and “at the point of origins, there is no 
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semantics” (par. 24). Thus if all bodies are representations of the able body, that is, the 
body privileged within any ableist system, the differentiation between the able body and 
the disabled body becomes indistinct. The existence of ability thus depends on 
enfreakment, that is, the identification and presence of the body of the person of with 
disabilities.  
A consequence of the enfreakment of bodies is the fragmentation of those bodies. 
Enfreakment goes beyond identifying what bodies are useful versus what bodies are not; 
enfreakment also divides bodies themselves into useful parts and useless parts. The 
result of such dividing produces a fragmented the body that is often associated with 
disability. Indeed, this fragmentation is often understood as the difference between cure 
and care, rehabilitation and death: if the “useless” or “abnormal” parts of the body can 
be returned or given the illusion of normalcy, then the status of “useless” or “abnormal” 
becomes challenged. This understanding and resistance is best seen in Lacanian terms, 
wherein the earliest and most underdeveloped experience of one’s body is the corps 
morcelé, the fragmented body. The infant experiences his or her body as an 
accumulation of fragmented body parts – arms, legs, etc. – the representations of which 
Lacan calls imagos. For the self to be constituted, a process begins that attempts to unify 
by providing an illusion of a whole body. This movement, according to Lacan, “extends 
from a fragmented body-image to a form of its totality…and, lastly, to the assumption of 
the armour of an alienating identity” (4). When the child reaches what Lacan terms as 
the “mirror stage,” he or she recognizes the image of him or herself in the mirror as a 
whole entity as opposed to the fragmented movements and experiences that have 
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constituted his or her world up until that point. Because of this opposition, the infant will 
first know itself as lacking a completeness that cannot ever be fulfilled.   
  In this way, the image that the infant sees in the mirror serves as “armor” against 
a fragmented body or experience. Consequently, the disabled body becomes a reminder 
of the unwanted fragmented body. Lennard J. Davis argues that  
the disabled body is a direct imago of the repressed fragmented body. The 
disabled body causes a kind of hallucination of the mirror phase gone 
wrong. The subject looks at the disabled body and has a moment of 
cognitive dissonance, or should we say a moment of cognitive resonance 
with the earlier state of fragmentation. Rather than seeing the whole body 
in the mirror, the subject sees the repressed fragmented body; rather than 
seeing the object of desire…the subject sees the true self of the 
fragmented body. (60) 
The disabled body comes to represent what is undesirable or not wanted: fragmented, 
underdeveloped, and unrepressed. Furthermore, the disabled body highlights the illusory 
nature of wholeness and development. The image of the disabled body calls on the 
fragmentary state that the “armor” of “natural” development attempted to guard against. 
It is a reminder that bodies and experiences are never anything but fragmented, despite 
the illusions of wholeness and development established in the “mirror stage.” Ultimately, 
this understanding of wholeness and development positions disability as never capable 
of being the object of desire because its role is to represent the reality of the fragmented 
body. Dan Goodley notes that “the cultural prerogative is to refute those who remind us 
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of our own fragmentation (e.g. impaired bodies)” (130), and as Ghai reminds us, 
“disability, by definition, implies ‘lacking’ or ‘flaw’” (51). The disabled body becomes a 
site of cultural projection, wherein the nondisabled viewer is positioned to see the 
disabled body as lacking and, in many ways, becoming another part of the “armor” that 
distances the (illusionary) wholeness of the “able” body from the fragmentation of the 
“disabled” body.  
The Body as the Trace 
 Considering the nondisabled body as an origin point – where bodies begin, and 
are fragmented to the point of abnormality and disability – a space between binaries 
(nondisabled/disabled) is produced. Derrida refers to this space as the trace, the mark of 
an absence, or the movement between what was and now is. Although the trace is always 
already connected to the past, thereby implying an origin, it is only an effect of the past: 
the movement of the trace erases the difference between signifier and signified. This 
difference, therefore, separates nothing and distinguishes nothing. Derrida writes,  
  It is because of différance that the movement of signification is possible  
   only if each so-called ‘present’ element, each element appearing on the  
   scene of presence, is related to something other than itself, thereby  
   keeping within itself the mark of the past element, and already letting  
   itself be vitiated by the mark of its relation to the future element, this  
   trace being related no less to what is called the future than to what is  
   called the past, and constituting what is called the present by means of  
   this very relation to what it is not: what it absolutely is not, not even a  
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   past or a future as a modified present. (13)  
The movement between binaries is what creates meaning, yet what is required for this 
movement to commence is the “presence” of the two binaries. In other words, an 
established value must be ascribed to each element for it to be distinguished as opposite 
of another element, thereby creating a binary. And as each element essentially means 
what it is not, that is, its value is determined by elements outside of it, the value of an 
element can vary with the context that surrounds it. In this way, it is only “on the scene 
of presence” but retaining “the mark of the past element,” or what came before it in its 
specific context. Simultaneously, however, it is also vulnerable to the context it will be 
for another element, marking it for the future. As such, the trace is always both past and 
present, constituted by what it is not, what it always is, and what it will not ever be.  
An ableist model depends on this position of the body as a trace, and manipulates 
it to perpetuate systems of oppression. If the body operates as a trace, it is only an effect 
of the difference between the two binaries that perpetuate the ableist systems. Spivak 
describes Derrida’s trace as “the mark of the absence of a presence [. . .] of the lack at 
the origin that is the condition of thought and experience.” (xvii, Of Grammatology). 
The trace is the absence of a presence, a representative of a nonexistence that has a 
presumed presence and origin. Derrida writes, 
The trace is not only the disappearance of origin – within the discourse 
that we sustain and according to the path that we follow it means that the 
origin did not even disappear, that it was never constituted except 
reciprocally by a nonorigin, the trace, which becomes the origin of the 
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origin. . . . The (pure) trace is differance.  It does not depend on any 
sensible plenitude, audible or visible, phonic or graphic.  It is, on the 
contrary, the condition of such a plenitude.  Although it does not exist, 
although it is never a being-present outside of all plenitude, its possibility 
is by rights anterior to all that one calls the sign. . . .  The trace is in fact 
the absolute origin of sense in general.  Which amounts to saying once 
again that there is no absolute origin of sense in general.  (Of 
Grammatology 61-62, 65) 
The existence of the body in this model signals the disappearance of an origin, as it is 
acting as a trace. More significantly, it signals the nonexistence of an origin, as any 
origin can only be formed in opposition to a nonorigin. If the body is considered 
operating as the trace within an ableist model, its nonexistence is the condition of 
meaning-making between the binary of able and disabled. Yet, as Derrida points to, if 
the body is the trace and the trace is the origin of sense, there is no origin of sense at all. 
In other words, because Derrida argues that there is no origin, the effect that is produced 
from différance – the body – is only an effect. 
 The rendering of the body as an effect is the means through which bodies 
become disregarded, forgotten, and effaced: subject to eugenicist logics. Yet an ableist 
system depends on such effacement and logics: what has no utility – a full, present, and 
static value – in the system is vulnerable to erasure. Its utility does not extend beyond the 
existence and preservation of its opposite, that is, what is considered useful. Thus the 
project of ableism is one always connected to the determination of what is desirable 
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through the process of categorization and utility assessment – enfreakment – and is 
vulnerable to the eradication that eugenicist logics require. 
Center as Control 
Within this space between binaries where différance occurs, ableist models 
consider the body as operating in a similar way as the trace, a space where difference is 
written but also where difference transcends the time and space imposed on it. The body 
carries memory and history with it, those things that are required for the play of signs to 
occur. Yet because it represents that which is absent (or required within ableist 
structures), certain bodies become effaced, and in being recognized, they are ignored or 
forgotten; in other words, these structures allow for bodies to be acknowledged only in 
terms of what they are not and what they cannot ever be, which in turn establishes and 
perpetuates the existence of other bodies, those bodies upon which the “undesirable” 
ones are held against. Able-bodiedness becomes the presence that subjugated bodies are 
expected to represent. Derrida’s explication of the nature of the representational aspect 
of the sign demonstrates the reliance on representing a supposed “original” presence – in 
this model, the impossible able-bodied presence: 
the substitution of the sign for the thing itself is both secondary and 
provisional: secondary due to an original and lost presence from which 
the sign thus derives; provisional as concerns this final and missing 
presence toward which the sign in this sense is a movement of mediation. 
(9) 
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For people with disabilities, the body – if regarded as a sign within a system of ableism – 
cannot ever achieve full presence because it is secondary and provisional to the idealized 
image of the nondisabled body. The nondisabled body becomes the original presence, 
rendering the bodies of people with disabilities as always already secondary and 
provisional to the nondisabled body: secondary because it cannot inhabit able-
bodiedness and provisional because it is always within the process of deferral and re-
signification away from the nondisabled body.  To be recognized and valued in this 
system means to occupy able-bodiedness, yet the categories of able-bodiedness and the 
able body are categories that make it difficult for anyone – even “able” people – to 
inhabit at all times, due to its constantly shifting parameters that effect different people 
at different times. Therefore for the disabled body, it is always in a process of deferral 
and signification as able-bodiedness goes through this process of construction and 
reconstruction. Yet even the nondisabled body is an illusion – therefore the able-body is 
always attempting to find a way to inhabit able-bodiedness, an impossible construct. 
Thus in creating the “abnormal” body, the idealized body that has been constructed 
cannot ever be present or truly exist. The able body as a representation of fullness or 
presence, then, cannot ever achieve that full presence, yet ableist systems depend on the 
movement towards full presence.  
Conclusion 
Understanding the operation language in this way underscores the function of 
eugenicist logics in the attempt to reach “full” meaning. If meaning-making is 
ambiguous and inconsistent, the center is constructed as a way to control the 
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reproduction of desired meanings and the eradication of undesirable meanings. 
Restricting the free play of the sign also restricts unwanted meanings. To restrict 
unwanted meanings, the contexts that surround the sign are altered to shape the desired 
meaning. For example, to foster the meaning of “disability,” constructions of “ability” 
are cultivated and encouraged so that “disability” comes to signal the absence of 
“ability.” When a body deviates from the image of the “normal” body – either in the 
medical textbook, or in the staircase that assumes all bodies can reach the top – that body 
is dis/abled
3
, abnormal, and deviant within that context. When a body cannot perform 
within the prescribed context, it is effectually dis/abled. This is not unlike Judith Butler’s 
conceptualization of performativity, which argues that what the body “means” is a 
production at the site of performativity: 
For discourse to materialize a set of effects, “discourse” itself must be 
understood as complex and convergent chains in which “effects” are 
vectors of power. In this sense, what is constituted in discourse is not 
fixed in or by discourse, but becomes the condition and occasion for 
further action. This does not mean that any action is possible on the basis 
of a discursive effect. On the contrary, certain reiterative chains of 
discursive production are barely legible as reiterations, for the effects they 
have materialized are those without which no bearing in discourse can be 
taken. (187) 
                                                 
3My use of the term “dis/abled” does not refer to the lived identities of those who identify as disabled, but 
rather the process of disablement, wherein contexts – including environmental and social – restrict the 
participation of certain bodies through the assumption of abilities.  
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For a context to achieve its desired effect/s, the context itself must be understood as a 
construction produced by systems of power in order to maintain and perpetuate that 
power. Contexts may either be understood as discourse, as Butler uses it, or as discursive 
practices, as I use it in the example of dis/abling. Either use of the term “context” 
highlights the ways in which what happens within that context determines that 
“condition and occasion” for action within that context. “Normalcy” is thus constructed 
as a reiteration, or a constant presence in the construction of a context. Because of its 
constant presence in the structure, it becomes viewed as natural, until the “structurality 
of the structure” is interrogated. Thus because ableism, “normalcy,” and “ability” are 
constantly repeated in structures of power, “ability” takes on a sense of “naturality,” thus 
rendering bodies without ability – disabled bodies – as “unnatural.” Because this context 
determines what is “natural” versus “unnatural,” it also determines the where “natural” 
and “unnatural” are located, thereby controlling and constructing the desired effects or 
meanings. 
This re-signification away from the nondisabled body has effects both internally 
and externally. “Abnormalities” become understood as markers of ableism more than 
markers of disability. What this suggests about ableism, then, is that ableism creates a 
disability that in turn manifests in the body. In other words, in the attempt to normalize 
and to situate bodies in controlled contexts necessarily puts the “different” or 
“abnormal” body into a category of disability. While this version of disability is based 
on bodily difference, it is also one that is socially constructed. Difference operates 
similarly to disability in such a way that makes a disability studies reading of 
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deconstruction imperative for an understanding of the implications of textualizing the 
body. 
Considering this concept within an ableist model opens up new spaces for 
understanding how origins and binaries operate in the process of signification. The 
foundation for ableism depends on the establishment and perpetuation of the binary 
between able and disabled. For ableism, “able” is situated as an origin, rendering it a 
superior and full presence that “disabled” should – but cannot – move toward. Able 
bodiedness thus becomes the goal if presence is to be achieved. Yet this establishment of 
able opposite disabled in a binary renders able as both dependent on the existence of 
disabled, but more significantly, “able bodiedness” as an effect of the movement 
between able and disabled. It is neither full nor present, as its illusory existence depends 
on elements outside of it.  Able bodiedness becomes the trace, always differing and 
deferring the effect of “able bodiedness” in the move between able and disabled. 
            Such a consideration of the body in ablest systems opens up new ways of 
understanding the relationship between enfreakment, eugenics, and disability. Derrida’s 
linguistic analysis leaves out the material consequences, however: if things and ideas 
function like signs in a linguistic system, the body necessarily becomes a text because it 
becomes an effect. Systems of oppression rely on this idea of the body as an effect or a 
text because the body then becomes manipulatable and dehumanized. When the disabled 
body is put at the center of ableist critiques, the reliance on the able body emerges, 
complicating the way that difference is understood and represented in the body and 
through language. When meaning is made through the body, signs no longer are 
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understood as lacking full meaning; when bodies are recognized as nontextual, they too 
are no longer understood as lacking, offering up new challenges to the project of 
eugenics, a project reliant upon determining the “lack” in the movement toward full 
meaning or presence. Thus the ableist system’s refusal to accept alignment between the 
able body and the disabled body reveals how significant and present this relationship is 
and the ways that signification is contingent upon the disabled body. Furthermore, the 
reliance on the logics of enfreakment and the logics of eugenics demonstrate how many 
modes of Western and Euro-American meaning-making are inherently ableist, as they 
rely on eradication of “abnormal” elements. As such, any representation of “abnormal” 
in dominant rhetorical systems invokes the histories and implications associated with 
eugenics, enfreakment, and disability. 
This project offers three examples of the use of enfreakment of language as a 
heuristic, uncovering the interaction and relationship between eugenics, enfreakment, 
and disability. My first example in Chapter II traces the development of eugenicist logic, 
highlighting the Greco-Roman and European traditions that constructed the eugenicist 
logic implemented in the United States and Nazi-occupied Europe. These traditions, 
similar to the ones that construct what we now understand as “the Rhetorical Tradition,” 
are largely constituted by the erasure of other forms of meaning-making so as to achieve 
a desirable outcome – in the case of the Rhetorical Tradition, to achieve a desired 
definition of rhetoric. Because the erasure of “undesirable” traditions are often the 
beginning of an erasure of bodies – such as the attempted erasure of Indigenous peoples 
of the Americas – I demonstrate how eugenicist logic in language creates contexts in 
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which acts of eugenics are deemed acceptable and necessary for the desired outcome. I 
analyze the eugenicist logic in the language of the first “ugly law” on record – a law 
designed to keep people with “unsightly” disabilities out of public view – alongside the 
logic of the process of euthanasia programs implemented under Nazi legislation.  
Chapter III offers the second example of how the enfreakment of language can be 
used to uncover ableism in dominant representations of “abnormal.” In this chapter, I 
extend my discussion of Nazi eugenics to postwar representations of the eugenics of the 
Holocaust in the United States. Focusing on the use of Anne Frank’s image as the 
ultimate victim of Nazi eugenics, I show how eugenicist logics take a different form and 
are able to continue to operate successfully through the removal of Frank’s rhetorical 
agency. Drawing on Rosemarie Garland-Thomson’s work on representations of 
disability, this chapter shows that the logics used to construct Frank’s image are the 
same as those used to construct representations of disability, effectively rendering Frank 
as disabled within eugenicist systems of meaning-making. Because these logics of 
disablement are the same as those of the freak show, wherein “different” or “abnormal” 
is privileged so the audience may be distanced, audiences relate to Frank’s constructed 
image to confirm that they are not affected by the logics that first erased her body and 
then her rhetorical agency.  
My last example in Chapter IV interrogates the references to eugenics and 
freakdom in the work of Lady Gaga. Gaga’s performances and self-positioning as a 
freak who has been disabled by societal norms challenge the reliance on “normalcy,” 
and by extension, “freakdom.” By privileging the body and relying on the histories and 
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implications of a body associated with eugenics, freakdom, and disability, Gaga’s 
challenge shows the limits of systems of meaning-making based on elimination. My 
final chapter considers the pedagogical implications of the relationship I have outlined, 
and the impact that the enfreakment of language has on making the classroom and field 
of Rhetoric and Composition more accessible. 
  
 28 
 
CHAPTER II 
THE LANGUAGE OF EUGENICS 
 
This chapter will demonstrate the movement from enfreakment to eugenics, both 
in language and in practice, interrogating of histories of eugenics in the United States 
and relating them to Nazi eugenics, specifically concerning people with disabilities. 
Acknowledging the relationship between European racism, American racism, and 
consequently, the Holocaust, eugenics provides a logic that motivates isolation and 
persecution of those deemed “undesirable.” The logics of eugenics assert the control 
over undesirable qualities in order to produce desirable results. I will explore specific 
examples of how this logic motivates language, and how that logic can move from 
language to the enactment of eugenic practices. Furthermore, I will examine the logics of 
freakdom, as “enfreaking” undesirable or unwanted bodies to solidify normality; 
freakdom as such is an essential step that led to eugenics. Ultimately, what emerges is 
the impact of disability and ableism in the histories of eugenics in the United States and 
in Nazi Germany: through acts of disablement – rendering bodies disabled via the 
establishment of social restrictions – bodies were enfreaked and then removed from 
society, either through sequestering, or through extermination. 
Because eugenicist logic and acts have been recorded as early as Plato, the role 
of eugenics and eugenicist logic should be understood as beyond Francis Galton, and 
rather as a settler colonial project of “racial hygiene” in the United States. This project 
first emerged in the context of official genocide policies against people of color, 
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beginning with the colonization of Indigenous peoples in the 15th century. These 
policies later took the form of what became known as the “ugly laws,” laws that forbade 
“unsightly persons” from appearing in public. Such laws were both reflections of and 
precursors for the eugenicist movements that were quickly picked up by Nazi physicians. 
Juxtaposing the language of the “ugly laws” with Nazi eugenicist practices, the distinct 
relationship to medical practices in Nazi Europe emerges.  
Francis Galton  
I begin my discussion of eugenics much like most scholarship on the history of 
eugenics, with Francis Galton, “the Father of Eugenics.” Unlike most scholars, however, 
I begin with Galton to highlight the reliance on Western modes of constructing histories, 
and the impact these modes have on understanding how these histories function. Because 
eugenics did not begin with Galton – neither the logics of eugenics, nor the acts 
performed under the name eugenics – acknowledging his work as the starting point of 
eugenics and eugenicist logic is misleading. Furthermore, this acknowledgement is a 
product of eugenicist logic that operated and existed long before he first coined the term. 
Nicholas W. Gillham argues that “Galton’s scientific career did not proceed in the linear 
fashion outlined…but was instead a jumble of interconnected interests and approaches. 
[Thus] to make sense out of it, one must tease out specific sequences of events and leave 
out others entirely” (98). Gillham is one of many who position Galton as the man who 
both “coined the word and initiated the original eugenics movement” (84). This very 
reliance on Galton as the man who initiated the original eugenics movement suggests 
two things: Galton was the first and only man researching this subject, and that, 
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somehow, eugenics had an “original,” “harmless,” movement that eventually took the 
form that would come to be associated almost synonymously with Hitler’s project of 
“racial hygiene.”  
I highlight this one specific history of Galton’s creation of the word to 
demonstrate one aspect of the relationship between language, eugenics, and history. The 
need to understand the origins of eugenics through Galton and his creation of the word 
points to what Derrida argues in “Differance,” wherein origins are always entangled in 
language. Thus using language to talk about origins and about what is secondary to them 
produces the effect of origins. In other words, an “origin” is only the effect of the 
movement of difference, which then projects a supposedly “original” moment (11). 
Indeed, what compels most scholarship on the history of eugenics to begin with Galton 
is his role as “originator” in the history of the word eugenics. Edwin Black describes the 
origins of the term:  
[Galton] played with many names for his new science. Finally, he 
scrawled Greek letters on a hand-sized scrap of paper, and next to them 
the two English fragments he would join into one. The Greek word for 
well was abutted to the Greek word for born.  
In a flourish, Galton invented a term that would tantalize his 
contemporaries, inspire his disciples, obsess his later followers and 
eventually slash through the twentieth century like a sword. The finest 
and the fiendish would adopt the new term as their driving mantra. 
Families would be shattered, generations would be wiped away, whole 
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peoples would be nearly erased – all in the name of Galton’s word. The 
word he wrote on that small piece of paper was eugenics. (16) 
Black’s construction situates Galton as both prior and simultaneous to the emergence of 
the word and the concept of eugenics itself. He is prior because his “new science” had 
not been named yet, and is simultaneous because naming makes it visible. Michel 
Foucault argues in The Birth of the Clinic that “we must re-examine the original 
distribution of the visible and invisible insofar as it is linked with the division between 
what is stated and what remains unsaid: thus the articulation of medical language and its 
object will appear as a single figure” (xi). Black is re-examining the original moment 
where the distribution of the concept and the word came together. The concept of 
eugenics had existed prior to Galton, but as the attention to Galton in the history of 
eugenics demonstrates, it had not become wholly visible until Galton named it. Eugenics 
existed in the realm of the “unsaid,” and thus Galton is associated with the emergence of 
the concept because he “stated” it, thereby positioning him and his articulation as a 
“single figure.” In this way, many histories of eugenics begin with Galton because 
within these contexts, eugenics cannot become visible until it enters into the language of 
science and medicine. The reliance on the story of the word demonstrates the reliance on 
language to identify origins. In this original moment, Galton is positioned as the last in 
line of Eurocentric thinkers, such as Charles Darwin, yet the conceptualization of the 
difference between what the science of eugenics did before the naming versus what 
happened after – such as Black’s description of eugenics as slashing “through the 
twentieth century like a sword” – gives the effect of an origin. In other words, the effect 
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of assuming Galton as the origin point of eugenics is that eugenics began as a “harmless” 
science with Galton, because before Galton, there was no name to it.  
But eugenics was never harmless, and it was hardly “original” by the time that 
Galton had coined the term. Diane B. Paul and James Moore argue that Galton’s work 
was an implication of Darwin’s Origin of Species, noting that while Darwin did inspire 
Galton to pursue a long-standing interest in the topics of heredity, Galton’s “intervention 
was the first to make an evolutionary argument about human nature and to link questions 
of human breeding to the anxieties about biological decline that Darwin had provoked” 
(29). More significantly, John C. Waller’s seminal essay, “Ideas of Heredity, 
Reproduction and Eugenics in Britain, 1800-1875” argues against this “originary” 
position often granted to Galton. In it, Waller, examines the historical context in which 
Galton worked, pointing out the continuities between pre-Victorian hereditarianism and 
later Victorian eugenical ideologies, ultimately arguing that “little attempt has been 
made to determine the range of social, ideological, and intellectual factors that rendered 
eugenical thought unprecedentedly credible in the mid-Victorian period” (458). For 
Waller, that means decentering Galton’s eugenical ideas and instead highlighting the 
existence and prevalence of hereditarian theories, their relationships to eugenical 
thought, and “the demonstrable impact that theories of heredity had upon choices of 
marital partner” (458). Waller further argues that  
By attaching too much importance to individuals we lose sight of the fact 
that – in terms of causal agency – the idea of eugenics arose from a 
general fascination for heredity (intensified, but not initiated by the 
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publication of The Origin of Species) and a particular set of social, 
institution and political circumstances of the mid-Victorian period. These 
factors were not only largely responsible for producing Galtonian 
eugenics, but they continued to stimulate eugenical thinking 
independently of Galton’s earlier advocacy. (484) 
This tendency to attach too much importance to Galton himself was, and continues to be, 
the product of the attempt to situate and consequently locate eugenics at a specific point 
of time and place. Ignoring the “general fascination for heredity” that Waller points out 
ignores the operation of eugenic logic in the creation of this fascination, but more 
significantly, acts in the name of this logic. Waller’s attention to the “particular set of 
social, institution and political circumstances of the mid-Victorian period” are an 
essential part of understanding why Galton is situated as the “father of eugenics,” but it 
also is significant to consider why and how these circumstances are privileged in the first 
place. If understanding Galton’s role in the establishment of eugenicist thought depends 
on understanding mid-Victorian medical, political, and social circumstances, what 
exclusions from this history are equally dependent? What histories have been erased in 
the name of a linear history of eugenics, even in the act of decentering Galton himself? 
What does this suggest about how we understand eugenics and why we wish to 
understand it in the first place? What does this say about what is “required” to have a 
“complete” understanding of eugenical origins, logics, and actions? I cannot attempt to 
satisfactorily answer all of these questions; I can, however, point to some of these 
exclusions in the history of eugenics that has been offered to build a new perspective of 
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eugenics. I do not attempt to create a new history, but in the sections that follow, but to 
contribute to a new understanding of eugenics and its place in histories of people most 
affected by it.  
Eugenics Before Galton 
My analysis of Francis Galton’s place in the “history” of eugenics demonstrates 
one of the ways that eugenics begins with language, as evidenced by the consistent 
positioning of Galton as the “founder” of the science. Yet, as David J. Galton has 
argued, eugenic ideas existed long before Galton, specifically in the works of Plato and 
Aristotle. Richard Barnett points out that “in true Victorian style, Galton – a scientific 
polymath and Charles Darwin’s cousin – drew on Greek for his coinage: eu (true or 
noble) and genos (to give birth)” (1742). This suggests that the Victorian historical, 
political, and social context from which the word eugenics emerged was imbued with 
specifically Greek ways of understanding, recognizing, and perpetuating a certain type 
of value placed onto bodies. This can translate into a reliance on specifically Greek ways 
of making-meaning. In DJ Galton’s essay, “Eugenics: some lessons from the past,” he 
reinforces the fact that  
the ideas behind eugenics are not new. As with so many other things, the 
Ancient Greeks were there first. It is impossible to overstate the 
importance of the impact that Plato and his pupil Aristotle have had on 
Western society. It could be said of the European philosophers who came 
afterwards that they have mainly picked one or two paragraphs from the 
works of the two Greeks and then expanded and analysed them in more 
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detail. The legacy of Plato and Aristotle will be discussed and debated for 
centuries to come, as it has been in the past. Both of them held decidedly 
strong views on eugenics, their aim being to provide the City State with 
the most able and effective children for the next generation. The methods 
they proposed are bold, radical and if adopted would transform family 
life. They go far beyond the techniques suggested by Francis Galton, who 
originated the term in the nineteenth century. (133) 
Indeed, Plato’s Republic suggested enforcing means onto healthy persons reproducing, 
but also means to prevent sick and “malformed” citizens from reproducing as well, 
reasoning that these children would likely share the same “deficiencies” as their parents 
(407d). Plato’s suggestions also included abortion (461c) and removal to the “other city” 
(Timaeus, 19a).This removal, Plato argued, was essential to the perpetuation of 
“healthy” individual evolution (Republic 407e), which would in turn be responsible for a 
good quality of life (407e) for those deemed “acceptable” citizens. Aristotle held similar 
views, explicitly arguing for a mandate that deformed children must be executed, and 
those children of deformed or “unacceptable” citizens should be aborted (The Politics, 
1335b). Furthermore, regulation needed to be enacted to ensure that “children 
produced…have bodily frames suited to the wish of the lawgiver” (1334b). Although 
David J. Galton argues in the above passage that the methods Plato and Aristotle 
proposed are “bold, radical and if adopted would transform family life” and that they “go 
far beyond the techniques” forwarded by Francis Galton, this is not entirely true. As 
demonstrated in the preceding section, Galton’s rendering of these beliefs into the 
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concept of “eugenics” implies both an explicit adherence to Plato and Aristotle’s ideas 
regarding marriage and reproduction, and also suggests an implicit compliance with 
ideas related to the extermination of “deformed” citizens. More significantly, these 
regulations that would ensure productive and healthy citizenry are made mandatory 
through written law. In this way, it can be argued that eugenics begins and develops 
through the use of language against unwanted bodies.  
One way that this practice emerges is through colonization and 
institutionalization. As noted above, Plato’s writings argued for the sequestering of 
unwanted bodies as a eugenic measure to attain an ideal State, saying that  
the children of the good should be properly educated, but that those of the 
bad should be secretly sent to some other city; yet so that such of the 
adult among these as should be found to be of a good disposition should 
be recalled from exile; while, on the contrary, those who were retained 
from the first in the city as good, but proved afterwards bad, should be 
similarly banished. (19a). 
In this context, the children of the “bad” refer to those whose parents were sick or 
“malformed.” He continues, reasoning that if these children themselves are not bad, they 
may re-enter the state, and alternatively, if children of those who were deemed “good” 
develop otherwise, they are banished from the state. In this way, Plato is arguing that the 
State retains control of this city, one close enough to transfer people. This is not unlike 
the logics behind institutionalization, whereby citizens “unfit” to contribute to society 
are sequestered off until they can prove themselves a “good” citizen. In the first U.S. 
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state-sponsored asylums in the 1800s, designed to rehabilitate those deemed “insane,” 
Sharon L. Snyder and David T. Mitchell argue that “mid- to late nineteenth-century 
eugenics authorized, anchored, and certified what we refer to as diagnostic regimes. 
Here we coin a phrase that defines the historical transition from a ‘curative’ promise of 
rehabilitation to an increasingly ‘custodial’ proposition involving the oversight of 
pathologized groups viewed as nonnormative” (71). In this way, eugenics serves to 
diagnose and sequester difference in the interest of maintaining standards of “normalcy” 
and “health.” For Plato, achieving the “ideal” community meant removing unhealthy and 
undesirable bodies from public view and participation. Plato’s argument for the 
relationship between health of the body and health of the state indicates one of the 
earliest moves towards Snyder and Mitchell’s “diagnostic regime.” Furthermore, as 
Francis Galton himself pointed out, eugenic passages in The Republic and Laws “don’t 
amount to much beyond the purification of the city by sending off all the degenerates to 
form what is termed a colony!” (312). David J. Galton argues that “it is not clear where 
Galton obtained this idea of colonisation as a eugenic measure; it does not appear to 
occur anywhere in Plato’s works. in the early ancient Greek history…establishing 
colonies was a way of coping with population expansion and of establishing trading 
contacts overseas” (263). Despite this argument, it is clear that Francis Galton had 
recognized Plato’s connection between colonization and eugenics, an entwined 
relationship that is essential to any understanding of eugenics. 
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Colonization and Eugenics 
The relationship between colonization and eugenics must also be taken into 
consideration. This link between the concepts of colonization and eugenics form the 
basis of eugenicist movements, particularly those in the United States. Roxanne Dunbar-
Ortiz argues that  
the origins of white supremacy as it is now experienced and 
institutionalized – and denied – in the United States (and, due to 
colonialism and imperialism, throughout the world) can be traced to the 
prior colonizing ventures of Christian Crusades into Muslim-controlled 
territories, and to the Calvinist Protestant colonization of Ireland. These 
were the models for the colonization of the Western Hemisphere, and are 
the two strands that merge in the genetic makeup of U.S. society. 
These models of colonization often are based on concepts of normalization that would 
later serve as the foundation of the laws that enforced colonization. The system of 
colonization of Indigenous peoples put in place by the early European settlers and 
government set regulations and laws in order to "normalize" and therefore take 
advantage of the imbalance of power and privilege. The end of the nineteenth century 
saw the United States government imposing strict laws onto Indigenous people in an 
effort to control and discipline Native bodies via Western traditions and foundations. 
Jacqueline Shea Murphy writes 
The federal governments' stated intent in all of these institutions was to     
"civilize" – and thereby save – a dying people by incorporating Native 
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people (who would then no longer be Indian) into the state. Once 
differences between Native Americans and European Americans were 
eradicated, then no special land rights need be accorded Native peoples, 
and Native land could be absorbed into the United States or Canada and 
bought, sold, and regulated according to their laws. Thus, one 
consequence of this corporeal policing and assimilation would be the end 
of Indian claims to land. (30) 
The rationale for these regulations was to establish and enforce a standard of living. This 
standard of living would appear to be fair: once everyone conformed to the same law, 
the same opportunities would be available to everyone. For Indigenous peoples, this 
meant a total refiguration of ideologies and practices. According to the laws enacted by 
the U.S. government, compliance with these laws was the only way to ensure survival 
and acceptance into this new, colonized society. For the government, "saving" Native 
people meant civilizing them through the standardization of "normal" living.   
The objective of civilization was to minimize difference visible through bodily 
actions, a version of "normalcy" that is emphasized on the body. Murphy writes that 
“virtually all the institutional disciplining of Native bodies was corporeally enacted, and 
included, for example, the physical force sometimes used to take children from their 
homes and send them to boarding schools… and the imposition of Western hairstyles 
and clothing on Native children” (30). Native people were forced into unfamiliar spaces 
and forced to embody unfamiliar practices, practices that often conflicted with their 
ideologies or religious beliefs. Not only did the government physically remove Native 
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peoples from their lands, the government implemented a "normalization" of the practices 
and performances that would occur on the land provided to them. Not only did bodily 
movements have to resemble Euroamerican movements, but the bodies themselves were 
manipulated to look like Euroamerican bodies. Murphy continues, saying that “the 
policies worked to establish Indians as so irreconcilably different that they could not just 
be left alone…[which] then served to justify the use of force to eradicate the differences 
the policies had just established” (31). These efforts towards “civilization” also worked 
in an alternative manner, that is, it created an example of what is different, abnormal, 
and by extension, dangerous. In doing so, it would easily identify what was not useful to 
the system and then take measures to eradicate it.  
The establishment of difference also proved essential for the establishment of 
whiteness. Murphy argues the determination of Native Americans as wholly different 
“served to invent an understanding of Indians that European settlers could identify 
themselves and consolidate their own sense of whiteness against” (31).  In other words, 
the recognition of otherness led to a creation and recognition of “normal-ness” that in 
turn made whiteness accessible to those who were not considered “different.” Whiteness 
became synonymous with civilized, wherein civilized bodies resembled white bodies, 
both literally and figuratively.  
Imaginary Authenticity: Eugenics and Immigration 
These concepts of “abnormality” that are rooted in ideas of recognizing 
“civilized” and “acceptable” bodies carried through to early twentieth century American 
ideas of immigration. Whiteness, American, and civilized are largely formed by the 
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logics of eugenics. In attempting to create and maintain a normality that would be 
distinctly “American,” systems of power were designed to identify difference through 
the enforcement of designated norms, and then remove those differences. In short, the 
nationalism of the United States was directly tied to what Étienne Balibar calls “the 
obsessional quest for a ‘core’ authenticity that cannot be found’ (60). The eugenicist 
logic that formed this imaginary authenticity relied on imagining what the nation was, 
how it was threatened, and what it could be. By creating an imagined appearance or 
phenotype based on genetics and environment to characterize the citizens of the United 
States, this example of eugenicist logic formed the “ideal American.” Immigrants and 
other undesirable people threatened this imagined appearance, and from the standpoint 
of eugenicist logic, threatened the future of the nation by multiplying that which halted 
the progress and future of the United States.  
Measures were taken to protect what was believed to be the existence of an ideal 
American citizen. For example, the 1891 Immigration Act pronounced certain groups 
unfit to become American citizens, specifically those who risked becoming a public 
charge: 
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United 
States of America in Congress assembled, That the following classes of 
aliens shall be excluded from admission into the United States, in 
accordance with the existing acts regulating immigration, other than those 
concerning Chinese laborers: All idiots, insane persons, paupers or 
persons likely to become a public charge, persons suffering from a 
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loathsome or a dangerous contagious disease, persons who have been 
convicted of a felony or other infamous crime or misdemeanor involving 
moral turpitude, polygamists, and also any person whose ticket or passage 
is paid for with the money of another or who is assisted by others to 
come, unless it is affirmatively and satisfactorily shown on special 
inquiry that such person does not belong to one of the foregoing excluded 
classes…(Chap. 551, Section 1) 
What this law outlines is a type of eugenicist system, privileging the productive and 
healthy bodies, and limiting the existence of unwanted bodies in the name of producing a 
healthier and more industrious nation. To begin, the law identifies difference through 
classes. The use of this term is highly suggestive of a product of what Diane B. Paul and 
James Moore call “the Darwinian Context.” First published in 1859, Darwin’s On the 
Origin of the Species argued that individuals more suited to the environment would be 
more likely to survive and reproduce, leaving inheritable traits to future generations. 
This, in turn, would lead to the process of natural selection. Distinguishing those that 
would be more suitable, then, depended on the methods of classification developed by 
naturalists. Arguing the relationship between classification and physical similarities, 
Darwin uses an example of the physical similarities between the Hottentot people and 
the “Negro race,” implying that all races of human beings are evolutionarily linked 
(424). The consequence of this implication is that of evolutionary human hierarchy, 
wherein those more suited for their environments – or for survival – would have 
progressed further evolutionarily than those who are unfit for survival.  To use the term 
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classes within the context of this immigration law suggests that eugenicist logic 
determined how to define who was wanted and who was unwanted. Furthermore, the 
word itself creates a context specific to eugenicst motivation: to say that “the following 
classes of aliens shall be excluded admission into the United States,” is to say that those 
people who are classed are those who are unwelcome. In other words, those whose 
difference is recognized and designated “unwanted” are those who are denied admission 
into the United States.
4
  
This law also forbade entrance to “all idiots, insane persons, paupers, or persons 
likely to become a public charge, [and] persons suffering from a loathsome or dangerous 
contagious disease.”  This discrimination of persons with disabilities is coded in medical 
language: idiots, insane, disease. The context of this medical language suggests that 
people with disabilities are people who are, and should be, feared: loathsome, 
dangerous, and contagious all signal the fear of disability, and relate it directly to the 
health of the nation and its people. To code ableism in this way is to say that persons 
with disabilities should be feared on the grounds that they prevent the evolutionary 
progress of both the nation, but of the people themselves. Furthermore, to associate 
disability and disease within the context of immigration is to also put those same labels 
onto the bodies of the immigrants themselves. In other words, because the Immigration 
Act describes of what is not wanted and what is considered unhealthy to the nation, it is 
                                                 
4
 Chinese laborers were excluded from this law because the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 explicitly 
forbade Chinese peoples from migrating to the United States between 1882 and 1892, on the grounds that 
Chinese laborers were a threat to order in certain localities. This law was extended to another ten years in 
1892 under the Geary Act.  
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not insignificant that it opens up with a description of disabled bodies. By situating what 
is unhealthy to the nation within the context of immigration, this act is very clearly 
implying that the bodies of immigrants are diseased and unhealthy. The description of 
who is excluded continues, denying entrance to those charged with a felony, 
misdemeanor, or any activity considered in opposition to the beliefs and standards of 
society, as well as those whose ticket was paid for by another – suggesting that they 
could not care for themselves, or depended on the assistance of others to survive. The 
attempt to maintain and protect the “American norm” surfaces in the law, creating a 
context specific to ideas of what it means to look, think, and act like an “American.”  
This requirement to fulfill the role of the ideal American was extended to the 
body. Snyder and Mitchell argue that “this period in American history is the first to 
introduce disability as disruptive to rationales of national citizenship” (39). Further, in an 
analysis of Ellis Island as a rhetorical space,  specific to disability, race, and 
immigration, Jay Dolmage argues that “the social processing that Ellis Island 
engendered was all about identifying and sometimes manufacturing abnormal bodies: 
these elements are out of place; these bodies are disordered. Ellis Island created a 
physical space in which abnormality could be arrested or deposited” (26). Ellis Island – 
the gateway to the United States for millions of immigrants – served as a type of 
designating station, wherein bodies were subjected to a normalizing gaze that 
determined their level of difference and its relationship to the development of “the 
norm” in the United States. Victor Safford, a medical doctor stationed at Ellis Island 
describes in his memoir the motivation behind the medical inspection:  
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The scheme as it was maintained in actual operation at Ellis Island during 
my time there provided an opportunity for an observer to inspect an 
immigrant systematically both at rest and in motion at a distance of about 
twenty or twenty-five feet; for an observer to inspect or scrutinize the 
immigrant as he approached the observer, and finally after the immigrant 
came close at hand. Somewhere in this inspection process provision was 
to be made for the close examination of hands, eyes, and, if deemed 
advisable, of throat. No attempt was to be made on such an inspection to 
determine what was wrong. Suspicion that something might be wrong 
was alone sufficient justification for turning a person aside. (246) 
Part of this “scheme” of identifying “deficiencies” that Safford describes is dependent on 
bodily ability. From a distance, Safford and others could determine mobility 
impairments by observing how an immigrant carries his or her bags, causing him or her 
to make two right hand turns to determine muscular coordination, and stamping cards to 
observe how the immigrant looked at it, signaling any kind of defective vision (247-49).  
Once again, eugenicist logic operates here as the logic that determines the acceptability 
of bodies within the context of American nationalism. Indeed, Dolmage calls Ellis Island 
“the key laboratory and operating theater for American eugenics, the scientific racism 
that can be seen to define a unique era of Western era of Western history, the effects of 
which can still be felt today” (27). These effects highlight the fears of difference and 
aberration, yet the existence of this threat is precisely what maintained the idealized 
image of the desired American citizen. 
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The existence of terms to guide and determine the recognition of aberrance or 
deviance existed only because of the standard of normalcy attributed to those closest to 
the ideal citizen. Those deemed unworthy or unable to achieve citizenship or social 
participation were cast aside, but done so in a way to exhibit what the “acceptable” 
citizens were not. This is not unlike the logics of a freak show, wherein those deemed 
different or undesirable were put on display for purposes of maintaining ideas of 
normalcy. Eli Clare writes that “the freak show tells the story of an elaborate and 
calculated social construction that utilized performance and fabrication as well as deeply 
held cultural beliefs” (86). Indeed, as evidenced by Safford’s description of the medical 
examination, the bodies of immigrants were subject to a gaze that reduced them to a 
social construction that represented cultural beliefs about the future of the country. In 
The Birth of the Clinic, Foucault writes, “the gaze is passively linked to the primary 
passivity that dedicates it to the endless task of absorbing experience in its entirety, and 
of mastering it…The gaze is no longer reductive, it is, rather, that which establishes the 
individual in his irreducible quality. And thus it becomes possible to organize a rational 
language around it” (xiv). The gaze of the doctor onto the bodies of immigrant peoples 
rendered them undesirable and unwanted. Once designated undesirable, the language of 
deviance was written onto their bodies, and once named, this medical model of deviance 
provided the rationale for the eugenicist acts initiated by eugenicist logic.  
The Ugly Laws 
One such act is the implementation of the ugly laws. From the late nineteenth 
century until the early twentieth century, laws were created in the United States that 
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barred people with “unsightly or disgusting” disabilities from public spaces on the 
grounds that their appearance was offensive and a legal liability.
5
 These laws were 
intended to prevent street begging, but also served to emphasize the desire for mutual 
identification among “productive” members of society. As Tobin Siebers writes, “the 
need for mutual identification (or desire for) between form and instance of the body 
politic accounts for the existence of the ugly laws” (264). In other words, the need to 
maintain the idea of the imagined America and American citizen meant that those 
elements that were not conducive to the improvement and strength of the nation were 
removed. In the case of the ugly laws, laws were created so as to enforce this eugenicist 
logic, namely, remove all offenders from sight.  
The motivation behind the creation of the ugly laws cannot be understood as 
purely limited to the desire for any kind of public aesthetic. Susan M. Schweik argues 
that “one of the most important foundations of the ugly law involves a specifically 
American socioeconomic determinant: the broad cultural emphasis on individualism, 
which enabled the law’s supporters to position disability and begging as individual 
problems rather than relating them to broader social inequalities” (5). This emphasis on 
individualism is indicative of the relationship between the body of the nation and the 
bodies that constitute the citizenry of that nation. The body of the American citizen 
represented the body of the nation. As Siebers writes, “the appearance of disabled bodies 
in public provokes fears that the community is itself under attack or coming apart (264). 
                                                 
5
 Most states’ ugly laws were not repealed until the mid-1970s. (Chicago was the last to repeal in 1974.)  
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Maintaining the strength and the appeal of the nation means maintaining the bodies that 
are a part of that nation.  
One particular motivation behind the creation and implementation of the ugly 
laws was the desire to recognize and remove those who were not deemed productive 
citizens in the interest of making the nation more productive. One way to achieve this 
end was to implement modes of disablement onto undesired bodies. Eric Foner writes, 
“it was an axiom of eighteenth –century political thought that dependents lacked a will 
of their own, and thus did not deserve a role in public affairs (xii). In this way, the ugly 
laws were a product of the sociological context that associated accessibility to 
independence and labor with productivity and citizenship, effectually stripping citizen 
rights from those without that access. In this way, disablement occurs within eugenicist 
logic as a way to control and monitor those bodies that were unwanted by limiting and 
removing access to public life and resources.  
Consequently, the people who were barred from this access were blamed for their 
own disablement. Indeed, part of what motivates these eugenicist systems is the ability 
for those in positions of power to mask the level of their involvement through “charity.” 
The first ugly law on record is an 1867 law passed by the city of San Francisco, titled 
“Order No. 783. To Prohibit Street Begging, and to Restrain Certain Persons from 
Appearing in Streets and Public Places.” The law opens up with the express restriction 
against any kind of practice of or related to begging in public places. Section 2 of the 
law continues this restriction, further describing what might constitute “mendicancy or 
begging”: “if it shall appear that such person is without means of support, and infirm and 
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physically unable to earn a support or livelihood, or is, for any cause, a proper person to 
be maintained at the Almshouse, the fine and imprisonment provided for in the 
preceding section may be omitted, and such person may be committed to the 
Almshouse.” In this context, appearing to not have means of support is just as illegal as 
being physically unable to work or support oneself. If, however, one is considered a 
“proper person to be maintained at the Almshouse,” then appropriate action would be 
taken, that is, the offender would be committed to an Almshouse. Snyder and Mitchell 
argue that charity organizations, such as Almshouses, existed to ensure that the needs of 
those who would benefit from these organizations “could be met with stern disapproval, 
moral disapprobation, and patronizing religious instruction,” while simultaneously 
providing “a public benefit in recognizing individual contribution as a sign of 
beneficence, generosity, and commitment to capitalist values of self-reliance” (41). In 
other words, these charity organizations that bound offenders of this law operated under 
the same eugenicist logic that the law reflected. Once removed from public viewing, 
charity functioned as a “rehabilitative” service, designed not to rehabilitate, but to 
reinforce people’s position as the threat to the healthy functioning of society. In this 
way, eugenicist logic – such as the law – determines who is a threat, and freak show 
logic holds these bodies up to provide satisfaction to those attempting to rehabilitate. In 
other words, within this ritual, “’disability’ itself becomes a matter of performative 
interdependency as disabled bodies are made to appear unduly dependent and donors 
further solidify their own social value as able benefactors” (41). Those who are a benefit 
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to society attain this designation by making themselves distinct from those who are 
considered a risk.  
The law continues, outlining in detail just what kind of person constitutes a risk. 
It reads, “any person who is diseased, maimed, mutilated, or in any way deformed so as 
to be an unsightly or disgusting object, or an improper person to be allowed in or on the 
streets, highways, thoroughfares or public places in the City or County of San Francisco, 
shall not therein or thereon expose himself or herself to public view.” It is important to 
understand that these terms – diseased, maimed, mutilated, deformed, disgusting – were 
highly subjective and indicative of the desired outcome of these laws.  
Each adjective used to describe the unwanted beggar on the street are words 
written onto the bodies those deemed undesirable. Yet each word also holds multiple 
meanings. Diseased is a particularly interesting word choice, given that the conditions 
these laws attempted to prevent were often understood in terms of the body, rendering 
these undesirable bodies as the disease of the nation, not simply a symptom or 
consequence of a larger “disease,” namely the harmful conditions crafted by the systems 
of power against aberrant bodies.
6
 Maimed is also an interesting choice of word, given 
                                                 
6
 It is interesting to note that Aimé Césaire’s Discourse on Colonialism refers to nations that colonize 
bodies, or nations that justify colonization (and by extension, force), “is already a sick civilization, a 
civilization which is morally diseased, which irresistibly, progressing from one consequence to another, 
one denial to another, calls for its Hitler, I mean its punishment” (39). Colonizers are barbaric for their 
treatment of those in the colonies, defining the relationship between the colonizer and the colonized as one 
based on “forced labor, intimidation, pressure, the police, taxation, theft, rape, compulsory crops, 
contempt, mistrust, arrogance, self-complacency, swinishness, brainless elites, degraded masses” (42). 
While claiming to civilize the colonies and its peoples, colonization produces the opposite effect. I do not 
mean to suggest that the experiences of victims of colonization are tantamount to the experiences of those 
with disabilities during this time period of the ugly laws; rather, that the ways in which attempts to control 
bodies in the name of “civilization” are constructed in similar ways, ways that attempt to disable bodies 
through the use of constructions of able-bodiedness (labor), and the ways those constructions are forced 
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the fact that “maimed” is used to refer to the deprivation of the use of a part of the body; 
in other words, “maimed” is used to invoke impairment, disability, and more 
significantly, disablement. The example of the wounded veteran proves that the 
usefulness of the body was subjective, as a veteran’s body is always esteemed because it 
was risked in the name of nationalism and patriotism, yet any other body designated as 
“useless” consequently becomes maimed by systems of disablement. Mutilated also 
invokes a similar use, making imperfect by damaging parts of the body. Deformed 
threatens to alter a form, specifically with regard to aesthetics, and disgusting refers to 
the offense of moral sense or good taste. Putting these words together achieved a 
constructed context that did not define the unwanted body, but rather created it. The 
body that must be removed from public view and participation is the body that is 
abnormal and harmful, deprived of usefulness, damaged, aesthetically abnormal, and 
repulsive. Significantly, these words and concepts can also be understood as 
manifestations of the fears of the nation, that is, becoming abnormal, useless, diseased, 
etc. But by putting this language onto bodies, language – such as the law – can control 
them. In this way, language is creating the “freak” within the context of freak show 
logics, that is, creating the standard upon which normality is held against. This standard 
is deliberately vague because it is dependent on multiple meanings, rendering it as 
always in flux and existing to serve the imaginary ideas of normalcy. Within this context 
                                                                                                                                                
onto the body (intimidation, pressure, police, taxation, arrogance, degradation).  It is also interesting to 
note Césaire’s reference to Hitler, suggesting that the violence condoned under Nazi policies was violence 
that was previously enacted through colonial procedures onto the bodies of non-white populations (36). 
The implication in the context of my argument is that colonization and disablement are of the same 
eugenicist logic, enacted similarly, but justified through the same means, that is, through the rhetoric of 
progress, health, and charity.   
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of abnormal, harmful, useless, and repulsive, the able body emerges – one that is normal, 
safe, useful, and appealing. Once a body is designated as anything but able, they become 
disabled by systems of power and are often unable to exist outside of these labels written 
onto bodies.
7
  
The logic behind the ugly laws is influenced by eugenicist logic and the logic of 
freakdom. It posits that by constantly shifting the norm and the levels of acceptability, 
bodies become subjected to higher standards, and those bodies that cannot “keep up” are 
subjected to processes of removal and restriction, so as not to reveal the constructedness 
of “normalcy.” It is also this logic that the United States eugenicist movement shared 
with the same movement in Nazi Germany. Stefan Kühl argues that American 
immigration laws were of particular interest to Nazi policy makers, specifically the ways 
in which laws designated and restricted participation of unwanted peoples (38). 
American sterilization laws were also of particular interest, as eugenicists in the United 
States and Germany supported calls for sterilization by relying on scientific evidence 
                                                 
7
 It is important to remember that the existence of the ugly laws is not one that can be or should be 
restricted to disability history. Rosemarie Garland-Thomson suggests that the ugly laws maintained 
control over not only the “unsightly” citizens, but also controlled the etiquette that characterized 
“civilized” society. In other words, the laws attempted to create a space where this etiquette would not be 
threatened. She writes, “while these laws try to limit the nuisance of beggars, a stronger concern seems to 
be rid public places of people who will incite staring…[it is] less about the act of begging than the act of 
viewing, [as] the law does not forbid giving them money; it forbids looking at them […] like anti-
prostitution laws, ugly laws are intended to save us from ourselves” (72-3). The laws were created as a 
way to control those members of society that did not perform either the aesthetic or physical performances 
that were required for a “civilized” nation. It was a way to control group behavior of the underclass. 
Schweik argues that “what the ordinance embodied was disability oppression deployed and embedded, 
ideologically and structurally, in classed, capitalist (and also gendered and racialized) social relations. 
Here ‘disability history’ and ‘poor people’s history’ profoundly intertwine” (16). It is in this way that 
disability and class became virtually synonymous with one another: the ugly laws constructed disability as 
an indicator of class by making disease, deformity, and other forms of “unsightliness” as inherent 
characteristics of the poor person. 
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that discouraged and intended to halt the reproduction of “degenerates.” The United 
States was the first country to rigorously implement compulsory sterilization programs 
in the name of eugenics, targeting a variety of people, including people with intellectual, 
physical, and psychological disabilities.
8
 California’s sterilization program, for example, 
was responsible for over a third of all sterilization operations, and served as a guide for 
the conception of large-scale compulsory sterilization programs in Nazi Germany.  
One of the many ways language was used in the ugly laws was to determine what 
was wanted by laying out what was feared: the fears of what the nation might become 
were turned into metaphors that relied on the metaphor of the nation as a body. 
Eugenicist logic created unwanted bodies that became “diseases” that threatened the 
health of the nation, and this same logic created the laws that served as “medicine” that 
would cure society of what ailed it. The interaction between all of these metaphors 
created the able body, that is, the body that is welcome and wanted, and thus able to 
participate in society. From this interaction emerged a new way of understanding and 
recognizing difference in the name of solidifying sameness. The context of the ugly law 
is driven by the eugenicist logic of language, which guides the multiplicity of meanings 
by discouraging the production of those meanings that would be deemed undesirable: 
The nation is only understood as under threat, and bodies that are unwanted are only 
understood as the cause for that threat. For example, disabled veterans were not affected 
by ugly laws the same way others were. According to Schweik, penmanship contests 
                                                 
8
 Again, these were by no means the only victims of forced sterilization. Many people of color, including 
Native Americans and African Americans, were sterilized against their will.  
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were held in San Francisco, giving wounded veterans the opportunity to demonstrate that 
they were still productive and fit for social participation. Schweik continues: “a 
hierarchy of disabled street masculinity developed. Proven veterans, maimed soldiers 
and sailors, got the frayed red carpet in the form of free license to eke out subsistence in 
the street culture. Men whose impairments prevented or did not result from military 
service got treated like dirt” (150). Just like in the language of the law, determining the 
veteran exemption depended on the manipulation of the multiplicity of meanings within 
the given context. Language is used to create the context upon which the multiplicity of 
meanings are limited: diseased, maimed, mutilated, deformed, disgusting bodies cannot 
ever be healthy, beautiful, appealing, or useful. The example of the disabled veteran 
proves this: it was only outside of these laws and this language that disabled veterans 
were able to participate in society, but this participation was dependent on the ability to 
prove that one was, in fact a veteran, and by extension, a vital part of the nation’s health.  
In many ways, Nazi legislation mirrored that of American legislation. Both had 
similar goals – to disable bodies through restriction and limited participation, and to 
remove those bodies from view. Both the ugly laws and Nazi legislation depended on the 
multiplicity of meaning within language; for example, there is no written evidence that 
legalized the extermination of peoples under Nazi rule. What differs in them is that the 
ugly laws practiced eugenicist reasoning through language: the use of metaphor created 
a specific context that limited unwanted meanings – such as the idea that the fact that a 
“disgusting” body could simultaneously be an able body. Nazi legislation, alternatively, 
relied on this reasoning in order to enact eugenicist practices. The ugly laws produced 
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unwanted bodies through language formed from eugenicist logic, and Nazi legislation 
used that language and logic to rationalize the extermination of unwanted bodies.  
The Rhetorical Performance of Nazi Eugenics 
To demonstrate this relationship, I will draw on the English translation of Dr. 
Viktor Brack’s affidavit during the Doctors’ trial of the Nuremburg Military Tribunals in 
1946, where he describes the basic process of the Nazi euthanasia program, Aktion T4. 
Furthermore, I will also draw on Suzanne E. Evans’ rendering of the form letters sent to 
the families of the victims, constructed  from the testimonies during the same trial. 
The T4 program, organized by Brack and developed out of the Nazi party policy 
of “racial hygene,“ responded to the belief that certain groups of individuals were 
“racially unsound,” and needed to be “cleansed” from the nation. The T4 program was 
designed to euthanize people who were incurably ill, emotionally distraught, elderly, or 
who had a physical or mental disability. While the program was officially discontinued 
in 1941, killings covertly continued until the military defeat of Nazi Germany in 1945. 
The program targeted institutionalized people with disabilities, children and adults alike. 
IBM’s English translation of Brack’s testimony is one of the first accounts of eugenicist 
practices in Nazi Germany that the American public were confronted with, and as a 
result, largely shaped American understandings of how eugenics was implemented 
during the Nazi regime (Black, 421)
9. As such, Brack’s testimony is crucial to 
                                                 
9
 For more information about IBM’s involvement, see Edwin Black’s IBM and the Holocaust: The 
Strategic Alliance Between Nazi Germany and America’s Most Powerful Corporation. 
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understanding America’s relationship to eugenicist practices in Nazi Europe and 
elsewhere. 
Brack outlines the structure of the program, beginning with its initiation in the 
summer of 1939. The directors of all insane asylums under the Reich were required to 
complete questionnaires regarding the health of the patients in the asylums. These 
questionnaires would be sent to a group of 10 to 15 “expert” doctors who commented 
whether or not they believed the patient was capable of recovery or rehabilitation. The 
comments were sent on to a senior expert, who ultimately decided if the patient could 
remain at the asylum – and thus have a chance at recovery – or if the patient was 
“incurable” and should be sent to an “observation institution.” Once at the observation 
institution, patients were observed by doctors to confirm the opinion of the senior expert. 
Upon confirmation, patients were transferred to one of six Euthanasia Institutions, where 
they would be gassed. 
Brack states that the overall reason for the Euthanasia program in Germany was, 
according to Hitler, to determine who and what was best for the Reich and remove those 
who were deemed useless. People confined to insane asylums and similar institutions 
“were considered useless objects, and Hitler felt that by exterminating these so-called 
useless eaters, it would be possible to relieve more doctors, male and female nurses, and 
other personnel, hospital beds and other facilities for the armed forces” (844). In this 
context, bodies that were able to perform ability – that is, as soldiers or workers – were 
bodies that were best for the development of the Reich. Bodies that were “useless 
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objects” were only a distraction, and limited the care of injured soldiers that would 
presumably gain a full recovery.  
Indeed, Brack’s testimony shows a distinction between those who were of no use 
to the Reich and those who were confined to insane asylums and similar institutions: not 
all “useless” citizens were in asylums, and not patients in asylums were considered a lost 
cause. This distinction points to the process of disablement that was placed onto 
unwanted bodies. In this case, bodies that were unable to perform ability and therefore 
unhelpful to the cause of the Reich were dis/abled from the public. Because those who 
were considered to be “incurable” would be removed, the asylum became a place of 
diagnosis, resulting in either recovery or death. Regarding asylums in the United States, 
Snyder and Mitchell argue that institutions as a whole accomplish three objectives: 
erasing disabled citizens from public view under the protection of the government, 
reifying stigmatizing beliefs about disability by preventing the public from becoming 
familiar with differences that might mitigate the construction of disability as alien, and 
lastly, they pose as “safe, humane places for the ‘treatment’ of disabilities while 
operating essentially as research warehouses” (91). In this way, the process of deciding 
which patients would remain and recover in the asylum and which patients would be 
removed largely depended on the status of the patient against Snyder and Mitchell’s 
three objectives of the asylum: if the patient was “incurable” and therefore useless to the 
German public, then s/he needed to be erased from public view under the rationale of a 
“safe,” “humane” treatment of disability, called a “mercy killing.”  
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“Mercy killings” were only given to non-Jewish German citizens, thereby 
positioning each act of euthanasia and each practice of eugenics as matter of national 
philanthropic regard. Brack states that “the blessing of euthanasia should be granted only 
to Germans…the government did not want to grant this philanthropic act to the Jews” 
(880). By positioning the patients as victims of their disabilities, the line between the 
rhetoric of care and the rhetoric of eugenics becomes blurred, allowing eugenicist acts 
against a “useless” citizen to be viewed as a “blessing.” This blessing is constructed not 
only as a blessing for the victim and his or her family, but also a blessing for the nation. 
By removing the unwanted body from public view – and the public altogether – Nazi 
eugenics created the image of the body that would be useful to German military efforts: 
a dying body, willing to be erased in the name of Nazi success.    
Nazi practices of eugenics used murder to determine what was useful by 
removing what was “useless.” The rationale to murder was the fear of what the nation 
would become with the “useless eaters” using the resources needed for the useful 
citizens, such as the military. In Nazi practices of eugenics, eugenicist logic created 
determiners for bodies that would be useless in the quest for German “superiority.” Both 
the ugly laws and Nazi eugenics determined what was wanted by clearly identifying 
what was feared with regard to the future of the nation and its citizens. These fears then 
became metaphors: for the ugly laws, unwanted bodies were “diseases” upon the “body” 
of the nation, and for Nazi eugenics, unwanted bodies became objects upon which 
“blessings” would be disseminated. In both cases, the logic that created these metaphors 
also created the answer to these metaphors through law and legislation –either the 
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removal of unwanted bodies from public view or the literal removal of bodies through 
euthanasia – serving as the “cure” for what prevented the nation from a “complete” 
recovery and identity. Furthermore, these laws are also tied to rhetorics of cure and 
medicine: in both cases, the asylum serves as the place of “cure,” either the cure for the 
public view, or the cure for the victim’s disability.  
Another example of using the rhetoric of cure as a rationale to murder is the 
condolence letters sent to the families of peoples with disabilities that were euthanized 
under the Aktion T4 program. Hugh Henry Gallagher writes,  
The original regulations envisioned a “conservative” program with 
careful review procedures. In operation the program became a matter of 
killing in wholesale lots. The psychological reasons why physicians were 
willing to participate in these killings are no doubt complex. There is, 
however, an aspect of the program’s structure which made it easier: there 
was no single point of responsibility – no place in the procedure at which 
it was possible to say, Here is where the patient receives his death 
warrant; no point where it could be said, This physician is responsible for 
this patient’s death. (103) 
In this way, according to Gallagher, “responsibility was diluted” (104). One way in 
which the origin of responsibility was avoided was through the creation and use of form 
letters, purposefully vague enough to be used for all instances of death, whether from 
natural causes or from euthanasia.  
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Once a patient had been murdered, Nazi physicians sent form letters to the 
family. Suzanne E. Evans outlines the basic structure of the condolence letters:  
As you have certainly already been informed your daughter, --- was 
transferred to our establishment by ministerial order. It is our painful duty 
to inform you that your daughter died here on --- of influenza, with an 
abscess on the lung. Unfortunately all efforts made by the medical staff to 
keep the patient alive proved in vain. We wish to express our sincere 
condolences at your loss. You will find consolation in the thought that the 
death of your daughter relieved her from terrible and incurable suffering.  
As the outline indicates, these letters gave no indication of the relationship between the 
patient’s death and the Nazi ideology that led the doctors to euthanize the patient The 
opening phrase, “as you have certainly already been informed,” suggests an immediate 
shift in responsibility from the medical establishment or institution from where the 
patient was registered to the family of the murdered patient. Yet, as Evans reminds us, 
“informed consent was in fact rarely obtained” (28). By immediately shifting focus and 
responsibility to the family, the institution that sent the letter puts the family in a 
vulnerable position. Evans writes that “when parents received official letters informing 
them of their children’s death, many of them accused the hospitals of deliberately 
causing their child’s death” (28). With such accusations, the rhetorical move to implicate 
the family in the child’s death shifts the focus away from the suspicious circumstances 
presented in the letter. Furthermore, there is also the suggestion that the family is 
implicated by suggesting a lack of involvement in the child’s life would discourage the 
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family from calling attention to the child’s death and their limited participation in the 
child’s life. 
Distancing from any involvement in the child’s death also occurs when the 
child’s transfer is referred to as an action by “ministerial order.”  Again, the institution is 
distancing itself from any involvement or responsibility of the child’s presence at the 
institution. In doing so, the institution is also involving the state and nationalistic 
ideologies. By using the word “ministerial,” Evan’s outline suggests that the institution 
implies that the child’s transfer was, in the opinion of the state, the best thing for the 
child. Furthermore, the parental distance is also implicit here: if the ministry is making 
decisions for the child, then the implication is that the child is a ward of the state, and 
any decisions made for the child – including those that the parents believe are behind the 
child’s death – are for the best. This is the only political mention in this letter, but it is a 
significant one: the subtext of this involvement is that the state knows what is best for 
the child’s welfare, and by extension, the state’s. The child’s death is seen as a 
consequence of what was done in the interest of the child; however, knowing the truth, 
the child’s death is a consequence of what was done that was best for the state.  
This same line of subtext appears throughout the rest of the letter. The institution 
writes “it is our painful duty to inform you that your daughter died here on --- of 
influenza, with an abscess on the lung. Unfortunately all efforts made by the medical 
staff to keep the patient alive proved in vain.” Despite writing that this news is “painful,” 
the language that follows this news is unfeeling and contradictory: influenza and lung 
abscesses can be treated, yet the medical staff is portrayed as unable to treat the illness. 
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Furthermore, the naming of the child shifts from “your daughter” to “the patient.” This 
shift from an intimate choice of words – “your daughter” –  to a medicalized wording – 
“the patient” – creates distance from the intimacy that was established in the opening of 
the letter.    
The implications of this message may not be obvious at first look, but 
consideration of the real situation around the child – euthanasia – reveals the 
implications of the state’s benefits in this section of the outline. “You will find 
consolation in the thought that the death of your daughter relieved her from her terrible 
and incurable suffering” (28). The state – or the institution that was ultimately 
responsible for the child’s death – is telling the parents that the child’s death was a good 
thing because their daughter was a victim of “terrible and incurable suffering.” Yet, as 
noted above, the child’s ailment was indeed treatable. In light of the fact that the child 
was deemed undesirable, the “terrible and incurable suffering” is not the child’s, but in 
fact the state’s. Clause 2 of the German Ministry of Justice Commission on the Reform 
of the Criminal Code reads that “the life of a person who because of incurable mental 
illness requires permanent institutionalization and is not able to sustain an independent 
existence, will be prematurely terminated by medical measures in a painless and covert 
manner.” The similarities in language reveal the regard which they treated the child, that 
is, as incurable. As such, she was unable to “sustain an independent existence.” This 
lack of independence is at the root of ableism, wherein only productive and independent 
lives are worth living. The suffering that the institution writes about is the suffering of a 
life that the state deems is unworthy of living. Because the child’s disability or 
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impairment is not able to be cured, the child’s suffering in a world that does not want her 
is incurable in the eyes of Nazi Germany.   
Evans’ outline of the basic condolence letter used in the euthanasia program 
uncovers the unique reliance on people with disabilities by ableist societies and systems, 
demonstrating that particular values are placed on the bodies of people with disabilities 
that distinguish them from the bodies of those who have been disabled by systems – in 
the Holocaust, Jews, Gypsies, and other peoples who were murdered in the name of 
“racial cleansing” in Germany. The consequence of these letters led many to protest the 
murder of people with disabilities, protests that existed in ways that the murder of other 
peoples were not, signaling the varying relationships that culture and eugenics have with 
the bodies affected.  These letters demonstrate the “value” of persons with disabilities 
within ableist systems, and how they are based on the rhetorics of cure, constructed as 
disabled so as to make ableist systems – and the nondisabled people within that system – 
operate and function.  As such, Nazi policies attempted to disable Jews, but because 
Jews were not ever positioned as valuable to the functioning of an ableist system, they 
were eliminated. The tradition of caring and curing people with disabilities was 
compromised, making small public protests possible; anti-Semitism in Germany, 
alternatively, had become a tradition in itself, and the will to protest was vastly 
diminished. 
Sameness becomes solidified through the eugenicist logic of language and 
practice, wherein “difference” is only acceptable insofar as it contributes to the 
construction of “acceptable” and “useful.” Language and practice are used to create the 
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context upon which the multiplicity of meanings are limited: diseased, maimed, 
mutilated, deformed, disgusting bodies cannot ever be healthy, beautiful, appealing, or 
useful. The logic behind the ugly laws and Nazi eugenics are influenced by eugenicist 
logic and the logic of freakdom, positing that by constantly shifting the norm and the 
levels of acceptability, bodies become subjected to higher standards. Those bodies that 
cannot “keep up” are subjected to processes of removal and restriction, so as not to 
reveal the constructedness of “normalcy.”  
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have argued that the process of enfreakment – identifying what 
is not wanted in order to recognize and affirm what is wanted – is an integral part of 
eugenics and eugenicist logic in both linguistic form and in practice. The use of language 
to construct context emerges as one way that control over bodies is achieved. Such 
policing perpetuated systems that depended on freak show logics—or enfreakment – in 
order to perform eugenicist acts. To determine who was the “correct” and “acceptable” 
citizen, people with disabilities – including, among others, Indigenous, eastern 
European, southern European, African, and Jewish peoples – were set aside and removed 
from the rhetorical spaces that created “normalcy.”  
I have demonstrated that origins are just as dependent on eugenicist thought, 
most visibly in contexts that are attempting to be controlled, as in the case of Francis 
Galton. By displacing the responsibility from Greek and other European thinkers, the 
emphasis on Francis Galton as the originator of eugenics suggests that eugenics was 
never harmful until the Nazis, and that Galton’s version of eugenics – the correct 
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version, and the version that was soiled by eugenicist movements such as Nazism – only 
sought to help humanity progress in the best way possible. Yet, as I have argued, this 
was not the case, as this eugenicist logic led to official genocidal policies, and played an 
essential role in the acts of “racial hygiene” in the United States and under Nazi rule. I 
do not intend to suggest that the logics of enfreakment or eugenics were the only 
motivators behind acts against “unwanted” bodies; rather, as my analysis has shown, 
recognizing one of the relationships between eugenics, language, and enfreakment, can 
open up new ways of thinking about we understand “normalcy” and our own 
relationship to it. In the chapter that follows, I will examine this idea of “normalcy” and 
eugenics further, specifically the ways that eugenicist contexts create and rely on 
concepts of “abnormalty” and disablement in order to sustain ideas of “normal.”  
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CHAPTER III 
THE RHETORICAL CONSTRUCTIONS AND RECONSTRUCTIONS OF ANNE 
FRANK 
 
In the previous chapter, I demonstrated one type of eugenicist logic that was used 
in the United States and picked up by German lawmakers in the early stages of Nazi 
power. Considering eugenicist logic in this way suggests that similar ways language 
used in the United States and Nazi power structures allowed for and led to eugenics in 
practice under Nazi legislation. The reliance on the concepts of disability and 
disablement also emerged as integral to this eugenicist logic. This chapter will expand 
on such reliance through an examination of the disablement and the function of disability 
with regard to representations of the Holocaust in the United States, specifically those 
representations of Anne Frank.  
Drawing on various representations of Anne Frank in multimedia(ted) forms in 
the United States as an example,  this chapter will interrogate what happens after the 
eugenicist logics used to eliminate begins to remove the rhetorics that initially served to 
create and perpetuate them. Eugenicist systems continually rebuild through the process 
of enfreakment, creating a new definition of “freak” through the revised determination of 
“abnormal” or “undesirable.” This chapter will argue that the process from enfreakment 
to eugenics is often reversed in order to sustain itself, refiguring elements – specifically 
the body – into a “freak,” a required element in the process of enfreakment and eugenics.  
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Ableist systems rely on the disabling of bodies – either through the medical 
industry or societial norms – in order to establish what ability and normality are not. 
Nazi policies disabled the bodies of who was not wanted. Such disabling occurred first 
in the visible marking of those bodies – the yellow star – and continued until bodies 
were physically unable to engage in certain spaces, from the segregated areas of 
communities to concentration camps. Anne Frank was disabled by those systems that 
forced her to go into hiding, and the images of her that continues to thrive are 
compromised by those same systems. Anne Frank has come to serve as a symbol of the 
horror that eugenicist logics produce. To construct Frank in this way, however, requires 
a manipulation of context dependent on eugenicist logic. Frank’s image is deployed as a 
representation of the effects of eugenics – victimhood – but it is also used to suggest that 
the end result of this eugenicist logic is positive: she may have died, but her death 
functions as a way for people who are unaffected by her fate to “get something” from it. 
Thus to ensure the survival of eugenics and eugenicist logic as positive, this chapter 
argues that Frank is consistently disabled in representation, that is, represented using the 
same logics of representing disability, as laid out by Rosemarie Garland-Thomson: the 
wondrous, sentimental, exotic, and realistic (58). This disabled representation of Frank 
serves the “repaired” system of eugenicist logic by encouraging audiences to expect 
something positive from Frank, such as inspiration, sentimentality, fear, or a lesson 
about strength and humanity. To achieve this positivity, Frank’s agency as a rhetorician 
and writer who was intentionally using her diary as an act of resistance, and who 
consciously revised her writing imagining that it would be published, is minimized and 
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erased. She becomes constructed to serve a different version of the eugenicist logics that 
first forced her to go into hiding, and her diary becomes “authentic” insofar as its status 
as the diary of a "young girl," despite the fact that she was a young woman at the time of 
its writing. The idea that eugenics yields consistently positive results, despite the real 
deaths that occur to reach those results, allows eugenics to evolve into different versions 
and appearances so they may function and have a consistent presence in the way we 
consider bodies, disability, and “health” of society.  
Eugenics in Post-War America 
As I have demonstrated in the previous chapter, the relationship between 
eugenics in the United States closely resembled the eugenics movements in Germany 
under Nazi power. The United States was considered a leader in the international arena 
of eugenics, having established several centers dedicated to the research of genealogical 
material. The Heredity Commission was established in 1906 by Willet M. Hayes, the 
Assistant Secretary of Agriculture and president and founder of the American Breeders’ 
Association. Charles Davenport and Harry Laughlin, significant contributors to the field 
of eugenics in the United States, founded the Eugenics Record Office (ERO) in 1910.
10
 
Additionally, sterilization laws were thriving in the United States. These laws all shared 
the aim to improve “the race,” some through compulsory sterilization and others through 
                                                 
10
 It is interesting to note that the ERO was primarily funded by the Rockefeller family and later the 
Carnegie Institution. Additionally, when the ERO closed in 1944, the records were transferred to the 
Charles Fremont Dight Institute for the Promotion of Human Genetics at the University of Minnesota. The 
Dight Institute closed in 1991, and the genealogical material was filmed by the Genealogical Society of 
Utah and given to the Center for Human Genetics. The remaining material was given to the American 
Philosophical Society Library.  
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limited marriage rights for those categorized as socially inadequate (Bruinius). 
Furthermore, many international committees were created under the direction of the 
ERO, including the Committee on Inheritance of Mental Traits, the Committee on 
Heredity of Deafmutisim (led by Alexander Graham Bell), the Committee on 
Sterilization, and the Committee on the Heredity of the Feeble Minded. What emerges 
here is a distinct relationship between eugenics, ableism, and disablement, three 
concepts that are, in actually, not entirely distinct from one another. What makes them 
distinct in this context is the ways in which these concepts interact with one another 
within specific situations. In most cases within the United States, eugenics offers a way 
of progressing towards a desired outcome by way of identifying what is undesirable, 
ableism deems useless elements as unworthy, and disablement offers the process of 
eliminating those elements. Nazi eugenics, similarly, provides the rationale for ableism 
(prejudice against “socially unacceptable” persons), and disablement is the process that 
provides the grounds for the extermination of those bodies.  
This is not to suggest that eugenicist movements in the United States and in 
Germany were entirely distinct from one another. On the contrary, both movements were 
vital to the creation and sustainability of one another. Indeed, the relationship between 
American eugenicists and German eugenicists thrived under the international eugenics 
movement, fostered by three International Eugenics Congresses between 1912 and 1932. 
Eugenicists – including scientists, politicians, and social leaders – met to address the 
application of programs that would assist in the improvement of human heredity. The 
American exhibit in the First International Eugenics Congress in 1912, sponsored by the 
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American Breeders’ Association, featured a demonstration that included incidence 
reports of hereditary defects, American sterilization laws, and ultimately argued that 
compulsory sterilization was the practical application of the principle of evolution. 
United States presence dominated the second Congress in 1921 – Bruinius notes that 41 
of 53 scientific papers were affiliated with the United States, with Henry Fairfiled 
Osborn presiding and Alexander Graham Bell as the honorary president. Even the 
United States Department of State was responsible for sending invitations around the 
world. Here, Charles Darwin’s son, Leonard Darwin, advocated eugenic measures that 
would lead to the “elimination of the unfit,” and the discouragement of “ill-endowed” 
families (252). In 1927, Charles Davenport founded the International Federation of 
Eugenics Organizations (IFEO), with Eugen Fischer, director of the Kaiser Wilhelm 
Institute of Anthropology, Human Heredity, and Eugenics in Germany, and was 
appointed by Davenport as chairman of the Commission on Bastardization and 
Miscegenation in the IFEO. Thus by the third and final Congress in 1932, American and 
German eugenicist ideas – along with other forms of eugenicist ideas from around the 
world – shared similar elements, and represented a progression of ideas that would lead 
to another form of eugenics, that of extermination. Sheila Faith Weiss found that in 
correspondence between Davenport and German eugenicist Fritz Lenz, Davenport wrote, 
“there is no country which has higher ideals [in respect to eugenics] than Germany and 
we assume that she will assume a leading position at the next congress” (in Weiss, 45). 
After Hitler’s rise to power in Germany, the Nazi government implemented eugenic acts 
and measures according to the recommendations made by American eugenicists 
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Davenport and Laughlin in the three prior Congresses, which would later be modified by 
Ernst Rüdin.
11
  Indeed, in its propaganda, the Nazi government pointed to related steps 
and acts to the leadership that had been provided by the United States.   
Yet after the war, American eugenicists publically distanced themselves from 
any involvement or similarities with Nazi policies of racial hygiene. Stefan Kühl writes, 
“after 1945 American eugenicists tried to portray their relationship to Nazi Germany as 
distant and critical. The leadership of the American Eugenics Society falsely asserted 
that the Society had opposed Nazi race policies” (xiv). Furthermore, many authors, 
including Christian Pross and Robert Proctor, highlight the argument that the mass 
killings of people with disabilities and the medical experiments in concentration camps 
as wholly distinct from “genuine eugenics.”12 It is this imaginary binary of “harmless 
eugenics” versus Nazi eugenics that informs the American response to the Holocaust this 
project is most concerned with. William J. Bosch writes,  
If the American public thought that few of the enemy should be punished 
severely as war criminals, they were united in what they thought the 
                                                 
11
 Davenport maintained his relationships with various Nazi institutions and publications, including 
editorial positions at two German journals (Bruinius 23). He did not approve of the Nazi government, 
however, citing that Joseph Goebbels’ leadership was dangerous on account of his disability: ”Why not 
look up history to see how dangerous is the ambitious, mentally well-endowed, physical cripple, whether 
the crippling was congenital or acquired? From Tamerlane (Timur the lame) to Goebbels (the clubfooted), 
physical cripples, genial, gentlehearted, charitable men…have led revolutions and aspired to dictatorships 
while burdening their country with heavy taxes and reducing its finances to chaos. The physically 
defective man tends to compensate for his defect by doing great and striking (even though appallingly 
dangerous) nonphysical things that lead to full satisfaction of his, in other directions thwarted, ambition” 
(Davenport, Charles. Letter. Life Magazine. June, 1938: 3. Print.) 
 
12
 See Robert Proctor’s Racial Hygiene: Medicine Under the Nazis and Christian Pross’ “Nazi Doctors, 
German Medicine, and Historical Truth” in The Nazi Doctors and the Nuremburg Code. 
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penalty for these few should be: “Kill them!” No judicial frills were 
desired – no legal process or possibility of escape or commutation. 
Exiling the German warlords as was done with Napoleon or Kaiser 
Wilhelm was a policy to be avoided rather than repeated. (90)  
For the majority of Americans after the war, punishment for eugenicist acts would 
follow a similar logic: remove the unwanted elements in order to attain a more 
acceptable society. While I do not mean to suggest that punishment for Nazi war 
criminals is inherently eugenicist, I do wish to acknowledge the eugenicist strains that 
lingered within responses to the Holocaust. Foucault argues in Discipline and Punish 
argues that punishment is ceremonial, intended to emphasize the place of authority and 
power. By drawing on observation and the gaze as instruments of power, Foucault 
demonstrates how processes of punishment based on observation and the gaze create and 
maintain ideas of normalcy (3). The overwhelming response of Americans to kill the 
Nazi perpetrators that Bosch points to is particularly interesting, given that offered 
alternatives – imprisonment, in particular – aims to deprive the individual of freedom 
with the goal of reforming the prisoner and to marginalize and control popular behavior. 
Thinking about this from a Disability Studies perspective, Foucault’s argument can be 
understood, in part, as an argument that disablement and punishment have a particular 
relationship, wherein disablement occurs so that punishment can be enacted, or that 
punishment is a form of disablement. This relationship between disablement and 
punishment is especially noteworthy in the context of American attitudes with regard to 
punishment for Nazi crimes that were based on logics first developed in the United 
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States. As I have demonstrated, American eugenicists actively distanced themselves 
from Nazi eugenicists, but the attitude of the American public is more telling because the 
logics of eugenics were so embedded into the cultural understandings regarding bodily 
difference and deviance that instead of rejecting logics of eugenics, those logics were 
refigured into representations of the Holocaust.  
The Uses and Misuses of Anne Frank 
Alan Mintz suggests that the most significant aspect of understanding American 
responses to the Holocaust is “understanding how…cultural projects reflect and provoke 
American thinking and American attitudes” (149). Within the context of this project, I 
am most interested in the ways that ableism, disablement, and the logics and rhetorics of 
enfreakment and eugenics surface in American representations of the Holocaust. One of 
the first, and undoubtedly, most significant representations of the Holocaust in America 
was the adaptation of Anne Frank’s diary to stage and screen by Albert Hackett and 
Frances Goodrich in the early 1950s. Both the play and the movie (in 1955 and 1959, 
respectively), largely follows the text of the first published edition of the diary and was 
hailed by many for the universalization of Frank’s character and outlook. Indeed, a 
typical review described the play “like the diary itself…a moving document about the 
durability of the young in spirit” (Newsweek 53). The universal approach taken in these 
adaptations was a significant part of the success of the diary, the play, and the movie, but 
was harshly critiqued by those concerned with the removal of many Jewish elements 
regarding these representations of Frank, most notably from novelist Meyer Levin. This 
 74 
 
was not Levin’s initial response, however. In his 1952 New York Times book review of 
the Diary, Levin wrote, 
It is so wondrously alive, so near, that one feels overwhelmingly the 
universalities of human nature. These people might be living next door; 
their…emotions, their tensions and satisfactions are those of human 
character and growth, anywhere…This wise and wonderful young girl 
brings back a poignant delight in the infinite human spirit.    
Yet when Levin’s stage adaptation of the Diary was rejected in favor of Hackett and 
Goodrich’s rendering, he accused the accepted adaptation of presenting a “de-Judiazed” 
version of Frank’s diary.13 Peter Novick reasons that this argument “can be sustained 
only be a very selective reading of both the original diary and the play,” given the fact 
that Frank does not emphasize a Jewish identity in her diary, and consequently, in the 
stage and screen adaptations (119). As a result, it is argued by many, including James E. 
Young, that the adaptations of Frank’s diary were never universalized, as the Diary itself 
is already constructed as universal: “Even though she felt the sufferings of millions, in 
the context of her assimilated world view, it seems to have been as an extremely 
sensitive and intelligent member of the human community, and not as one who identified 
herself as part of a collective Jewish tragedy” (27-28). This distance between Frank and 
                                                 
13
 Anne’s father, Otto Frank, was ultimately in charge of which adaptation would be accepted. Once 
Levin’s was rejected, he wrote Frank saying that he was “disgusted and enraged at the thought that a non-
Jew had been selected to write the play….To have it produced by a Gentile…is scandalous beyond 
measure. I will not stand for this. I will write about it whenever I can” (Meyer Levin to Otto Frank, 25 
December 1952, quoted in Lawrence Graver, An Obsession with Anne Frank: Meyer Levin and the Diary 
(89)).  
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her Jewish identity is part of the process that enfreaks Frank within the context of 
American Holocaust representation.  
Because ableist systems rely on normalization, and by extension, abnormality, 
once the ableist systems that contributed to the disablement of peoples during the 
Holocaust were challenged, a new “normal” was established. Novick argues that “every 
generation frames the Holocaust, represents the Holocaust, in ways that suit its mood” 
(120). Anne Frank’s image serves as a rhetoric of the “new normal,” demonstrating the 
continual constructedness of “normal” and “abnormal” in an effort to represent the 
“mood” of the systems of power that manipulate these images. One way we can 
understand how Frank’s image serves as the “face of the Holocaust” is to consider her 
distance from her identity as a Jewish person, a distance that is emphasized and 
manipulated back into the ableist systems that rely on logics of enfreakment . Ableist 
systems require the presence of “normal” and “abnormal” elements; when these 
designations are unclear or no longer hold up, the system fails. To “repair” the ableist 
system, then, requires the re-designation of what is “normal” and “abnormal.” In this 
context, logics of enfreakment originally put Frank into the position of “abnormal” to 
serve as an example of what desired peoples were not. After her death, she is put back 
into the position of “abnormal” to demonstrate what the audience is and what she is not: 
safe from the racial persecution against “unwanted” bodies.  As a result, she becomes 
“universalized” so that her image can be manipulated to fit into various contexts in order 
to achieve the desired message related to the Holocaust.  
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Judith E. Doneson argues that the attempt to universalize and Americanize the 
Holocaust resulted in the positioning of the Holocaust as “a basis for comparison for all 
persecution and tragedy. The Holocaust as a verbal symbol for suffering was entering 
into the popular imagination, becoming part of the vernacular of tragedy” (125). As 
such, representations of the Holocaust, including representations of Anne Frank, 
function as a way to serve one of the American “lessons” of the Holocaust, namely what 
Minz describes as “a lesson about man’s inhumanity to man that should instruct us about 
hatred and intolerance in all walks of life and in relations among all groups” (35). 
Indeed, Otto Frank’s mission statement of the Anne Frank Foundation reads, “through 
her diary, Anne Frank has become a worldwide symbol representing all victims of 
racism, anti-Semitism and fascism. The foremost message contained in her diary sets out 
to combat all forms of racism and intolerance” (Anne Frank Foundation). This insistence 
on the universalization of Anne Frank reveals the constructedness of who fits into this 
category of “universal, ” namely, as Francine Prose argues, “universal is not just an 
adjective, but in the world of commerce, a projected number, which is why universal 
would be employed, more and more frequently, as the antonym of Jewish” (184). Thus, 
in the 1950s, the primary way to confront the Holocaust via Anne Frank was to make it 
“universal” – or, as Prose suggests, not Jewish. Ultimately the lesson that becomes 
associated with Frank’s diary becomes less about hatred and intolerance, but rather the 
constructions of those very lessons on hatred and intolerance. In this way, Frank was 
accessible to most American audiences because she’s recognizable enough that the 
audience may identify with her, but different enough that the audience does not 
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apparently risk the same fate. She is only different enough to emphasize that despite 
what the audience has in common with her, they are not her. As a result, Bruno 
Bettelheim writes, “while [the image of Frank] confronts us with the fact that Auschwitz 
existed, it encourages us at the same time to ignore any of its implications. If all men are 
good at heart [as Anne famously wrote], there never really was an Auschwitz; nor is 
there any possibility that it may recur” (189). Frank’s body is constructed in such a way 
that her lived material realities are overlooked in favor of an idealized image that can be 
manipulated to serve whatever message is needed in any given context. In the process, 
the material realities of those she is used to represent and inspire are also overlooked in 
the name of a “universal” approach to human relationships. Consequently, Frank comes 
to serve as a rhetorical symbol of “normal” within another ableist system, a system 
refigured in response to the eugenicist logic that threatened to destroy it. Frank becomes 
a symbol designed to define humanity, transgressions against humanity, and the response 
to these transgressions within eugenicist terms, namely, those terms that define 
“humanity” and the “transgressions” against humanity. 
Anne Frank, the Inspirer 
As with all versions of “normal,” new versions of “abnormal” are created in the 
name of supporting and perpetuating the new norm. Writing about representations of 
disability in photography, Rosemarie Garland Thomson argues that images of disabled 
bodies are used to create arguments in favor of the superiority of “able” bodies. She 
writes, “visualizations of disabled people act as powerful rhetorical figures that elicit 
responses or persuade viewers to think or act in certain ways” (58). Images and 
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representations of Frank have been used similarly, deployed rhetorically to elicit desired 
responses within their respective contexts, specifically the ways in which these images 
have been manipulated to serve versions of “normal.” For this project, I am interested in 
representations of Frank as a victim of disablement, and the ways that disability 
functions within these representations of the Holocaust in the United States. 
Turning to Garland-Thomson’s evaluation of disability in photographs 
demonstrates the ways in which representations of Frank have been affected by and are 
products of disablement. Garland-Thomson identifies four primary visual rhetorics of 
disability, arguing that “none of these rhetorical modes operates in the service of actual 
disabled people,” she argues. “Indeed, almost all of them appropriate the disabled body 
for the purposes of constructing, instructing, or assuring some aspect of a putatively 
nondisabled viewer” (59). Representations of people with disabilities thus romanticize 
disability and the bodies of those that the producers of these images do not have: they 
are produced by nondisabled people for nondisabled people. Looking at more popular 
representations of Anne Frank, many of these representations fall into these categories, 
demonstrating how the process of disablement works in the service of ableist ideas, 
identifying and displaying what is undesirable or unwanted, then refiguring it to achieve 
the desired response. Similar to representations of disability, representations of Anne 
Frank are constructed by people who have no relationship or similarity to the modes of 
disablement that were put on her body.  
 Garland-Thomson calls the wondrous “the oldest mode of representing 
disability” (59). The purpose of the wondrous representation is to provoke admiration 
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and inspiration, based on the interpretation of disability or difference as marks of 
distinction, either positively or negatively. It is this mode of representation from which 
the concept of the supercrip emerges, one who inspires the viewer by “overcoming” his 
or her disability through the performance of tasks that the nondisabled audience cannot 
imagine performing themselves. Anne Frank’s image as one that evokes admiration and 
inspiration is perhaps the most recognizable, and largely emerges from the attempt to 
universalize her. In 2011, a graffiti artist on the Yale campus painted a giant stencil of 
Anne Frank on the side of a cafe with the words “Believe in People” above it. A former 
student of Yale was quoted as saying, “some people are going to see [the Anne Frank 
mural] and at a very basic level just look at the image and think it’s cool. But maybe 
they’ll keep the thought of Anne Frank in their head all day and just think about 
believing in people” (Rosenfeld).   
Indeed, Frank’s most famous words – “I still believe, in spite of everything, that 
people are truly good at heart” – are repeatedly deployed to represent her as 
“overcoming” her situation (including her disablement), in an effort to amaze and to 
inspire audiences with hope. In the English translation of the critical edition, Frank’s 
entry with this particular quote reads, 
So if you’re wondering whether it’s harder for the adults here than for the 
children, the answer is no, it’s certainly not. Older people have an opinion 
about everything and are sure of themselves and their actions. It’s twice 
as hard for us young people to hold on to our opinions at a time when 
ideals are being shattered and destroyed, when the worst side of human 
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nature predominates, when everyone has come to doubt truth, justice and 
God.  (…) 
We’re much too young to deal with these problems, but they keep 
thrusting themselves on us until finally, we’re forced to think up a 
solution, though most of the time our solutions crumble when faced with 
the facts. It’s difficult in times like these: ideals, dreams and cherished 
hopes rise within us, only to be crushed by grim reality. It’s a wonder that 
I haven’t dropped all my ideals, they seem so absurd and impractical. Yet 
I keep them, because I still believe, in spite of everything, that people are 
truly good at heart.  
It’s utterly impossible for me to build up my life on a foundation 
of chaos, suffering and death. I see the world being slowly transformed 
into a wilderness, I hear the approaching thunder that, one day, will 
destroy us too, I feel the suffering of millions. And yet, when I look up at 
the sky, I somehow feel that everything will change for the better, that 
this cruelty too will end, that peace and tranquility will return once more. 
In the meantime, I must hold on to my ideals. (July 15, 1944.) 
Frank is wondering if it is worth it – and if she is able – to uphold her beliefs and world 
view that she had before she was forced to go into hiding. She calls on this subject 
multiple times throughout the Diary, speculating what it means to be a survivor in a 
world that is attempting to eradicate her.  For the adults, she reasons, it is easier to hold 
on to deeply held beliefs and ideals, mostly because they have had a lifetime to develop 
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them and test them out in the world. For the young people in the annex, however, she 
argues that it is much more difficult to maintain any kind of belief system or world 
views because, as she observes, she is trapped in a system that is designed to, and exists 
through, the eradication of unwanted beliefs and ideals. Frank recognizes that she is 
marked as the unwanted and unhealthy element that is preventing the nation from 
progressing into something stronger and healthier. Because she resists this, her 
developing world view is consistently challenged by what she sees in the world, namely, 
“the worst side of human nature.” The “grim reality” that she faces every day tells her 
that she should succumb to the position she’s been relegated to, a reality that she takes 
very seriously: she writes that she feels the suffering of millions, and counts herself 
among those that will be destroyed by the “approaching thunder” that is turning the 
world into a wasteland.  
Thus, when Frank writes that she holds onto her ideals because she believes that 
people are truly good at heart, she is relying on the belief in the goodness of humanity as 
a means to maintain her sense of self. By clinging to these ideals while simultaneously 
critiquing the world from which they emerged, Frank is acknowledging the 
constructedness of the systems that are attempting to destroy her, not the people. This is 
one of the beliefs that Frank feels she must cling to so she may survive: remembering the 
difference between systems and the people who work within those systems. This is not 
to suggest that Frank had any particular regard for people working within the systems, 
but it is to highlight Frank’s sophisticated understanding of what was happening outside 
the annex. Thus this famous line is not, despite the continued use of it, originally 
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intended to suggest anything about overcoming the hatred of the Nazi systems that 
threatened her, but how to survive that hatred without compromising herself or her 
beliefs. The distinction I aim to make here is that if we understand this moment as Frank 
overcoming her situation, we risk understanding Frank as adjusting the situation to fit 
her body. To explain, Garland-Thomson writes of the wondrous representation as 
inflected with sentimentality,  
producing the convention of the courageous overcomer, contemporary 
America’s favorite figure of disability. Even though armless calligraphers 
are no longer an acceptable form of middle-class entertainment, photos of 
disabled people who have adapted tasks to fit their bodies still ask the 
viewers to feel a sense of wonder. (…) By making disabled subjects 
masters of ordinary activities such as climbing rocks, drinking tea, or 
using hammers, these photos create a visual context that elicits adulation 
for their accomplishing what the normalized viewer takes to be a 
superhuman feat. (62-63) 
Constructing disabled subjects as wondrous relies on the focus of tasks adapted to 
accommodate different bodies in such a way that audiences are expected to respond with 
wonder. One example Garland-Thomson provides is a photograph of a Habitat for 
Humanity volunteer that centers on his fingerless hands holding the hammer. The task 
here is the use of the hammer – he adapts it to fit his body so that instead of gripping the 
hammer with his fingers (as it is designed), he's gripping it with his palms. Inspired by 
witnessing an extraordinary body doing an ordinary task, the viewer is moved to 
 83 
 
consider the disabled subject as superhuman, alienating the viewer from viewed, thereby 
diminishing the similarity between the two that equality requires (61). Thus the 
wondrous representation aims to focus the adaption of tasks and ways those tasks are 
accomplished to accommodate bodies. 
In the original context of Frank’s famous words, she is musing about how to hold 
on to herself and her humanity within the systems of power that attempt to dehumanize 
her. She concludes that she must believe that people are good at heart – in other words, 
to hold on to her humanity, she must believe and hold on to the humanity of everyone 
else. Yet in the service of the wondrous or inspirational representation of her and her 
words, the original context of this line is removed and reconstructed in order to achieve 
the desired outcome.  This is most clearly seen in the way that Frank’s musings turn into 
a task that can be achieved or “overcome”: trying to retain her ideals and her humanity 
becomes an inspirational task for those removed from a context with any resemblance to 
her. If Frank’s “task” is to retain her humanity via the maintenance of her ideals that 
remind her to always acknowledge the humanity of others, then her adaptation of that 
task to fit her body is to compromise herself and her ideals to continue to survive; she 
accepts, unwaveringly, that all men are good at heart, without the original context of her 
complicating that particular ideal. To return to Bruno Bettleheim’s observation, “if all 
men are good at heart, there never really was an Auschwitz; nor is there any possibility 
that it may recur.” Ultimately, the rendering of Frank’s words as inspirational 
necessarily alters her ideals into beliefs that allow her to appear inspirational. The 
foundation of chaos, suffering and death that Frank knew she had to avoid becomes a 
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reality in these representations, making her appear inspirational because she “overcame” 
the foundation she was forced to build upon.   
The Hackett and Goodrich script for both the play and the film have Frank 
speaking the line twice, once to Peter and again as voiceover after her father tells the 
other characters what happened to Frank. Speaking to Peter, the young man in hiding 
with her, she says, 
ANNE. I know it’s terrible, trying to have any faith…when people are 
doing such horrible…(Gently lifting his face.) but you know what I 
sometimes think? I think the world may be going through a phase, the 
way I was with Mother. It’ll pass, maybe not for hundreds of years, but 
some day….I still believe, in spite of everything, that people are really 
good at heart. 
The most obvious change to this context is the addition of the character of Peter. Peter is 
constructed in the Goodrich and Hackett dramatizations as an intermediary between 
Frank and the audience, supplying the scenes with the exposition necessary to construct 
Frank’s words not as just a narration of the scenes, but rather as the element that propels 
the scene. Because Frank’s diary entries were written as reflections, told after the action 
of the scene occurred, Peter’s role as “listener” offers a way for the audience to 
“experience” Frank’s experiences simultaneous to her.  
This change to the audience necessarily changes the context in which Frank’s 
original words appeared. Where Frank’s original entry was written for herself, these 
dramatizations reposition Frank as a speaker to the audience, conflicting her self-
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presentation. Because the context and audience were altered, this passage moves from 
being an example of Frank’s private moment of musing to a complex mode of her self-
presentation. The self-presentation offered in these dramatizations, service the wondrous 
representation by emphasizing her commitment of adjusting her task to fit her body. If 
her task is to hold onto herself and her ideals, then this dramatization relies on Frank 
resisting her ideals to change, preferring them to remain uncomplicated. The removal of 
the original context erases her reality and by extension, her body, so that she may serve 
as an ideal example of “overcoming.” Speaking to Peter in the above example, Frank 
does not complicate the situation that they are in. In this version, Frank can only 
understand what she originally referred to as an impending darkness as a “phase,” one 
that is tantamount to her tenuous relationship with her mother.  She also accepts the fact 
that this “phase” the world is in may not pass for another hundred years; despite this, she 
continues to believe that people are good at heart without holding them accountable for 
this phase. Simply put, in these representations, Frank “overcomes” the hatred of the 
Nazis and systems of power that have imprisoned her by removing the responsibility of 
people’s actions, arguing that it is best not to challenge or complicate what has been 
done to her in the hopes that the good in people will surface. Implied here is the idea that 
this Frank will overcome and maintain her ideals to the very end; indeed, a large part of 
what makes this mode possible is the fact that the audience knows the ending to her 
story, but is never shown it.  
This tendency to equate the end of Frank’s diary with the end of Frank’s story is 
possible through, among other things, the wondrous representation of Frank. The end of 
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the production serves as an epilogue, telling the audience what they already know but do 
not see:   
MR. FRANK. That’s how I found out about my wife’s death…of Margot, 
the Van Daans, Peter…Dussel. But Anne…I still hoped. (He picks up the 
diary.) Yesterday I went to Rotterdam. I’d heard of a woman there. She’d 
been in Belsen with Anne….I know now. (He opens the diary and turns 
the pages back to find a certain passage. As he finds it, we hear Anne’s 
Voice. His eye falls on a sentence.)  
ANNE’S VOICE.  In spite of everything, I still believe that people are 
really good at heart. 
MR. FRANK. She puts me to shame. (Dim med. Slow. Curtain. Work 
light on. The lights begin to fade. Mr. Frank slowly closes the diary. The 
lights are out.) 
  THE CURTAIN FALLS 
The fact that Mr. Frank still had hope for Frank specifically signals to the audience that 
there is something remarkable about Frank that would make one assume she had a better 
chance of survival than the others. The use of Frank’s words after having been informed 
of her death emphasizes this remarkableness, implying that even though she died, she 
should be commended for her bravery – “bravery” in this context as meant to refer to her 
belief in the goodness of people in the face of the hatred she was confronted with.  
Indeed, Mr. Frank’s reaction to Frank’s words is that “she puts me to shame.” Humbled 
in the face of his daughter’s strength of character, Mr. Frank – and the audience as well – 
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are invited to reflect on Frank’s “unwavering” beliefs and how, despite her eventual fate, 
the tyranny of the Nazi’s only emphasized her morals and her character. Indeed, even in 
the 1997 adaptation of the Goodrich and Hackett script by Wendy Kesselman, Frank’s 
voice is heard saying this line as the audience watches the inhabitants of the annex 
arrested. Ultimately, as the lights dim and Mr. Frank closes the diary, the audience is 
meant to consider what Frank’s strength means to them and how they can apply Frank’s 
same attitude to the struggles in their own lives. Bettleheim suggests that 
the fictitious ending…explains the enormous success of this play and 
movie. At the conclusion, we hear Anne’s voice from beyond, saying, “In 
spite of everything, I still believe that people are really good at heart.” 
This improbable sentiment is supposedly from a girl who had been 
starved to death, had watched her sister meet the same fate before she did, 
knew that her mother had been murdered, and had watched untold 
thousands of adults and children being killed. This statement is not 
justified by anything Anne actually told her diary. (188) 
In the process, the reality of Frank’s fate is erased in the interest of those least affected 
by a similar fate. In this way, Frank comes to serve as a “poster child” for how to deal 
with the fate of the millions who died in the Holocaust: if Frank can keep a positive 
attitude and maintain her ideals, then anyone can.  
This construction of Frank, as noted above, is the most prevalent representation, 
and often serves the idea of “overcoming” outside the context of representing her story. 
The 2003 movie, Anne B. Real, directed by Lisa France and written by Luis Moro, tells 
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the story of a young female rapper who finds her inspiration by reading The Diary of 
Anne Frank. The tagline of the movie, “Anne Frank in the Hood,” aptly describes the 
attempts to combine Frank’s story with a modern-day coming of age story. In fact, the 
writer and director even refer to it as “two movies in one,” citing the fact that the lead 
character’s best friend is named Kitty, and that the movie is set in Amsterdam Avenue in 
upper Manhattan, New York, a reference to Amsterdam, Holland, where Frank lived for 
most of her life. While the existence of these links as evidence for “two movies in one” 
is tenuous at best – especially given the fact that the writer incorrectly cites the fact that 
Kitty was a longtime friend of Frank’s, inspiring him to write the lead character’s best 
friend as “Kitty” as well14 – what is clear is the role the writer and director wished to put 
Frank in. The writer, Moro, says,  
If you’ve never read the book, you will stand up and cheer for the lead 
character [as] she uses Anne Frank[‘s] words for inspiration. Now, if you 
read the book and see the movie, you will be moved, touched, and 
inspired by who Anne Frank is, that her spirit is alive and well in all who 
perceive [her] under any circumstances…I would like to take credit for 
the diverse [multicultural] back ground the director, Lisa France and I 
have. But as much as we’re both responsible for bringing this universal 
multi-cultural story to the big screen, I know we were both really 
                                                 
14
 The “Kitty” that Anne wrote to was actually a character from one of Cissy van Marxveldt’s Joop ter 
Heul novels. These books tell the story of a group of female friends through school, marriage, and 
motherhood. In Anne’s earliest entries, she addresses other members of the group – Conny, Marianne, 
Phien, Emmy, Jettje, and Poppie – but it was Kitty Francken to whom Anne decided to address all of her 
entries relatively early. Thus, in her revisions, she revised the various recipients to simply be “Kitty.”  
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honoring Anne Frank. There was never a moment when Lisa and I did not 
know all we have to do is stay true to the spirit of Anne Frank. We 
believe we had Anne frank next to us [throughout] the entire rewrite 
process, the casting, the production, the editing, everything…Anne Frank 
was the one really getting the awards. (“Anne Frank in the Hood.”) 
For Moro and France, the “spirit of Anne Frank” that they needed to stay true to was the 
inspirational version of Frank, the one that may inspire their lead character and the 
audience to stay true to themselves while “overcoming” life’s obstacles. What makes 
this possible, according to Moro, is the universalized message that Inspirational Frank 
offers, one that lends itself to multicultural stories that are best told when they are 
universalized and inspirational. Indeed, Anne Frank’s words are “for inspiration,” 
reducing the reality of the context in which she wrote in service of the “inspiration” that 
people seek from her.  
The risk here is that the wondrous representation allows for audiences to believe 
that despite what was happening to her, there was always room for forgiveness in 
Frank’s heart. While this may be the kind of sentiment that Frank strove for, she makes 
it very clear in her entry that this is nearly impossible when faced with reality. Attaching 
this sentiment to Frank thus erases the context and reality in which she first wrote these 
words, erasing the bodies of the people who suffered a similar fate as Anne’s and turning 
it into something “useful” for people in power, people who would never know Frank’s 
fate.  
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Sentimental Anne Frank 
Garland-Thomson situates the sentimental representation of disability opposite 
the wondrous, arguing that the wondrous elevates and the sentimental diminishes (63). 
Yet the relationship between the two is not entirely contrasting. Garland-Thomson 
argues that the sentimental mode emerged from Victorian bourgeoisie belief of the 
capability of capitalizing the world, and by extension, fostering the belief in an 
imaginary responsibility for the world. This, in turn, “launched humanitarian and reform 
movements to which today’s telethons are heir. This discourse of middle-class noblesse 
oblige operates on a model of paternalism, often trafficking in children and alluding to 
the cute, the plucky, the long-suffering, and the courageous” (63). Specifically, “the 
sentimental produces the sympathetic victim or helpless sufferer needing protection or 
succor and invoking pity, inspiration, and frequent contributions” (63).  Sentimental 
representations of Frank are primarily linked to this idea of calling on “the cute, the 
plucky, the long-suffering, and the courageous.”  
What makes Frank so appealing, in part, is her youth: it is no coincidence that the 
original cover of the English translation of The Diary of a Young Girl shows a nine-year-
old Frank, despite the fact that Frank began her diary at the age of thirteen. This picture 
is one that Frank included in her diary with the caption, “This is a photograph of me as I 
wish I looked all the time. Then I might still have a chance of getting to Holywood [sic]. 
But at present, I’m afraid, I usually look quite different” (10 October, 1942, Critical 
Edition). One could argue that the picture was chosen because of the American 
connection – Hollywood – and that it is a photograph that Frank liked. However, 
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regarding the photograph as a part of the cover of the Diary and not just the photograph 
itself, that the attempt to render Frank as childlike in order to provoke pity was the 
impetus behind this choice of picture. The picture is large, taking up most of the front 
cover, and aligned slightly to the left of the center. It is also slightly cropped from the 
original photograph, emphasizing her face and childlike features. Her eyes are focused 
upwards, a pose that, on a nine-year-old, would be appropriate for a school photograph, 
but in this context, is recognizable as a cliché pose primarily used to invoke inspiration 
and indicate “overcoming” and strength of character. Below the picture is her name in 
capital letters, followed by “The Diary of a Young Girl” beneath. Significant about the 
title is the split between Frank’s name and her diary: it is Anne Frank: The Diary of a 
Young Girl, not Anne Frank’s Diary or The Diary of Anne Frank (the title later used in 
productions of the diary). What this suggests is that the reader should be focused on 
Anne Frank and not the diary itself. The reader is encouraged to seek out and find the 
inspirational and sentimental parts of Frank that are found in the diary, not the 
information found in the diary. Indeed, below the title are the words “An Extraordinary 
Document of Adolescence,” suggesting that an extraordinary writer documented 
adolescence – not that this particular story of adolescence is extraordinary or even out of 
the ordinary. What this signals to the reader is that the diary itself is just a document of 
adolescence – its writer makes it extraordinary.  Nowhere on the cover is there any 
indication of the context in which this document was written – in fact, the photograph 
does not suggest anything about Frank being anything other than a typical American 
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teenager, one that readers could surely relate to
15
. The cover of the Diary then becomes a 
way to instruct the reader to find and construct an image of Frank that fits the picture: 
inspirational Anne Frank, an image that, through the process of becoming inspirational, 
actually operates as a sentimental figure. Thus, the sentimental and the wondrous are not 
entirely distinct from one another, and recognizing this relationship is vital to 
understanding how representations of disablement operate.  
Sentimental representations of disability invite the audience to attempt to rescue 
the subject from the stigma of being disabled. This is accomplished by domesticating the 
figure, making it familiar and comforting (63). In order to become inspirational, Frank 
must be recognizable. But to be recognizable, Frank must also be able to be sentimental. 
As noted earlier, the attempts to make Frank familiar and accessible to American 
audiences have been noted by many Anne Frank scholars as a systematic “de-Judaizing” 
of Frank. Judith Doneson argues that  
The universalization of the Holocaust through the diary, that is, the 
adapting and adjusting of images so that a broad consensus of the 
population can identify with the event, diminishes its Jewish particularity. 
As the Holocaust becomes a universal symbol of suffering, it also 
becomes possible for Americans to find significance in an event that they 
have no experienced… In addition, the question arises as to whether the 
Americanization and ultimate universalization of the Holocaust through 
                                                 
15
 The introduction by Eleanor Roosevelt, noted on the cover, also supports this construction of an 
American relationship to Anne and the “universalization” of her story. 
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the diary mirrored America’s attitude toward its Jews and other minorities 
– the growing phenomenon of ‘sameness” – rather than a blatant desire to 
alter the Jewish meaning of the Holocaust? (124) 
One way in which Frank is situated as a sentimental figure is through the rhetorical 
refashioning of her self-presentation in the various productions of her diary. With regard 
to self-presentation – the process by which one attempts to influence a perception of 
one's own image – I am most interested in the ways that language and narrative are used 
to create this image. I am therefore interested in the ways that language is used to create 
the sentimental image of Anne Frank.  
In most productions of the Diary, Frank’s actual words are used to describe the 
events that are shown to the audience. But, by virtue of being a representation or 
production, the context is shifted in order to achieve a particular end with regard to the 
narrative. The context of Frank’s story and words are often shifted so as to emphasize 
the message of the narrative that Frank records: Frank’s experiences are constructed so 
as to invoke pity, which in turn can be used as a catalyst to invoke inspiration. People are 
made to feel sorry for Frank, but inspired by her because she “overcomes” her 
disablement. 
 A common way self-presentation occurs is through language and narrative. 
James Gee writes that perspective stems from one’s social identity and from the 
resources one’s social group makes available to them, which, by extension, encourages 
“marked” behavior or characteristics (23). The manipulation of Frank’s self-presentation 
attempts to attenuate the links between Frank’s perception of her social identity and the 
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resources she was aware were available to her, effectively removing the elements that 
mark her as Jewish, and by extension, alien. Thus what makes Frank’s image effective as 
a symbol that evokes pity in varying contexts is the degree to which her difference is 
marked. Furthermore, Rom Harré argues that people will seek to present themselves 
through their actions as beings of value, whose worth is defined with regard to a specific 
moral order (11). Frank’s words are offered to represent desired values for specific 
moral orders. Frank becomes universalized so that she can invoke empathy in situations 
that are deemed relevant to all. She can only inspire those she resembles: to be relevant 
to the audience, apparently, is to not be Jewish. 
Central to representing Frank as a sentimental figure is the construction of her 
narrative discourse. Michael Bamberg writes that linguistic factors influence the 
conceptual organization of narrative, and that the choice of form that the speaker 
chooses to use (lexical or grammatical) not only represents the relationship between the 
speaker and the event, but also how one wants to be understood. (91) .For example, 
referring to events in time reveals a perspective that perceives the events to be related. A 
speaker’s choice of form signals what we talk about and how we talk about it. Thus, the 
choice of a linguistic form indicates the perspective: it informs the audience how events 
and references to events are understood with regard to each other and a unifying theme  
Doneson reminds us that in both the play and the 1959 film version of the Diary,   
the structure…forces the issue of authenticity. The voiceover of Anne 
reading from her diary, fading into dramatic sequences, stresses the fact 
that these scenes are based on Anne’s writing; that it is always her diary 
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“speaking” throughout. If any elements of the diary are falsified, then 
Anne’s history is distorted. How then is Anne’s history reflected in the 
adaptation of her diary? (133) 
Thus, refiguring Frank’s words necessarily alters the relationship between Frank and the 
context or event that she describes. This alteration is always in the interest of 
representing Frank as a sentimental figure.  
A useful example of this alteration is found in the stage and film production of 
the Diary, based on the Hackett and Goodrich script. Telling the story of her family, 
Frank writes in her diary,  
No one will grasp what I’m talking about if I begin my letters to Kitty just 
out of the blue so I’ll start by sketching in brief the story of my life, much  
as I don’t like to. My father, the dearest darling of a father I have ever 
seen, was thirty-six when he married my mother who was then twenty-
five. My sister Margot, was born in 1926 in Frankfort-on-main in 
Germany. I followed on June 12, 1929 and, as we are Jewish we 
emigrated to Holland in 1933, where my father was appointed Managing 
Director of the Netherlands Opekta Co., which manufactures jam. The 
rest of our family who were left in Germany felt the full impact of 
Hitler’s anti-Jewish laws, so life was filled with anxiety. In 1938 after the 
pogroms, my two uncles (my mother’s brothers) escaped to North 
America, my old grandmother came to us, she was then seventy-three. 
After May 1940 good times rapidly fled, first the war, then the 
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capitulation, followed by the German invasion which is when the 
sufferings of us Jews really began. Anti-Jewish decrees followed each 
other in quick succession and our freedom was strictly limited. Yet things 
were still bearable, despite the star, separate schools, curfew, etc. etc. 
(June 16, 1942) 
Frank tells the parts of the story that only affects her. For example, her parents’ marriage 
is discussed, but not their lives before they were married. Her sister Margot’s birth is 
reported to establish a timeline and a setting for Frank’s birth: instead of Frank aligning 
herself with Margot – thereby suggesting they share the same story – Frank uses 
Margot’s story as a frame for her own. As Frank’s story progresses, she broadens the 
framework from her family’s story -  Margot’s in particular – to historical context, thus 
allowing the historical context drive her story. Upon recording her birth, she writes 
because she and her family are Jewish, they emigrated to Holland in 1933. This is the 
first time in this passage that Frank identifies herself and her family as Jewish. She gives 
no reason why being Jewish would matter where she lives, apparently operating under 
the assumption that her reader would understand. The entry continues from an objective 
standpoint: although she does not identify the rest of her family as being Jewish, the fact 
that they “felt the full impact of Hitler’s anti-Jewish laws” indicates that she is 
identifying her family as Jewish, and by extension, herself. Indeed, Frank writes that life 
was filled with anxiety for her and her family. Frank continues to describe her family in 
terms that would mark them as Jewish without naming them as such. She refers to the 
1938 pogroms as if she is again speaking to someone who would immediately know 
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what this implies, which is especially evident in the use of the word escape when she 
refers to her uncles’ reaction to these pogroms. The dangerous environment that was 
emerging during this time is also evident in what follows, when Frank describes that “the 
good times rapidly fled, first the war, then the capitulation, followed by the German 
invasion which is when the suffering of us Jews really began.” Earlier, Frank refers to 
her place as a Jew when she writes “we could not do this and we were forbidden to do 
that.” Frank’s phrase the suffering of us Jews really began is the second time she 
explicitly aligns herself with “the suffering…Jews.” She continues to align herself, 
writing that “our freedom was strictly limited and that things were still bearable.”  
The scene in the play and 1959 film version of the Diary, uses this passage as the 
introduction to Frank’s story in hiding. The story begins with Mr. Frank reading out of 
Frank’s diary, eventually giving way to Frank’s voice alone:   
MR. FRANK AND ANNE. “My father started a business, importing 
spice and herbs. Things went well for us until 1940. Then the war came 
and the Dutch…(He turns the page.) defeat, followed by the arrival of the 
Germans. Then things got very bad for the Jews.” (…) 
ANNE’S VOICE. You could not do this and you could not do that. They 
forced Father out of his business. We had to wear yellow stars. I had to 
turn in my bike. I couldn’t go to a Dutch school any more. I couldn’t go 
to the movies, or ride in an automobile, or even on a streetcar, and a 
million other things. But somehow we children still managed to have fun. 
(1.1) 
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The fact that Mr. Frank shares Frank’s words in this scene is significant, given the fact 
that it was Otto Frank who did the first heavy revision of Frank’s diary before 
publication. Thus, this representation of Frank’s words can serve as a signal to the 
audience that their relationship with Frank is both mediated and constructed. Frank’s 
backstory is not given here, as the only pertinent information for the production is the 
information directly related to her time in hiding: the business her father started served 
as the hiding place, she recounts the process of her disablement after the German 
occupation, and, more significantly, the impact it has on her life as a child. She does not 
identify herself or her family as Jewish, only noting that “things got very bad for the 
Jews.” Even as she describes the measures against Jewish people in Holland, she 
changes tenses from first person to second person, a rhetorical move to distance herself 
from the Jewish people she describes. When she does attach herself, it is to emphasize 
the fact she is a child: she had to turn in her bike, she couldn’t go to a Dutch school, she 
couldn’t ride in an automobile, or even go see a movie. The Frank that is constructed 
here is wholly child and only marginally Jewish, thus the audience should understand her 
story as threat to her right to her childhood, and not a threat to a right of her life. 
This construction of Frank’s story to render her sentimental is thus in the service 
of the audience, and not Frank or her story. Garland-Thomson writes, “sentimentality 
makes of disabled people occasions for the viewers’ own narratives of progress, 
improvement, or heroic deliverance and contains disability’s threat in the sympathetic, 
helpless child for whom the viewer is empowered to act” (63). Because Anne Frank’s 
story was one the first and most accessible accounts to emerge after the war, the success 
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of her story largely depended on it remaining – and becoming even more – accessible. 
To do this, Frank was rendered sentimental, serving as a “poster child” for the lessons 
that should be learned from the Holocaust. Introducing the Holocaust to American 
audiences, Frank’s story contained Americanized views of progress, improvement and 
deliverance, positioning the audience to act on her behalf. For many audiences, this “act” 
required only the will to “never forget” what they believed what the “lesson” of the 
Holocaust was, and to carry the same kind of hope and inspiration that Frank 
demonstrated in the rhetorical refashionings of her and her story.  Alan Mintz suggests 
that the lesson taught by the Holocaust “is a lesson about man’s inhumanity to man that 
should instruct us about hatred and intolerance in all walks of life and in relations among 
all groups” (35). Thus, sentimental representations of Anne Frank are deployed to 
demonstrate narratives of progress or improvement with regard to “man’s inhumanity to 
man,” signaling a distance from the atrocities that Frank faced from the people or 
institutions using her image. Frank’s image is used to represent this “improvement” in 
the way people treat one another, yet because her image only works this way once she is 
sentimentalized, this idealized “improvement” can also be read as an enhancement in 
empowering idealized images of ability, normalcy, power, and what it means to be an 
Other of the same.  
Exotic Anne Frank 
The third visual rhetoric that Garland-Thomson defines is the exotic. The exotic 
is marked explicitly by difference, presenting disability as foreign, exaggerated, 
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eroticized, or entertaining. Describing the exotic, Garland-Thomson cites a photograph 
of “a tattooed biker figure brandishing a hockey stick.” She writes, 
The image alludes at once to the strong men and tattoo kings of the 
sideshows and then inflects it with a hyperphallic sexuality, completely 
rewriting the cultural script of the emasculated invalid and the male who 
becomes feminized by disability…The exaggeration characteristic of 
eroticization here marshals ironic hyperbole to mount a brazen, 
sensational parody, proactively challenging the viewer by lewdly 
commanding, “Lick this!” Such representations preclude even a trace of 
the sentimental or the wondrous, insisting instead on the empowerment of 
the transgressive, even at the expense of distancing the spectator from the 
spectacle. (66) 
The exotic relies on distance between the viewer and the viewed so that the “cultural 
script” of disability is exaggerated to the point where those scripts are rewritten. Yet this 
rewriting is for the audience only: as demonstrated by Garland-Thomson’s example, the 
signifiers typically attached to disability become hyperbolic, so that disability becomes 
something to be feared. Furthermore, whereas the wondrous and the sentimental elicit 
emotion or action that elevates the person represented, the exotic only serves to 
perpetuate distance between the subject and the audience. It does this by exaggerating 
the transgressive, empowering it to the degree that it becomes frightening. 
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I wish to extend Garland-Thomson’s definition of the exotic to include that of 
monstrosity, that is, the representations of bodies that are, in Foucault’s terms, 
monstrous. In Abnormal, Foucault writes, 
The frame of reference of the human monster is, of course, law. The 
notion of the monster is essentially a legal notion, in a broad sense, of 
course, since what defines the monster is the fact that its existence and 
form is not only a violation of the laws of society but also a violation of 
the laws of nature. Its very existence is a breach of the law at both 
levels…The monster is the limit, both the point at which the law is 
overturned and the exception that is found only in extreme cases. The 
monster combines the impossible and the forbidden. (55-56)  
Combining the impossible and the forbidden is a trope most common to representations 
of Anne Frank that I argue fall under the category of monstrous. While images and uses 
of Anne Frank do not tend to resemble the photograph described by Garland-Thomson, 
some uses render Frank as a violation of the laws of society and of nature. More 
specifically, monstrous or exotic representations of Frank usually represent Frank as a 
survivor, thereby disrupting the laws of society – her position as the world’s most 
famous Holocaust victim – and of nature – her supposed death.  
Perhaps the most monstrous representation of Anne Frank can be found in 
Shalom Auslander’s Hope: A Tragedy. In the novel, the main character, Kugel, finds 
Anne Frank in the attic of his new home. He describes her as  
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hideous, horribly disfigured, and terribly old…the white of her right eye 
yellowed with age, the left eye clouded with cataracts, dead, unseeing. 
Her skin, sallow and gray, was thin, almost transparent… a massive hump 
on her back forced her skull forward so that she faced the ground, head 
bowed, even when looking straight ahead. (25) 
When she moves, she scurries; when she speaks, she growls (25, 26). He notes that her 
body “devolved…into a shape most suitable for attic life” (54), and when he sees her, he 
thinks back to his childhood, when “he would cry from fright at the sight of the mentally 
handicapped, certain he was going to catch whatever it was they had” (53). It is 
interesting to note that he recalls his fear of the mentally handicapped when faced with 
her physically disabled body. For Kugel – and for most exotic and monstrous 
representations of Anne Frank – the disablement that she experienced in life as a Jew in 
Nazi-occupied Holland is primarily situated within her mind: limiting her body allows 
her mind and intellect to develop, a development seen in her diary. What saves Frank 
from becoming grotesque or frightening is her death: we are not confronted with the 
consequences of her fate on her body because all that is available is her diary. Images of 
Anne Frank as a survivor, then, exaggerate the limitations put on her body and stifle her 
mental development, as if her talent peaked with her diary. Anne Frank as a diarist is 
marked by her mind; Anne Frank as a survivor is marked by her body. Accordingly, 
because Anne Frank is situated as the most famous victim of the Holocaust, her 
surviving body becomes monstrous because of the contradiction of her existence. 
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This representation of survivor Anne Frank stems from Phillip Roth’s The Ghost 
Writer, one of the first representations of Anne Frank as a survivor. Roth’s protagonist, 
Nathan Zuckerman, is a young writer who spends a night in the home of established 
author E.I. Lonoff. Amy Bellette, a student of Lonoff’s who holds a strong resemblance 
to Anne Frank, is also staying in the house. Because of this resemblance and her vague 
past, Zuckerman begins to suspect that she actually is Anne Frank, living anonymously 
in the United States having survived the Holocaust. The story then breaks off into a 
description of Frank’s journey to the United States after the war and how she came to 
choose to remain anonymous. Although Zuckerman concedes at the end of this section 
that it is entirely fictitious, a distinct portrait of survivor-Anne Frank emerges, rendering 
her wholly exotic and, in Foucault’s terms, monstrous.  
The exotic representation of disability, as noted above, is concerned with 
rendering the body as foreign, exaggerated, eroticized, and entertaining. Amy is 
immediately represented as all of these things almost at once: 
Admittedly, the rich calm of those eyes would have been enough to make 
me wilt with shyness, but that I couldn’t return her gaze directly had also 
to do with this unharmonious relation between body and skull, and its 
implication, to me, of some early misfortune, of something vital lost or 
beaten down, and, by way of compensation, something vastly overdone. I 
thought of a trapped chick that could not get more than its beaked skull 
out of the encircling shell. I thought of those macro-cephalic boulders the 
Easter Island heads. I thought of febrile patients on the verandas of Swiss 
 104 
 
sanatoria imbibing the magic-mountain air. But let me not exaggerate the 
pathos and originality of my impressions, especially as they were 
subsumed soon enough in my unoriginal and irrepressible preoccupation: 
mostly I thought of the triumph it would be to kiss that face, and the 
excitement of her kissing me back….[and] as if she hadn’t charm enough, 
Miss Bellette’s speech was made melodious by a faint foreign accent.(24-
25) 
For Zuckerman, the “unharmonious relation between body and skull” implies that Amy 
has a history of loss and misfortune, which, for Zuckerman, provides impetus for him to 
write a history for her. In this way, then, the ambiguity of Amy’s past provides 
entertainment for him that is wholly dependent on her distance from him. Furthermore, 
Zuckerman’s note of the split between Amy’s body and skull implies two things: Amy’s 
body physically looks incongruous, leading him to believe that such an incongruity can 
only exist because of something outside her body, that is, the incongruity acts as a result 
of having lost something vital, or as a “punishment” for a misfortune in her past.  
Secondly, the split between Amy’s body and skull implies a mind/body split, 
wherein the image of Anne Frank fostered by her talent as a writer and her eventual fate 
collides with the image of Amy Bellette, a survivor. More importantly, this implication 
calls on images of disability in describing Frank as a survivor. In his fiction of Amy as 
Frank, Amy says, 
I felt as though the skin had been peeled away from half my body. Half 
my face had been peeled away, and everybody would stare in horror for 
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the rest of my life. Or they would stare at the other half, at the half still 
intact; I could see them smiling, pretending that the flayed half wasn’t 
there, and talking to the half that was. And I could hear myself screaming 
at them, I could see myself thrusting my hideous side right into their 
unmarred faces to make them properly horrified. ‘I was pretty! I was 
whole! I was a sunny, lively little girl! Look, look at what they did to 
me!’ But whatever side they looked at, I would always be screaming, 
‘Look at the other! Why don’t you look at the other!’ That’s what I 
thought about in the hospital at night. However they look at me, however 
they try to comfort me, I will always be this half-flayed thing. I will never 
be young, I will never be kind or at peace or in love, and I will hate them 
all my life. (152-153).  
Amy is describing the need to be seen and recognized as whole, something Zuckerman 
did not see in his first meeting with her. For Zuckerman, then, the idea of Anne Frank as 
a survivor is simultaneously horrifying and appealing. This is what makes Amy so 
desirable to him: her exoticness – that is, the representation of her disablement – is only 
visible to the extent that he is able to avoid confronting the implications of how he views 
Anne Frank, the victim. He relies on the existence of the disfigured side of Amy/Anne to 
create and foster the intact side, the only side he wishes to see. Zuckerman wants a 
version of Anne Frank he can have, but because Anne Frank is only known in terms of 
her disablement and eventual death as a young woman, he can only understand Amy as 
split and not entirely “whole.” She is simultaneously dead and alive, appealing and 
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horrifying, Anne Frank and not Anne Frank. One side is dependent on the existence of 
the other, and both are exaggerated to the point of being transgressive of the other. 
Amy’s beauty and mere existence overshadows the flayed half, yet the “flayed” and 
“hideous” half of Anne Frank is terrifying enough to keep Zuckerman at a distance. 
Zuckerman thus takes the parts of Anne Frank’s image that are desirable to him as a 
young Jewish writer – the idea that Frank had survived, in some form, and would be 
romantically interested in him – and discards the undesirable consequences of Anne 
Frank’s survival.  
The split between Frank’s image and Frank’s body is also explored in Bill 
Murdon’s webcomic, “Anne Frank Conquers the Moon Nazis.” Here, Frank is 
represented as a cyborg, built by Nazi scientists stationed on the moon. The story begins 
in 1955 with the Nazi project of resurrecting the dead and turning them into battle 
cyborgs. When Anne Frank’s skeleton is recovered from the ruins of a Nazi 
concentration camp, scientist Dr. Pretorius begins rebuilding her. The project is halted, 
however, and does not resume until generous military research grants are allotted by the 
Reagan administration to continue the project. Max Fleischer, a young janitor working in 
Dr. Pretorius’ lab discovers the project, and becomes smitten with the completed Anne 
Frank cyborg, now indestructible and ready for battle.   
Representing Frank as a cyborg calls attention to Foucault’s definition of the 
monster, a transgression of natural and social laws. He argues, “the monster is the 
fundamental figure around which bodies of power and domains of knowledge are 
disturbed and reorganized” (62). The power that brings Frank back into being is both 
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Nazi and American, in a combined effort to conquer the world.  Although the comic is 
currently on hiatus, it takes measures to lay the groundwork of who and what this Anne 
Frank cyborg will become. In a moment of reflection, Dr. Pretorius says to the skeleton 
of Frank,  
you, Anne…you’ll be different, I svear it. Not just a run-of-ze mill clone 
constructed to be a Nazi propaganda mouthpiece…but a biomechanical 
terror, capable of leveling mountains and laying waste to entire armies! 
The army that vill carry Anne Frank before it vill be INVINCIBLE!! I 
can see it now! I’ll clone your brain and fuse it into an indestructible 
robot body!! You vill breathe fire and shit lightning!! And you vill 
appreciate fine literature und German potato salad! Und then I’ll send you 
to speak before ze United Nations in ze name of vold peace! Once there, 
you vill unleash your POSITRONIC DEATH RAY und slaughter zem 
all!!!  
Frank is reconstructed to serve as a “Nazi propaganda mouthpiece” that is also a 
“biomechanical terror.” To do this, her brain must be cloned and then fused into a robot 
body. Her body is deemed unneeded or unworthy for this project, and is replaced with a 
body that is more suited to the purposes of the Nazi project. Eugenicist logic once again 
drives this line of thinking, not unlike what Frank experienced while she was alive. Nazi 
procedures took measures against bodies that were thought to be useless or not useful 
enough for the health and strength of the nation, and were consequently removed. In this 
fictional scenario, Frank’s body is replaced with a machine so that her mind and her 
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image can be retained. For this project, then, it is Frank’s image that is needed, but 
specifically, the image that is constructed by her mind.  
To explain, Donna Haraway argues that the cyborg is “a hybrid of machine and 
organism, a creature of social reality as well as a creature of fiction. Social reality is 
lived social relations, our most important political construction” (149). In constructing 
Frank as a cyborg, she retains her mind so as to retain the “lived social relations,” or, in 
Frank’s case, the relationship the audience developed with Frank’s image. Her body, 
then, becomes hyper-able to the point of being feared. So, as Dr. Pretorius suggests, 
retaining Frank’s mind and removing her body is the only way to integrate her into 
German culture, that is, to appreciate fine literature and German potato salad, and by 
extension, the Nazi propaganda that she is slated to represent.  
In this way, Frank is situated as the fundamental figure around which the Nazi 
and American power and domains of knowledge are disturbed and reorganized. Her 
existence as a cyborg disturbs the inspirational and sentimental image that ableist and 
eugenicist systems created, thereby reorganizing what Frank’s image represents by 
challenging the constitution of the good versus evil binary. Drawing on an image of 
“good,” this project literally remakes her body so that she can exist in multiple realms – 
the living and the dead, human and machine, victim and perpretrator – in order to 
resurrect Hitler and his Nazi forces stationed on the moon. Although Frank is 
constructed to do just this, the title of the webcomic – Anne Frank Conquers the Moon 
Nazis – suggests that cyborg Anne Frank does not follow through with the evil plan laid 
out for her.  
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Rewriting Frank as a survivor, she is simultaneously exotic and frightening. For 
this representation of Frank to exist, she must be distanced from the audience as far as 
possible. Unlike the sentimental and inspirational representations, the exotic version of 
Anne Frank must frighten the audience because of its transgressiveness. Ultimately, 
what this kind of representation suggests is that Frank must only survive through her 
words, and not her body. As such, the eugenicist systems that disabled her in life retain 
power over her image in death. Although the idea of Anne Frank as a survivor is 
appealing in certain contexts, rendering her as such always services the logics that 
determined her death as essential part to achieving particular ideas about normality, 
health, and progress.  
Realistic Anne Frank 
The final representation that Garland-Thomson identifies is the realistic. The 
realistic representation of disability minimizes difference in an effort to “arouse 
identification, often normalizing and sometimes minimizing the visual mark of 
disability” (69). Garland-Thomson argues that “realist disability photography is the 
rhetoric of equality, most often turned utilitarian. The use of realism can be commercial 
or journalistic, and it can also urge the viewer to political or social action” (69). 
Ultimately, the realistic aims to represent a version of reality for commercial, 
journalistic, political, or social purposes (69). These representations do not intend to 
represent disability more realistically, rather, this type of representation intends to 
represent disability in more realistic contexts. Whereas the inspirational situates 
disability in harrowing contexts that must be overcome, the sentimental in contexts that 
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espouse sadness, and the exotic in contexts that are hyperbolic, the realistic attempts to 
domesticate disability by situating it in familiar and comfortable contexts.  
John Blair’s 1995 Anne Frank Remembered attempts to represent Frank as 
realistically as possible, relying on newsreels, photographs, and a rare home movie that 
contains the only known moving footage of Anne Frank. The opening lines, narrated by 
Kenneth Branaugh, situate Frank as the symbol of the millions of victims of the 
Holocaust, particularly the children, alongside the mention of her “miserable and lonely 
death” in Bergen-Belsen concentration camp. The strength of this documentary, as the 
New York Times movie review notes, are the film’s “harrowing eyewitness accounts” 
revealing “what befell Anne, and it is agonizing.”  Yet, as the opening lines of the 
documentary continue, she is best remembered for her faith in humanity. “This is the 
story,” the sequence continues, “of the life and legacy of Anne Frank.” The context that 
the documentary immediately attempts to represent is the life that contributed to the 
legacy: the events that might have impacted her faith in humanity, and the events that 
put that faith to the test. Most realistic representations of Frank are framed as such, and 
are thus laced with traces of the inspirational and sentimental renderings that are usually 
relied on to represent Frank.  
Robert Dorhelm’s 2001 miniseries, Anne Frank: The Whole Story, based on 
Melissa Müller’s 1998 biography, aimed to present Frank’s life outside of the context of 
Frank’s diary as realistically as possible. Screenwriter Kirk Ellis has said of the project 
that  
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Otto Frank himself said after the war, when he finally read the diary, that 
it was a revelation to him because his daughter never spoke this way…I 
took that really as a watchword because I wanted to try to find a way in 
which we could distill a lot of thought that had come down to us in a way 
that was realistic to her age and the situation she was in at the time. (qtd. 
In Byrne) 
For Ellis, then, omitting Frank’s famous words, “in spite of everything I still believe that 
people are really good at heart,” was the right thing to do: "In the end I decided not to 
use that line at all, because in doing the research and going through the odyssey I just 
came to the conclusion that the association of the line with the life of Anne Frank is such 
a misrepresentation of what happened to her” (qtd. in Amarillo Times). Ellis aimed to 
represent a version of Frank that is not tied to the idea of Frank as inspirational or 
sentimental, but rather as one victim of the “Final Solution.” 
Yet avoiding using Frank’s famous words – or any of her words, for that matter – 
invited controversy from those most invested in protecting Anne Frank’s legacy and 
image. Because of issues around copyright infringement, Ellis chose not to quote Frank 
from The Diary of a Young Girl, or anything else from her writings, including Anne 
Frank’s Tales from the Secret Annex16. This created a conflict with Bernd “Buddy” 
Elias, Anne Frank’s only living relative and chairman of the Anne Frank-Fonds in 
                                                 
16
 Anne Frank’s Tales from the Secret Annex is a collection of Anne’s miscellaneous writing while she was 
in hiding, including short stories, essays, personal recollections, and the first five chapters of a novel. 
Anne intended for this collection to be separate from her diary; even dedicating a separate journal for 
them, called “Stories and Sketches from the Backhouse described by Anne Frank.” 
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Switzerland, the foundation established by Frank’s father Otto Frank. The Fonds holds 
copyrights to the diary, and consequently serves to protect Frank’s legacy. According to 
the Los Angeles times, Elias argued that representing Frank and her story without her 
words "is ignoring Anne Frank, in a way. The film can be good, but Anne speaks 
through her diary, through her words. [ABC] might be legally right but morally wrong, 
in my opinion.” (LA Times) 17The belief that Anne “speaks through her diary” alone 
suggests that the image of Frank that is fostered and protected is the image of Frank as 
inspirational and sentimental.  
As noted above, however, Ellis aimed to present Frank not as a beacon of hope or 
inspiration, but rather as one victim among many.  Removing the words that made her 
extraordinary in the eyes of the public risked making her an ordinary girl – the very goal 
of this project. Indeed, the series opens up with a birds-eye view of a playground, 
eventually focusing in on Frank’s face. The implication is that any one of these children 
could have or did share a fate similar to Frank’s. In this way, this production attempts to 
represent Frank as ordinary and not particularly remarkable; for Ellis, it is her story that 
is remarkable, and it is the way Frank tells her own story that contributes to the idea of 
remarkableness that surrounds her. Removing exact words from Frank’s diary meant that 
Frank would no longer tell her own story in this production, instead relying on the 
stories of others to construct Frank’s “whole story.” As such, the miniseries urges 
                                                 
17
 Steven Speilberg, originally slated to direct the miniseries, stepped down because of Elias’ objections.   
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viewers to understand the remarkableness of Frank’s story not through her words, but 
through the way her story is told.  
Thus Ellis and Dornhelm portray Frank realistically by removing the context of 
her subjectivity. The Los Angeles times reports that by not relying on Frank’s diary, 
Ellis “was able to give life and depth and nuance to the other characters in Anne's life… 
who have long been known largely only through Anne's highly selective eyes” (qtd. In 
Jensen). Susan Lyne, ABC's executive vice president of movies for television, argues 
that using accounts of Frank’s life – particularly her life in the concentration camps – 
allows the audience to become more engaged with her: "You've followed this girl from 
just before her 10th birthday; her spirit, her conversation, her mind are enormously 
engaging. And then you watch as she becomes almost a feral creature before her death" 
(qtd. in Jensen). Removing Frank’s perspective – and thus her “selective eyes” – allows 
the audience to experience Frank’s story as both an engaging experience and an 
opportunity to relate to her as an outsider. In other words, whereas the inspirational and 
sentimental representations of Frank encourage the audience to identify with Frank, the 
realistic encourages the audience to make a connection to the context: perpetuated by the 
typical invitations to identify with her, Frank becomes someone you care about in this 
production, whose fate could have been your own had you lived in her historical context. 
Frank is no longer someone “just like you,” she is a victim of a horrifying context, one 
that is familiar enough for audiences to identify with, but distant enough for the audience 
to feel safe. Asking audiences to identify with the context and not the individual is what 
differentiates the realistic from the inspirational and sentimental. In inspirational and 
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sentimental representations of Anne Frank, the audience is encouraged to identify with 
her so as to draw on her experiences for their own purposes, either to become inspired or 
to feel sorry for her. For realistic depictions of Frank, the audience is meant to align their 
own experiences with hers, understanding how certain contexts were created, but not 
believing that the context can be recreated.  
Ellis’ intention for the miniseries follows this line of reasoning, maintaining that 
notions of inspiration and sentimentality needed to be removed. Furthermore, the tropes 
used to create and nurture those notions also needed to be removed, such as Frank’s 
reflections about her life.  Yet while avoiding those tropes, Ellis, in many ways 
reproduced them to achieve the desired effect. Avoiding recognizable and cliché tropes 
of sentimentality – Frank never appears any more brave or courageous than those around 
her, for example – Ellis instead relies on tropes of sentimentality that affect other 
characters. When Frank is reunited with her childhood friend, Hannah, they stand 
between a straw fence in Bergen-Belsen, months before Frank’s death. Because Hannah 
is in the exchange camp of Bergen-Belsen,
18
 she appears healthier than Frank, who was 
                                                 
18
 Bergen-Belsen was comprised of eight camps. Three main components divided these camps up: the 
prisoner of war camp, the residence camp, and the prisoner’s camp. Hannah and her family were in a part 
of the residence camp, called the “Star Camp.” Here, several thousand Jewish prisoners (primarily from 
the Netherlands) were held under the pretext that they would be exchanged for German nationals held by 
the Western Allies (few were ever actually exchanged). The prisoners in the Star camp were protected by a 
power outside of Germany’s, and were thus on one of the “ban lists”:  the “Palestine list,” the “South 
America List,” or the “dual citizenship list.” Hannah’s family – her father and her little sister, Gabi – were 
on the “Palestine list,” as they had Palestinian passports. Prisoners wore a yellow Star of David on their 
own clothes (hence the name), and were forced to work in labor detachments. According to Ben Shephard, 
more than a third of those who survived Bergen-Belsen were inmates of the Star Camp.  
Anne, alternatively, was in a camp within the prisoner camp, called the tent camp. First 
established as an undesignated concentration camp, this camp was originally intended to serve as a transit 
camp for non-Jewish women from Poland. The prisoner camp, a collection camp for sick and injured 
prisoners, was soon referred to as the “recuperation camp,” which very quickly became overcrowded. The 
 115 
 
a prisoner, and even wears her own clothing (as opposed to the striped uniform Frank 
was forced to wear).  This scene operates as one of the few moments where the narrative 
of the story is, albeit briefly, perpetuated by Frank herself. Meeting Hannah, Frank 
recounts her experience:  
ANNE. I have no family, only Margot.  
HANNAH. Your father? Your mother?  
ANNE. My father’s dead. They sent him to the gas chambers.  
HANNAH. But your mother?  
ANNE. Selected. The chimney was smoking so black.  
HANNAH. It’s too horrible. I can’t believe it.  
ANNE. They’ve taken everything, Hannah. Everything. It’s so cold here. 
The lice are crawling over my clothes and there’s no food. Everything I 
find I give to Margot because she is so weak. 
Ellis calls this scene “the most affecting scene,” suggesting that this scene is not only the 
most emotionally-driven scene, but also one of the most realistic scenes of the miniseries 
(qtd. in Byrne). Because this scene is constructed solely through Hannah Goslar’s 
personal recollection, the viewer is presented with a version of Frank as seen through the 
eyes of someone very close to her – that is, in the same position as the representation of 
Frank would have the audience feel. Simply put, because Hannah appears much 
healthier, and in many ways, much safer than Frank, the audience is made to identify 
                                                                                                                                                
female prisoners were moved to another part of the prisoner camp, called the “tent camp” because 
prisoners were housed in tents, and later came to hold approximately 8,000 women from Auschwitz-
Birkenau, including Anne and her sister Margot (Rees, 32). 
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with Hannah, experiencing Frank’s suffering and her story, but distanced as well. 
Indeed, every shot of Frank in this scene is shown from Hannah’s perspective, that is, 
through a hole in the straw fence, showing Frank’s face constantly surrounded by straw 
and barbed wire.  
Similarly, other scenes that were poised to show Frank as realistically as possible 
are contextualized through another’s recollection. Frank’s childhood is constructed 
through a series of stories largely from memories of her schoolmates who survived her. 
While the diary provides the basis of her time in hiding, almost all of the scenes 
dramatized focus on Frank, but only to demonstrate her living conditions at the time. 
The scenes that do recount moments that Frank described in her diary – her relationship 
with her sister, or the romantic relationship with Peter van Pels – represent Frank as 
someone reacting to her environment, rather than someone whose strength and courage 
actively changes the environment. Accordingly, Frank’s life after hiding is not 
particularly specific to her experience, with the exception of the existing accounts of 
those who knew her in the camps. Frank is represented in this last half of the miniseries 
as just another prisoner. In many ways, these scenes capture Frank as realistically as 
possible: Frank is shown arriving at Auschwitz in early September, herded off the cattle 
car to stand in line, get her arm tattooed, relinquish all of her clothing and valuables, and 
have her head shaved. Because there are no survivors that recall Frank’s experience in 
those moments, she is treated as the project intends, as another victim. Yet despite Ellis’ 
reluctance to represent Frank as sentimental or extraordinary, his reliance on other 
people’s experiences to shape Frank’s comes across as representing her as just that: in a 
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context where her body is literally refigured in an effort to make her disappear – her 
uniform and shaved head, for example – Ellis’ representation of Frank suggests that 
Frank’s story was extraordinary enough to stand out among the 6 million stories that 
Frank’s has come to represent. Thus, while Frank is represented as another victim, her 
experience made unique by this representation counters the attempt to make her blend in.  
Perhaps Ellis’ greatest achievement in the miniseries is his decision to not 
dramatize Frank’s death. Frank’s death is insinuated directly after a dramatized scene 
where the audience sees Frank as she discovers that her sister is dead. The scene ends 
and cuts to Otto Frank arriving in Amsterdam after the liberation, searching for 
information about his daughters. Ellis chose not to dramatize Frank’s death because 
there is no information about it (other than the fact that she died shortly after Margot), 
instead allowing the audience to hear the confirmation of her death when her father does. 
Once again, the audience is not expected to identify with Frank, but rather to invest in 
her story from a safe distance.  
Conclusion 
This investment in Frank’s story from a distance is a trope in all representations 
of Anne Frank. Yet the logics that propel the need for a representation in the first place 
rely on logics designed to do just that: distance her body from any real investment, with 
the purpose of eliminating her body outright. Initially disabled by the very systems that 
were borrowed from and developed in the United States, the American relationship to 
Anne Frank is defined by her position as, according to the book jacket description of The 
Definitive Edition of the diary,  a symbol of the “testament to the indestructible nature of 
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the human spirit.” Through representation , Frank’s once “aberrant” body operates as a 
symbol of what “we” are, and what “we” are not, that is, neither a Jewish victim nor a 
Nazi perpetrator.  
This chapter has argued that American representations of Anne Frank have been 
manipulated to emphasize her role as a victim, rhetorically rendering her the ultimate 
freak in the Holocaust freak show, a freak show that I have demonstrated, is only 
possible after the ableist system attempted by the Nazis failed. Her body is held up in 
such a way that she becomes a representation of what happens when systems dependent 
on freak show logics diverge from the rhetorics that made those systems possible. As 
such, a new version of Anne Frank emerges, a version that is wholly rhetorical, and 
serves only to provide something to the audience: inspiration, sentimentality, fear, or a 
satisfaction that the audience knows her “whole” story. Frank is represented as a figure 
poised to inspire, her words manipulated to make the audience accept her fate as part of 
a lesson about humanity. She is represented as sentimental, encouraging the audience to 
feel sorry for her, and in opposition to the inspirational mode of representation, not 
acknowledge her strength. In this way, the audience can push aside the implications of 
any relationship to the systems that murdered her, and feel as if reading her words does a 
service to her spirit and memory. The sentimental wish of Frank’s survival becomes 
realized in exotic representations of her, representations that often make her surviving 
body monstrous. This image of Frank as a survivor is often monstrous, as her body is a 
contradiction between the living and the dead. As such, these representations imply and 
serve the desire for Frank’s body to remain static, while her image is encouraged to 
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continue developing as time goes on. Finally, Frank is represented as realistic in an 
attempt to make her story “whole” and “complete.” In doing so, however, her 
subjectivity is compromised, as Frank’s own account of her experiences complicate the 
way that her story is understood. Representing Frank with the same logics used to 
represent disability, my analyses have demonstrated how ableist systems relied on, and 
refigured, eugenicist logic to disable, murder, and eventually enfreak her body. By 
turning Frank back into a “freak” to serve a different purpose within the same logics, the 
system attempts to “repair” itself so that the position of “freak” is always occupied, 
allowing for eugenicist logic to continue to eradicate what is not wanted or needed. In 
this way, disability is always implied in any understanding of eugenics, just as eugenics 
is always implied in any understanding of disability. As I have demonstrated in this 
chapter, ableist systems rely on the logics of eugenics to continually improve and 
develop, but more importantly, the existence of ableist systems is only possible when 
eugenicist logics remove what compromises their functioning. Yet, as my next chapter 
will argue, the contexts of disability and tropes of freakdom are not always refigured in 
the service of ableist and eugenicist systems and logics, as I have demonstrated with the 
image of Anne Frank in this chapter. As my following analyses will show, one way to 
begin breaking down these logics is to encourage the breakdown of the system – as with 
the consequences of the “Final Solution” – and instead of relying on disabling logics to 
repair the system, as with the image of Anne Frank, begin interrogating the relationship 
of eugenics to the tropes of disability and freakdom.  
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CHAPTER IV 
GAGABILITY: LADY GAGA AND REPRESENTATIONS OF DISABILITY, 
FREAKDOM, AND EUGENICS 
 
The last chapter outlined the ways in which ableist systems rely on the elements 
dis/abled within them, specifically through enfreakment, positioning them as a constant 
standard of “abnormal.” In this chapter, I will interrogate the references to eugenics and 
freakdom in the work of Lady Gaga. By pushing the eugenicist logics to the point where 
“normal” becomes mythologized, Gaga’s performances and self-positioning as a freak 
who has been disabled by societal norms challenge the reliance on “normalcy,” and by 
extension, “freakdom.” By privileging the body and confronting the implications 
eugenics, freakdom, and disability has on bodies, Gaga’s challenge shows the limits of 
systems of meaning-making based on elimination. 
This constant shifting of “abnormal” is largely due to the constant shifting of 
contexts; in the case of Anne Frank, removing her from her historical context made it 
possible to shift her role from rhetorician to representative, thereby divesting her of her 
rhetorical agency as a diarist. That Frank’s role can shift at all in a structure designed to 
limit meaning (and by extension, make that meaning static) reveals a flaw in the 
structure, since meaning cannot ever be static because it is determined by the movement 
between oppositions. To recognize the flaw in the structure opens up the opportunity to 
confront the contradictions of the structure, as well as explore the spaces created in those 
contradictions, what Derrida refers to as bricolage. This chapter uses the work of Lady 
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Gaga to demonstrate the ways in which ableist systems are challenged through bricolage, 
diminishing the effects and necessity of eugenicist logic. Self-identified as a person with 
mental illness and chronic pain associated with lupus, Gaga not only privileges the body 
deemed unwanted, but she uses the logics that determine these bodies to demonstrate the 
constructedness of ableist systems.  
Gaga uses the process of enfreakment to identify unwanted elements not to 
remove them, but to privilege them. In doing so, she demonstrates that it is possible to 
manipulate a system believed to be static – either to enforce new standards of normalcy, 
or to deconstruct those standards – but also that any act of elimination is simultaneously 
an act of preservation. By enticing the audience to stare at her, she is able to use the tools 
of ableist systems against itself, specifically her use of symbols, props, and performances 
of “abnormality” to call attention to the role and the history of the rejected elements’ role 
in an ableist system. Ultimately, by working against the moment of “repair” that the last 
chapter outlined, Gaga’s work shows the value of a fragmented system that is sustained 
not by eugenicist logic, but by a perpetual state of “becoming.”  
Because she relies heavily on the image of the disabled body to challenge 
systems of oppression that create ideas of normality, she is arguing that not only must 
the body must always be remembered and respected, but this respect can only occur with 
a recognition of the disabled body. Challenging the ableist conceptualizations of the 
body in myriad forms of meaning-making, Gaga is arguing that the disabled body is the 
element of meaning-making within ableist systems that makes all meaning possible. By 
considering the disabled body as a way to create and refigure meaning, Gaga privileges 
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disability in order to confront the oppressing structures that assign values to bodies. In 
the process, Gaga demonstrates how ableism is entwined with other forms of oppressing 
structures, dependent on the illusions of “normal” and “acceptable.”  
Bricolage and Derrida 
In “Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences,” Derrida 
analyzes Levi-Strauss’ theorization on the opposition between nature and culture to 
demonstrate how Levi-Strauss experienced the necessity of using the language of the 
form in order to deconstruct it. In Levi-Strauss’ Elementary Structures, nature is defined 
as something universal and spontaneous, and not dependent upon any system of norms. 
Culture, alternatively, is the inverse, where anything that is wholly dependent upon a 
system of norms is attributed to culture. As Derrida’s analysis shows, it impossible to 
accept the oppositions as existing independently of one another because there are 
elements that belong to both nature and culture. This inconsistency reveals a flaw in the 
structure, wherein Derrida argues that the structure must submit to one of two options: 
the structure in its entirety can be discarded, and flawless structure can be attempted, or 
the recognizably flawed structure can continue to be used. In continuing to use the 
structure, the center is understood as a construct around which other ideas are built upon. 
The center is thus used as a tool that can be replaced if other elements or “instruments” 
prove more useful.   
This method, according to Derrida, is called “bricolage,” and the person using 
this method is the “bricoleur.” The method of bricolage encourages the use of what is 
available – including elements outside of the structure – regardless of the purity or 
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stability of the system being used. The terms and ideas of a system are utilized only 
when useful, and the coherence of these terms and ideas is of little importance. Derrida 
uses the example of an engineer, who, in creating a stable system, becomes the center of 
a unique discourse, using a language that only she or he would understand. This example 
highlights the most important part of bricolage: bricolage produces new languages to 
talk and think about systems without the risk of creating a new system out of an old one. 
In effect, it provides a way to talk about structures without creating a new center.  
Gaga’s status as a bricoleur has been challenged through charges against her as 
someone who is not a bricoluer, but rather as an expert assembler of past cultural 
references, not making anything “new” in the process. Rebecca M. Lush argues that 
“Lady Gaga’s borrowings often function to blur their antecedents, not in the deceptive 
sense of plagiarism, but in the sense of community identities, they allow her to appear 
‘original’ despite her reliance on the pop cultural past” (179). That Gaga’s work only 
holds the appearance of something new because of its familiar elements is, in Derrida’s 
terms, the way in which Gaga positions her body as a Derridan trace, the mark of what 
was and now is, erasing the difference between what came before it and what will come 
after it:  
It is because of différance that the movement of signification is possible 
only if each so-called ‘present’ element, each element appearing on the 
scene of presence, is related to something other than itself, thereby 
keeping within itself the mark of the past element, and already letting 
itself be vitiated by the mark of its relation to the future element, this 
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trace being related no less to what is called the future than to what is 
called the past, and constituting what is called the present by means of 
this very relation to what it is not: what it absolutely is not, not even a 
past or a future as a modified present. (13)  
Furthermore, if, as Derrida argues, the trace operates as the origin, and there is no origin, 
the trace becomes an effect. In this way, Gaga is an effect of the fear of the 
deconstruction of binaries, serving as a reminder of the constructedness of oppositions or 
the difference between binaries. Gaga is the absence of a presence, resisting the meaning 
assignments that are consistently deployed in an attempt to define “what” or “who” she 
is. As Gaga argues in “Born This Way,” she is always in a state of becoming: “‘Born 
This Way’ in so many ways is about the way that we see the future. Right now we’re in 
a state of drifting, we’re not so sure where we are supposed to go or what we’re 
supposed to understand or replicate or imitate, so we’re drifting, we’re drifting in space 
towards the light, and ‘Born This Way’ tells us that the light is within us and to follow 
yourself” (qtd. in Will). Put another way, she says, “in the video, we use Rico, who is 
tattooed head to toe [including a skull on his face]. He was born that way. Although he 
wasn't born with tattoos, it was his ultimate destiny to become the man he is today” (qtd. 
in Blasberg, 158). Gaga, in many ways, is describing the space created out of difference, 
drifting between past elements and moving towards the light of future elements. She is 
born to always be moving towards her future signification. 
But even more than drifting past the elements that came before her, Gaga hopes 
to use those familiar themes and tools to show the constructedness of what is normal or 
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expected of a female performer (“original” but also not too different). Feminist cultural 
critic Camille Paglia (“America’s foremost cultural critic”) argues that for Gaga, this is 
impossible because Gaga is not sexy, therefore she does not have access to the tools that 
female performers (like Madonna) have: “despite showing acres of pallid flesh in the 
fetish-bondage garb of urban prostitution, Gaga isn’t sexy at all – she’s like a gangly 
marionette or plasticised android. How could a figure so calculated and artificial, so 
clinical and strangely antiseptic, so stripped of genuine eroticism have become the icon 
of her generation?” For Paglia, Gaga serves as the symbol of the “death of sex,” 
demonstrated by her “limited range of facial expressions. Her videos repeatedly thrust 
that blank, lugubrious face at the camera and us; it’s creepy and coercive...Gaga, for all 
her writhing and posturing, is asexual.” Paglia attempts to remove Gaga’s rhetorical 
agency – and attacks her identity as a female in the process – because of her “inability” 
to perform femininity, that is, because her body moves like “gangly marionette” that is 
“stripped of genuine eroticism,” rendering her “creepy and coercive.” This refusal to 
perform “normalcy” makes Gaga’s audience uncomfortable, but ultimately does exactly 
what she wants it to do: Paglia’s critique of Gaga demonstrates how constructed the 
performances of femininity, sexuality, and ability are, and in the process, shows the 
reliance on and the fear of deviating from the “norm.” 
While there is much to be said about Gaga’s feminism, the argument that I wish 
to make interrogates not just what is expected of Gaga as a woman, but as a supposedly 
able-bodied performer who rejects what makes a performer “normal,” “original,” or 
“beautiful.”  Gaga’s bricolage extends beyond elements related to her status as a 
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performer, defining what it means to be “normal” or “able” through the very tools of the 
ableist systems that attempt to expel her: eugenics, freakdom, and disability. Paglia’s 
refusal to take Gaga seriously demonstrates how entrenched these concepts are, refusing 
admittance to “normal,” holding her up as an example of what femininity is not (finding 
entertainment and profit in the act of listing her “abnormalities”), and preventing Gaga’s 
participation in a system of “normal.”  While ableist systems center and privilege an 
imaginary and unachievable “normal” body, Gaga privileges the material, “abnormal” 
body, and by privileging the dis/abled body in an able-bodied centered system, she is 
able to force a recognition of the relationship between able and dis/abled, normal and 
abnormal. In doing so, she deconstructs the center that consistently rejects a relationship 
between these elements, bringing the necessity and value of dis/abled in an ableist 
system to the fore.  
Central to this deconstruction is her use of staring, a critical element to diagnosis 
of “abnormal,” as a tool to both identify and privilege that which has been deemed 
“abnormal.” In doing so, Gaga is able to call on the histories of “abnormality” associated 
with staring, disability and freakdom in particular. Indeed, Rosemarie Garland-Thomson 
argues in the essay, “The Politics of Staring: Visual Rhetorics of Disability in Popular 
Photography,” that the history of disability is “in part, the history of being on display” 
(57). Such an argument suggests that the history of disability – like many other histories 
– is established through interrogative means that create an explanation or story as a way 
to understand and explain its (inferior) existence in relation to larger power structures. 
The history of disability thus emerges as a story created by and for ableist systems, 
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largely constituted through the interrogative means of staring. Garland-Thomson writes 
in her study of staring, Staring: How We Look, that “stares are urgent efforts to make the 
unknown known, to render legible something that seems at first glance 
incomprehensible” (15). Thus the visual diagnosis of difference occurs first through 
looking and staring, and in an attempt to render the unknown known, histories and 
representations of disability emerge, representations often linked to being on display for 
nondisabled people.  
Rejection    
Because representations of disability are often used in the service of the 
nondisabled viewer in a number of ways, understanding the impetus behind the 
development of freak shows and their impact will bring to light the ways that disability 
is represented and used in the service of ableist systems, particularly Gaga’s use of those 
representations. Drawing from the concept of staring, and consequently, the histories and 
structures of the freak show, Gaga’s performative and visual rhetorics demonstrates an 
acknowledgement of such histories and structures
19
 by embracing that which is rejected, 
and in doing so, challenges concepts of normality. 
A large part of the work done in disability studies is the theorization of the 
rejection of people with disabilities, both physically and culturally. Because freaks push 
and exceed the boundaries of “normal,” the initial reaction by mainstream society – or 
                                                 
19
 Although this analysis is focused on the ableist motivations of freak shows, I use histories and 
structures in plural to emphasize the myriad experiences and perspectives of, and affected by, freak shows, 
including (but not limited to) the racist and colonial lines of thought that led to the display and 
exoticization of people of color.  
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the people who consider themselves “normal” – is to hide what they consider deviant or 
unhealthy to the “normal” system under which they operate. Snyder and Mitchell argue 
that the “cultural locations” of disability, including hospitals and institutions, both 
structure and perpetuate the relationship between disability and subhumanity, 
encouraging ideas of what is allowed to be seen; in this context, only “humans” have a 
right to be seen. Garland-Thomson argues that “we prefer to stare for our own reasons 
and on our own terms rather than be forced into a stare by something or someone 
stareable” (19). In other words, what is allowed to be visible is limited to what is desired 
to be seen. Who is hidden thus becomes someone who is not wanted, and who is not 
wanted is reduced to the status of subhuman.  
Foucault’s Discipline and Punish examines this relationship between disability 
and subhumanity, specifically with its link to power. He writes, “in order to see perfect 
disciplines functioning, rulers dreamt of the state of plague. Underlying disciplinary 
projects the image of the plague stands for all forms of confusion and disorder; just as 
the image of the leper, cut off from all human contact, underlies projects of exclusion” 
(199). To determine a “perfect” form of discipline meant to develop such a discipline in 
response to a state of chaos and confusion, that is, the state of disease.  Thus disease and 
deviation merge in such a way that deviation is found and “cured” in the body. 
Aberration must be excluded from human contact so as not to limit the spread of chaos. 
The treatment of the leper and the plague victim are projects of discipline and exclusion, 
projects that he argues are different but not discordant. He continues,   
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On the one hand, the lepers are treated as plague victims; the tactic of 
individualizing disciplines are imposed on the excluded; and, on the other 
hand, the universality of disciplinary controls makes it possible to brand 
the ‘leper’ and to bring into play against him the dualistic mechanisms of 
exclusion…All the mechanisms of power which, even today, are disposed 
around the abnormal individual, to brand him and to alter him, are 
composed of those two forms from which they distantly derive. (199) 
Lepers – or those with “diseased” or aberrant bodies – are treated as indications of a 
state of chaos, indicators that serve as a representation of the effectiveness of discipline. 
In this way, discipline is developed and determined through individual cases, relying 
only on culturally agreed upon symbols of deviance to identify individuals; these 
individuals are consequently excluded and moved out of the public view. Alternatively, 
understanding discipline as universal, that is, an agreed upon method of discipline 
enforced on all types of deviance, makes the identification of deviance easier. This, 
according to Foucault, is made possible through the binaries that such universality 
produces: mad/sane, dangerous/harmless, abnormal/normal (199). In other words, 
deviance becomes easily identifiable when exclusion is possible: whatever is considered 
undesirable – whatever one wants to be excluded – becomes labeled as deviant. This 
labeling can only be determined and enforced by systems of power, power that exists 
only because of both forms of discipline – individual and universal – perpetuate it. 
Universal disciplinary controls enforce measures against deviance as determined by 
individual cases.    
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Thus the body emerges from history as a site upon which social regulation is 
enacted – a determiner for “normal” behavior and actions – as well as a site of what 
Snyder and Mitchell call “excesses and insufficiencies – what is referred to as ‘too much 
or too little of a body’” (32).  As a result, common cultural beliefs about disability are 
intimately tied to Western concepts of human deviation, thereby perpetuating cultural 
fantasies about difference and variation. Foucualt’s examination of discipline on these 
bodies point to what another binary created through such discipline: curable/incurable. 
When bodies cannot be “fixed” by removing what makes them undesirable, they are 
literally removed from the public eye and put in institutions, asylums, and prisons. Susan 
Schweik draws on Foucault and though an examination of the histories of the “ugly 
laws” as discussed in chapter II, points to the legal attempts to exclude “undesirable” 
bodies from the public view. These laws not only reinforced the eugenicist culture that 
created such laws, but made full access to social participation illegal for people with 
disabilities. As the primary target under the “ugly laws,” people with disabilities were 
removed from the mainstream based on the level to which their bodies conformed to 
bodily norms and aesthetics. Schweik writes,  
Ugly ordinances command the self-policing of a populace, checking 
always to ensure that it is not ‘unsightly’ or ‘disgusting.’ To the question 
of the Omaha judge in 1974 – ‘Does the law mean that every time my 
neighbor’s funny looking kids ask for something I should have them 
arrested?’ – postmodern biopower has an unspoken answer. What one 
does about the neighbor’s funny-looking kids is what one does about 
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oneself: shop at the local drugstore with its aisles of health and beauty 
products, contemplate the question of plastic surgery, respond to the 
pharmaceutical ads on television. What the neighbor’s funny-looking kids 
ask for is what we all ask of ourselves, making sure, daily, that we are 
‘well cared for’ – and not careless of our appearance. (65) 
Schweik’s example of the Omaha judge calls attention to the ways that social 
constructions of deviance are always already informing and informed by medical models 
of deviance: to “cure” the deviant, go to “the local drugstore with its aisles of health and 
beauty products, contemplate the question of plastic surgery, respond to the 
pharmaceutical ads on television” to ensure a healthy and “normal” appearance. Thus 
one of the longstanding cultural conceptions of disability that develops over time is the 
rhetoric of cure, rehabilitation, and choice: it is up to the person with disabilities to 
choose treatment, whether it is medical or social, in order to fit into mainstream society.  
Representations of disability often draw on this medical model, portraying 
disability as an individual problem. Amit Kama notes that images that are derived from 
this model are from the perspective of a non-disabled person:  “Disabled people are but 
objects of gaze, whose stories are often narratives of overcoming and curing their 
‘defect’. Individual actions seem to provide the sole solution to the ontological hardships 
for those who are seen as isolated agents and who are supposed to singlehandedly 
overcome various obstacles.” (448). Through such representation, Kama continues, 
people with disabilities are effectively removed from any and all social context, despite 
the fact that social norms and decorum create the environment that disables (448). In this 
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way, the experience of persons with disabilities functions as a reiteration of the cultural 
fantasy surrounding disability, one that displaces responsibility off of society and onto 
the individual. 
 As a result, disability in the media and in pop culture becomes construed as a 
representation of what is feared by the nondisabled viewer. Garland-Thomson argues 
that the rhetorics surrounding the individual with disabilities – cure, rehabilitation, and 
choice – are not only derived from, but also  
constitute part of the context into which all representations of disabled 
people enter.  Not only do these representational modes configure public 
perception of disability, but all images of disabled people either 
inadvertently or deliberately summon these visual rhetorics and their 
accompanying cultural narratives. None of these rhetorical modes 
operates in the service of actual disabled people, however. Indeed almost 
all of them appropriate the disabled body for the purposes of constructing, 
instructing, or assuring some aspect of a putatively nondisabled viewer. 
(58-59) 
People with disabilities thus become a representation of the aberrant, a source of pity, 
fear, or adoration for the nondisabled viewer. Consequently, these representations render 
the person with disabilities as a body that exists outside social expectations of what it 
means to be human, and therefore valuable. Indeed, Clare notes that nondisabled people 
“came [to freak shows] to be educated and entertained, titillated and repulsed. They 
came to have their ideas of normal and abnormal, superior and inferior, their sense of 
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self, confirmed and strengthened” (86). Thus, many representations of disability operate 
as affirmations of the fears, beliefs, and fantasies of nondisabled people towards people 
with disabilities. 
It is this attitude of nondisabled people that created and sustained the image of 
the freak or the monster, which in turn gave rise to the development of the American 
freak show, such as those by PT Barnum. The freak show represented the intersection of 
nineteenth-century preoccupation with display and the capitalization of pathological 
difference. Garland-Thomson argues in Extraordinary Bodies that “by highlighting 
ostensible human anomaly of every sort and combination, [the freak show] challenged 
audiences not only to classify and explain what they saw, but to relate the performance 
to themselves, to American individual and collective identity” (58). In this way, the 
freak show created and demonstrated emerging definitions of monstrosity and freakdom 
by, as Clare writes, “carefully constructing an exaggerated divide between ‘normal’ and 
Other, sustained in turn by the rubes willing to pay good money to stare” (87). The freak 
show provided a place for nondisabled people to pay to stare at what they were not and 
what they did not want to become; ultimately the freak show served to make the divide 
between “normal” and “abnormal” more rigid and distinct. By doing so, representations 
of people with disabilities came to be largely defined by what it does for the experience 
for nondisabled people.  
Gagability 
The relationship of the disabled body and disability to ableist systems occurs 
through Gaga’s theorization of the freak and the monster. Garland-Thomson writes that a 
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freak “bore evidence of ‘nature’s sport,’ God’s infinite capacity for mysterious surprise, 
or simply inspired delight” (164). Monsters, similarly, are beings “whose bodies are 
simultaneously ordinary and extraordinary” (163). Likewise, for Gaga, the freak or the 
monster is the person who has been rejected based on the expectations of society and 
what it means to be “normal.” Calling her fans “Little Monsters,” Gaga embraces that 
which deems them abnormal in society and encourages them to resist such rejection. 
During her Monster Ball tour, Gaga says to her audience, “I want you to forget all of 
your insecurities. I want you to reject anyone or anything that’s ever made you feel like 
you don’t belong. Or don’t fit in. Or made you feel like you’re not good enough, or 
pretty enough, or thin enough…” Under this definition of “freak” or “monster,” Gaga is 
including anyone who has ever felt like they do not belong because their behavior or 
their bodies do not conform to societal standards of what it means to be “normal.” By 
adopting such a broad definition, Gaga is pointing to the ways that “freak” and 
“monster” are constructed, given the fact that the definitions never remain static, as they 
change with the context. The audience may be freaks outside the doors of the arena, but 
as Gaga proclaims at the start of the show, “all the freaks are outside and I locked the 
fucking doors. It don't matter who you are, where you come from, or how much money 
you got in your pocket, because tonight and every other after night you could be 
whoever is that you want to be.” Thus, not only does the definition of “freak” always 
change, Gaga points to how those who occupy the position of “freak” are only relegated 
as such because of those on the other side of the locked door. Freakdom, for Gaga, is 
only a matter of perspective. 
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Gaga’s position of what it means to be a freak or monster aligns with more 
traditional definitions of disability within the field of Disability Studies. Clare identifies 
“disability” as “an adjective to name what this ableist world does to us crips and gimps” 
(83).  Additionally, with regard to the word “freak” in relation to disability, Clare urges 
for an awareness of the multiple histories of the word and its relationship to 
understandings of disability, which, I argue, is a relationship that Gaga enacts (85). 
Thus, when Gaga talks of the freak or the monster, she is necessarily invoking the image 
and a history of the disabled body, making her contribution to conversations surrounding 
freakdom essential to understanding how disability and normality is understood and 
represented in contemporary culture. 
The presence of disability in Gaga’s performances is largely meant to convey a 
critique of the ways in which “abnormal” is diagnosed and consequently dealt with. A 
2009 promotional photoshoot by photographer David LaChappelle features her lying 
next to a wheelchair and standing with a pair of crutches, similar to those used in the 
2009 video for “Paparazzi,” where she is also shown rising from a wheelchair. The 
criticism leveled against this performance has largely argued that in portraying disability 
as something that can be “overcome,” Gaga is using disability as a metaphor something 
negative about the character or her situation that she must “overcome.” Furthermore, 
feminist writer Annaham has argued that Gaga’s hidden, temporary disability in the 
video is the crux of what makes the representation of disability so offensive. She cites 
Susan Wendell, who argues that "[t]he public world is the world of strength, the positive 
(valued) body, performance and production, the able-bodied and youth," while "illness, 
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rest and recovery, pain, death and the negative (de-valued) body are private, generally 
hidden, and often neglected” (115). In this way, Annaham reasons, Gaga’s 
representation of disability reinforces this practice and idea, representing disability as 
something that needs to be hidden until it can be “overcome,” whereupon starlet Gaga 
can once again have her picture taken. According to Gaga, the video “explores ideas 
about sort of hyperbolic situations that people will go to in order to be famous” (Patch). 
Putting this in context with Annaham’s argument, the use of disability can indeed be 
read as something that is represented as hidden and capable of “overcoming,” but its 
presence also serves as a critique of that mindset. If the video is about the relationship 
celebrities have to their bodies – specifically in the context of being looked at – keeping 
a temporary disability hidden is, according to Gaga, one of those hyperbolic situations 
that people will go to in order to be famous, that is, to be ashamed of a body that is less 
than perfect. Yet the way in which Gaga deploys this critique is troubling: in 
highlighting the ways in which celebrity or fame reject material experiences in favor of 
more “plastic” experiences20, Gaga is rejecting the material, lived experiences of bodies. 
Consequently, the use of disability becomes a device or tool in this video, reiterating the 
attitude that disability need only be acknowledged in the service of nondisabled people 
and experiences, thus erasing bodies of people with disabilities and their experiences 
from this representation in the process.  
Yet as Gaga’s career and aesthetic has developed, her own lived experiences 
have informed more nuanced understandings and acknowledgments of disability in her 
                                                 
20
 Hence the line of the song, “We’re plastic, but we still have fun.” (“Paparazzi.”) 
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performances and personal life. Her 2009 video for “Bad Romance” features a variety of 
symbols associated with psychiatric hospitals, as well as images and themes of the freak 
show, demonstrating how the freak show continues not only in medical practices, but 
through popular representations of “abnormal” bodies (“Lady Gaga - Bad Romance”).  
Assistive devices have had a prevalent theme throughout most of her videos and 
performances, including her 2010 video for “Yoü And I,” featuring a variety of disabled 
Gagas in the quest to medically “fix” their bodies, and live performances of the song 
have frequently featured the use of a wheelchair while she is dressed as Yuyi the 
Mermaid, also featured in the video (“Lady Gaga - Yoü And I”). This use of the 
wheelchair in live performances sparked outrage, accusing Gaga of glamorizing 
disability
21. Yet Gaga’s use of the wheelchair was simply to be able to move around 
while dressed as Yuyi, the mermaid whose body is mutilated in the attempt to make her 
more “normal.” A similar backlash occurred following her February 2013 hip surgery, 
where she was seen being transported in a 24 karat wheelchair, opening her up to 
accusations of once again glamorizing disability, even going so far as to claim that 
Gaga’s need for a wheelchair was a publicity stunt (Dasilva). This backlash against 
Gaga’s use of a wheelchair – not in a performance, but in a medical situation where she 
literally could not walk – denies her subjectivity and rhetorical agency as a person with a 
disability, temporary or not. Thus central to understanding her use of disability is her 
                                                 
21
 Ironically, a large part of what became known as “mermaidgate” is the response from Bette Midler, 
accusing Gaga of stealing her concept of Delores DeLago, a beached mermaid in an electric wheelchair. 
Midler’s use of the wheelchair made disability the punch line of the joke, a fact overlooked in the critique 
of Gaga’s use of the wheelchair. 
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personal relationship to disability, particularly her status as a performer with a disability. 
She has been very open about her mental health, and her struggles with bulimia and 
anorexia. She is also deeply connected to her aunt Joanne, who died of lupus before 
Gaga was born. In an interview with Vanity Fair, Gaga says, “I was born, it's almost as if 
[I was Joanne’s] unfinished business…And one of [my guides] told me he can feel I 
have two hearts in my chest, and I believe that about myself." (qtd. in Robinson, 139). 
Thus Joanne’s struggle and early death has had a great influence on Gaga and how she 
understands herself and her body. In Caitlin Moran’s 2010 Times Interview Gaga speaks 
about living with that connection and the potential for developing the same disease:  
“What’s the nearest you’ve ever come to death?” I ask her. “Do 
you have any recurring illnesses?” 
  She goes oddly still for a moment, and then says, “I have heart 
palpitations and… things.” 
  “Recently?” 
  “Yes, but it’s OK. It’s just from fatigue and other things,” she 
shrugs, before saying, with great care, “I’m very connected to my aunt, 
Joanne, who died of lupus. It’s a very personal thing. I don’t want my 
fans to be worried about me.” 
  Her eyes are very wide. 
  “Lupus. That’s genetic, isn’t it?” I ask. 
  “Yes.” 
  “And have you been tested?” 
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  Again, the eyes are very wide and steady. “Yes.” Pause. “But I 
don’t want anyone to be worried.” 
  “When was the last time you called the emergency services?” I 
ask.  
  “The other day,” Gaga says, still talking very carefully. “In 
Tokyo. I was having trouble breathing. I had a little oxygen, then I went 
on stage. I was OK. But like I say, I don’t want anyone to worry.” 
  It’s a very odd moment. Gaga is staring at me calmly but intently. 
  Lupus is a connective tissue disease, where the immune system 
attacks the body. It can be fatal – although, as medicine advances, 
fatalities are becoming rarer. What it more commonly does is cause heart 
palpitations, shortness of breath, joint pain and anaemia, before 
spasmodically but recurrently driving a truck through your energy levels, 
so that you are often too fatigued to accomplish even the simplest of 
tasks. 
  Suddenly, all the “Gaga cracking up” stories revolve 180 degrees, 
and turn into something completely different. After all, the woman before 
me seems about as far removed from someone on the verge of a fame-
induced nervous breakdown as possible to imagine… Of course, she 
hasn’t said, outright, “I have lupus.” But the suggestion throws the whole 
previous year – being delayed on stage, cancelling gigs, having to call the 
emergency services – into sharp relief. 
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Just a month after this interview was published, she told Larry King that she tested 
“borderline positive” for lupus, and in February 2013, she canceled her tour due to the 
chronic pain of synovitis, a condition typically considered a symptom of lupus 
(Sepkowitz). Thus the awareness of disability and the implications of developing the 
same disease her aunt died from have always been in Gaga’s conscious; it is no surprise 
then, that Gaga would confront some of the constructions of disability, the disabled 
body, and what it means to live with a disability.  
As someone who has tested “borderline positive” for lupus, Gaga’s use of 
disability in her performances and self-presentations can also signal the ways in which 
she is working through her identification as someone living with a disability. Her 
infamous “disco stick” – a favorite prop made from a chrome pole with crushed acrylic 
plastic at the top – bears a stark resemblance to the large walking stick called the “staff 
of madness” that appears in medieval and Renaissance art, used to identify a person with 
a disability (particularly one with a psychological disability) (Gilman 7). The music 
video for “Marry the Night,” the fifth single from Born This Way, offers Gaga’s first 
explicit admittance of a psychological disability, or in Moran’s terms, she uses this video 
as a way to say outright, “I was/am crazy.” The video chronicles Gaga’s nervous 
breakdown and the process by which she came to accept and identify herself as “crazy.” 
The video opens with the image of Gaga being wheeled into a clinic on a gurney, 
accompanied by a voice over:   
When I look back on my life, it’s not that I don’t want to see things 
exactly as they happened, it’s just that I prefer to remember them in an 
 141 
 
artistic way. And truthfully, the lie of it all is much more honest, because 
I invented it. Clinical psychology tells us, arguably, that trauma is the 
ultimate killer. Memories are not recycled like atoms and particles in 
quantum physics. They can be lost forever. It’s sort of like my past is an 
unfinished painting, and as the artist of that painting, I must fill in all the 
ugly holes and make it beautiful again. It’s not that I’ve been dishonest, 
it’s just that I loathe reality. For example, those nurses? They’re wearing 
next-season Calvin Klein, and so am I. And the shoes? Custom Giuseppe 
Zanotti. I tipped their gauze caps to the side like Parisian berets because I 
think it’s romantic, and I also believe that mint will be very big in fashion 
next spring…The truth is, back at the clinic, they only wore those funny 
hats to keep the blood out of their hair. 
Pointing to clinical psychology brings disability directly into Gaga’s argument. Calling 
on institutions that determine the state of normality with regard to a person’s mind, Gaga 
is challenging the use of the term “trauma” and its implications on the perception of 
reality. If trauma is a psychological injury, Gaga is giving a body to thought and 
perception, confronting the notion that experiences injure the mind and are in turn 
represented in the body. Indeed, the music video opens up with Gaga’s entrance into a 
psychological rehabilitation clinic as a result of the psychotic breakdown she 
experiences (viewed later in the video). This breakdown is represented as a loss of 
control over her body: she is seen throwing things, screaming, and crying, that is, using 
her body to express something that is considered “abnormal” by her peers and her 
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environment. Alternatively, the “rehab” part of the video is represented as a controlled 
version of her body, lying in a hospital bed, medicated, and sedate. Interestingly enough, 
the elements that lead up to her psychotic break are scenes that represent her body as 
acting “abnormally,” demonstrating the link between what is considered “abnormal” and 
the ways that such abnormality is and must always be treated.   
This invention extends to her representation of the clinic itself. As demonstrated 
though her work up to this point, Gaga understands fashion as a representation of the 
ways that the body too often becomes a text upon which designations are placed, but 
also a place where those designations can be refigured to represent the opposite, that the 
body is that which is always writing. Indeed, Gaga is often criticized for wearing 
clothing that is “inappropriate” for the body – such as the flank steak that constituted the 
“Meat Dress” at the 2010 MTV Video Music Awards – which calls attention to the ways 
that there are expectations about how the body must always be presented, and when 
those expectations are not met, designations of “abnormal” are placed onto it.22 Indeed, 
there are around 123,000,000 hits produced from a Google search of “Lady Gaga crazy.” 
The argument for the link between physical behavior and appearance with mental 
“stability” is not new (as demonstrated with examples such as the “ugly laws”), but it is, 
however, a construction of the cultural fantasy of what it means to be “normal.” By 
refiguring the way that we (literally) view rehabilitation, Gaga is emphasizing the 
                                                 
22
 Incidentally, the “Meat Dress” is a critique of Don’t Ask Don’t tell, an interpretation of the need to stand 
up for human rights because, as Gaga argued, bodies are not just “pieces of meat.”  
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construction around the ways that ideas of disability and cure are understood under the 
fantasy of “normality.”   
In construing reality as art, Gaga is pointing to the different ways that reality is 
represented, dependent on perspective. For Gaga, reality is not necessarily “things 
exactly as they happened,” it is the way she chooses to remember and interpret her 
experiences. Thus what may be construed as abnormal by society can be altered and 
accepted as beautiful by the individual: every person – the artist of their own painting – 
has the capacity to fill in the holes to make it beautiful. It is up to the artist, however, to 
decide what the holes are that need to be filled in.  Ultimately what Gaga is arguing with 
this metaphor is that if we think of reality as art – as something constructed, something 
that is an expression of the aesthetic values of what is considered beautiful – then the 
“reality” of abnormality – and normality or beauty, by extension – can always be altered. 
This alteration, the filling in of holes, becomes more honest because it is not bound to 
the social designations of abnormality, rather, it reflects bodies and people better 
precisely because it is without the “reality” of “normal” or “abnormal.” Thus Gaga uses 
the term “invented” to demonstrate how even what is considered “real” is always just an 
invention of the person looking. Furthermore, the expectation of one to “fill in the holes” 
signals the resistance to fragmentation, much like the resistance to the fragmented, 
disabled body. “Filling in the holes” in this context can also signify performing able-
bodiedness, trying to rehabilitate or cure the “holes” so as to be seen as appealing and 
“normal.” 
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Alejandro  
Ultimately, what makes these post-“Paparazzi” uses of disability work within her 
critiques is her attention and response to the ways in which disability is theorized as 
monstrous, fragmented, and vulnerable to expulsion, but most importantly, the ways in 
which these theorizations affect the body. Gaga’s consistent use of elements considered 
“abnormal” challenges the logics of freakdom that identify and restrict unwanted bodies, 
and the eugenicist logics that attempted to remove those bodies from view and 
participation. Because Gaga deploys this critique through the body, she necessarily 
invokes the histories of eugenicist practices against bodies, particularly through her 
references to the Holocaust, most notably in the music video for her 2010 single, 
“Alejandro,” directed by Steven Klein. Gaga told Larry King that the video is a 
“celebration of my love and appreciation for the gay community, my admiration of their 
bravery, their love for one another and their courage in their relationships,” and in an 
interview with The Times, that “in the video I'm pining for the love of my gay friends—
but they just don't want me to be with them.” To portray this, Gaga frames the video as a 
response to and resistance of eugenicist and normalizing practices that dis/able 
“abnormal” bodies. In this way, thinking about disability in this video is essential to 
understanding her critique of normalization because it is deployed through bodily 
performances of “normal.” As Robert McRuer argues, “it is with this repetition that we 
can…locate both the ways in which able-bodiedness and heterosexuality are interwoven 
and the ways in which they might be contested….Moreover, as with heterosexuality, this 
repetition [of able-bodiedness] is bound to fail, as the ideal able-bodied identity can 
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never, once and for all, be achieved” (9). Positioning heterosexuality and the 
performance of able-bodiedness associated with heterosexuality as “normal,” Gaga 
demonstrates how anything that deviates from this “norm” is susceptible to removal. 
Consistent with many of her performances and storylines, Gaga appears as three 
characters – who I am calling queen Gaga, religious Gaga, and activist Gaga – that 
represent how systems of normalization and eugenicist logic move through the body. 
Queen Gaga is responsible for overlooking and enforcing standards of normalcy over her 
subjects (her male dancers, wearing skin-tight boxing briefs and matching bowl haircuts) 
via her Nazi-clad soldiers. When a female subject (religious Gaga) is incited by activist 
Gaga to challenge these restrictive standards of “normal,” she joins the male subjects in 
an attempt to become part of their group. Ultimately, she is rejected from the group– 
primarily due to the fact that she is a female – and is forced to rejoin the religious order 
from where she came. Yet she continues to be unable to meet the restrictions and 
expectations put on her body, and she dies. Her funeral procession is led by queen Gaga.  
Each character shows the extent to which structures of oppression seek to 
normalize bodies by the threat of exclusion and expulsion, but also the possibilities of 
thinking outside systems of normalization that require such exclusion and expulsion. She 
first presents herself as a queen or political figurehead, representing the “rules” or 
“norms” that govern a system. Thinking about this in terms of ableism and ableist 
structures, we can understand queen Gaga as representing the cultural norms regarding 
normality, and by extension, disability, including what disability “looks” like, its 
proximity to “normal,” and the unchallenged assumptions about the abilities of a 
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disabled or “abnormal” body. This character is limited to seeing things through a 
terministic screen
23
, and despite efforts to see outside of it, is never fully removed from 
it. Religious Gaga is the second character the audience sees, and is represented the most 
throughout the video. She is primarily depicted as a woman who attempts to embody 
“normal,” and in her failure, returns to her place as a nun. In this case, the oldest model 
of disability or the designation of “abnormal” is represented here, that is, the 
religious/moral model. While extreme and less prevalent today, this model equates 
disability and “abnormality” with something negative or “lacking,” serving as a 
“warning” or “lesson” to nondisabled, or “normal” people. Furthermore, this model 
posits that people with disabilities or “abnormalities” are morally responsible for their 
disabilities, leading to the rationale to conceal and exclude them. The last character Gaga 
represents, activist Gaga, is closest to her own persona, representing the confrontation 
of, and resistance to, the reiteration of norms that establish ideas of “normal” and 
“abnormal.” Gaga’s goal throughout this video is to show the ways in which these 
oppressive structures function and overlap with one another, thus it is important to note 
that the characters overlap and are not meant to be static, that is, the characters are never 
“wholly good” nor “wholly bad” at any time. Ultimately, the characters and storyline 
that Gaga develops shows the interaction between the logics of eugenics, freakdom, and 
disability: characters literally perform normality, those who cannot are dis/abled from 
participation, some are given assistive devices to help them maintain a position of 
                                                 
23
 A terministic screen is a concept developed by Kenneth Burke to consider the reasons why 
interpretations of signs vary among humans, based on the construction of symbols, meanings, and reality 
(“Terministic Screens,” 45).  
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“normal” (including binoculars and strings attached to the body), and those for whom 
rehabilitation or similar efforts towards “normal” fail are later removed. Despite the fact 
that the video is not told chronologically, the analysis that follows will focus on the 
chronological story of the three characters, one at a time. In this way, the characters’ 
constructions, motives, and ultimate roles in the video can be analyzed in more detail, 
ultimately demonstrating many (but not all) of the ways in which the characters and 
stories overlap.  
Queen Gaga 
The first time the audience sees Gaga in the video, she is representing herself as a 
political figurehead, surrounded by military men who are wearing the red band on the 
arm of a uniform that distinctly resembles a Nazi uniform. As Nazi structures of power 
are among the most recognizable structures that explicitly rely on eugenicist practices in 
order to achieve “normality,” this presence serves as a reminder of the extents to which 
“abnormal” is simultaneously needed and resisted. Indeed, the video itself can be 
understood as the process by which “abnormal” is determined and how it is immediately 
dealt with. Queen Gaga is most frequently shown sitting in front of an open window 
with two soldiers, wearing a metal headpiece that resembles a crown. Sounds of a large 
crowd can be heard as the video begins. In these scenes, queen Gaga is shown holding a 
smoking pipe as she looks down onto a group of men below who look and act almost 
identical to one another. The men’s sexuality is controlled and challenged into 
aggressive military posturing, simultaneously violent and erotic. They perform this 
control in front of a screen, showing images on a loop. The screen alternates between 
 148 
 
two scenes, one of a storefront on fire and the other of groups of people running through 
the smoke caused from the fire. Both scenes are at night, and shot in black and white.  
Although unconfirmed, it is generally agreed upon by fans as most likely meant to 
portray images of Kristallnacht, a series of coordinated attacks against Jewish-owned 
stores, buildings, and synagogues in Nazi Germany and parts of Austria in late 1938.  
This reference to Kristallnacht – or images that are most often associated with 
Kristallnacht – is significant in this scene because of its place in history: regarded to be 
the beginning of the “Final Solution,” Kristallnacht was the attempt to eliminate 
unwanted bodies by attempting to eliminate the elements associated with and valuable to 
those unwanted bodies. By removing a context for the victims of Kristallnacht, Nazi 
Germany attempted to rewrite a new context that would restrict and prevent the 
movement of certain bodies in this “new society.” In this video, the men who are 
dancing in front of this screen represent the attempt to remove and rewrite contexts that 
limit unwanted bodies by performing uniformity, thus creating a context for what it 
means to be “normal.” Furthermore, this reference establishes the power dynamic 
between the rule-governing queen Gaga and her subjects: not only does queen Gaga 
have the power to institute violence against unwanted elements and bodies, she also has 
the power to look on to this violence without intervening.  
As queen Gaga looks down on the men dancing in front of her, there is a soldier 
sitting in the room wearing a stylized helmet with strings attached to his body. His 
absence from the group of men below combined with the strings attached to his body 
suggests that the man is unable to perform the able-bodiedness demonstrated below and 
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thus requires the use of these strings – which can be understood here as an assistive 
device – to help him achieve this bodily performance of normality. Furthermore, he is 
also the only male in the video shown with a tattoo and any kind of body hair, further 
suggesting his deviance from the “norm.” Although subjected to the same rules of 
“normality” that religious Gaga is, he is able to remain alive because of his privilege of 
being a male in a male-dominated system that successfully employs assistive devices 
that help him perform able-bodiedness. He does, however, remain hidden from view in 
this room for the entirety of the video, fulfilling his “duty” as an “abnormal” body in a 
system that needs, but does not want to view, “abnormality.” Furthermore, the first time 
queen Gaga is shown looking directly into the camera, the scene bleeds into an image of 
this man looking away from the camera. This move signals two significant things about 
understanding the character of queen Gaga and the man: she finds herself trapped and 
restricted by her “duty” to enforcing norms, just as this man is literally trapped by his 
own “duty” to these same norms – that is, to remain hidden. Secondly, this move signals 
the power that queen Gaga has, namely that she has the privilege and ability to confront 
the rules of “normality” (i.e. she can look directly into the camera), but this man’s body 
is limited to the point where he cannot. In this way, queen Gaga and the man reflect each 
other: they both are restricted by the norms they enforce and perpetuate – she because 
she is a governing head, and he because he is enfreaked as an example of “abnormal.” 
Just as the “rules” that govern normality often require “props” to designate 
abnormality, the characters in the queen Gaga segments are no different. While the 
man’s position is determined by the strings on his body, queen Gaga’s props include the 
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crown, the binoculars, and the veil. Each of these “props” not only rely on typical usages 
of the symbols – the crown as power, for example – but also uses them to challenge the 
reliance on the static meaning of the props. For example, the use of eyewear to represent 
a way of seeing things – or through a terministic screen – is a popular trope throughout 
Gaga’s performances. The lenses of the binoculars are covered with black lace, the same 
black lace used as a veil in the religious Gaga’s funeral procession scene . Not only does 
the black lace serve as an identifier for queen Gaga, it also serves to represent the ways 
in which this rule-governing Gaga views those bodies that surround her. Most often used 
to symbolize death, the black lace in the lenses of her binoculars represents systems that 
require removal,
24
 the complex patterns of the lace making it nearly impossible to obtain 
an unobstructed view. Interestingly, however, a close up of the lace that covers the lens 
of the binoculars shows the small holes that would allow her access and unobstructed 
view, and since they cover lenses of binoculars, she is capable of seeing such a view 
when she wishes. Furthermore, Gaga is able to remove the lenses of the binoculars away 
from her face, either one at a time – complicating the depth perception of what she 
views, thereby only seeing something without its fully defined relationship to what is 
around it – or both at the same time; additionally, she is also able to remove the veil 
                                                 
24
 This is not unlike Foucault’s concept of biopower, where bodies are controlled and managed in an effort 
to nurture the life and health of the population: “By this I mean a number of phenomena that seem to me to 
be quite significant, namely, the set of mechanisms through which the basic biological features of the 
human species became the object of a political strategy, of a general strategy of power, or, in other words, 
how, starting from the 18th century, modern Western societies took on board the fundamental biological 
fact that human beings are a species. This is what I have called biopower" (Security, Territory, Population, 
1). It is important to note that biopower has a function apart from discipline in that “discipline is the 
technology deployed to make individuals behave, to be efficient and productive workers, biopolics is 
deployed to manage population; for example, to ensure a healthy workforce.”  (Society Must Be Defended, 
239). In this context, Queen Gaga can be understood as not disciplining “abnormal” bodies, but rather 
removing and hiding “abnormal” bodies so as to ensure the rest of her subjects continue to be “normal.”  
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made of the same lace. This signals one of the most important tenants of Gaga’s work: 
nothing exists independent of its opposite, therefore nothing is wholly “good” or wholly 
“bad.” In this context, despite positioning the political Gaga as bad, she is demonstrating 
the capability for this Gaga to move outside of the designation of “bad:” she is able to 
see outside a system that requires removal, but also the “rules” of ableist systems. 
Understanding this Gaga as a representation of the “rules” that govern ableist systems, 
the crown, binoculars, and lace demonstrate the constructedness of these rules and how 
they are deployed, but more significantly, the possibility of working outside of those 
rules.  
Religious Gaga 
The majority of the video chronicles religious Gaga’s attempt, and ultimate 
failure, to work outside of these rules. Like queen Gaga, religious Gaga is restricted to 
moving within ableist systems of normalization; unlike queen Gaga, religious Gaga is 
depicted as resisting this model and punished by it. In other words, religious Gaga’s 
actions should not be understood as representing the moral/religious model of 
designating abnormality, rather her actions should be understood as a resistance to this 
model and the nature of the consequences of this resistance. Chronologically, religious 
Gaga first appears in a white latex nun’s habit. The white habit is accented with red on 
the outline of her hood, and upside down crosses cover the back of her head, her torso, 
and her forearms; the gown opens up and reveals a red cross on her underwear, 
appearing to protrude from between her legs. She stands with the male dancers that 
queen Gaga looked down upon, the screen showing scenes of a fire in color. The men lie 
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in a circle around her, eventually standing to lift her body and repeatedly throw her up in 
the air. Her body is then carried in the same fashion the casket is carried in the funeral 
procession scenes. She is brought back to the ground, violently pushed among the men, 
and eventually disrobed.  
Religious Gaga is attempting to challenge the “moral” rules of an ableist and 
normalizing system by stepping outside the designation placed on her body. Working 
within a system bound by moral or religious rules that threatens to punish “abnormal” 
bodies on the basis of their “abnormalities,” religious Gaga denies the expectations put 
on her body and attempts to embody a different version of “normal.” The audience first 
sees her join the men in what can be assumed as in her typical role – both Gaga and the 
men move in sync and with purpose, as if the audience is witnessing a customary ritual. 
Here, Gaga is playing her assigned role. Once she allows the men to hold her up and 
carry her as if she were dead, she is symbolically and literally being carried to her death: 
the ritualistic Gaga is being removed, but as a consequence of this removal, her body is 
literally removed in death. She is then thrown up into the air by the men, symbolic of the 
men joining Gaga in rejecting the religious system that imposes the standard of “normal” 
they were compelled to live by. This rejection culminates in the act of disrobing Gaga of 
the religious imagery imposed on her body, leaving her nearly nude and resembling the 
uniformed look of the men.  
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Gaga begins performing the ritualistic acts of normalcy along with the men, 
including a choreographed dance
25
 and a series of simulated sex acts. Here, the men are 
in a room with a number of beds, resembling those that would be found in military 
barracks or in insane asylums. While not restricted to the beds, the men never leave 
them, instead holding on to leather whips that are tied to the bed. Religious Gaga is also 
shown holding on to the leather whips, but moving from bed to bed, even holding on to 
two whips from two beds at the same time. Within this framework that critiques 
eugenicist practices against bodies, this scene can be understood as a critique of the ways 
in which sex and expressions of (heterosexual) sexuality become normalized for the 
purposes of reproduction. In Foucaudian terms, Gaga is creating a space for a discourse 
on sexuality that frees her and all those with her from the repressive structures that deem 
non-reproductive sex as a violation of natural practice (History of Sexuality Volume 1, 
7). Because sex is largely understood as an object of scientific investigation, subjects are 
expected to confess, whereupon those confessions would be codified into a scientific 
form (12). Religious Gaga presents herself as Catholic
26
, and in Catholic teaching, 
confession (called the “Sacrament of Penance”) serves as the only way to receive God’s 
forgiveness for mortal sins. Thus religious Gaga uses this space to confess both her 
“unnatural” desires and the rehearsal of these desires, but also as a space to resist the 
scientific approach to her confession.  
                                                 
25
 A lot of religious Gaga’s choreography is an attempt to mimic activist Gaga, discussed more below. The 
most notable moment is when religious Gaga mimes a gun coming from her body, resembling the literal 
gun barrel’s coming from activist Gaga’s bra. 
 
26
 Gaga also identifies as Catholic.  
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One way Gaga accomplishes this resistance is consistently demonstrating what 
sex is outside of these scientific, normalized practices: men move provocatively and 
simulate sex alone on beds, Gaga simulates sex with a phallus in a variety of positions, 
and men simulate violent sex with Gaga. These actions are considered counter to the 
goals of reproduction – men cannot reproduce on their own, women do not have penises, 
and violence signals restriction and removal, the antithesis to reproduction – but even 
more so, they represent what a variety of moral-governing systems of power (including 
many organized religions) consider “abnormal” or “unnatural’ expressions of sexuality. 
In this way, Gaga is demonstrating the resistance to what Foucault calls “power over 
life,” power that is primarily enforced in the interests of creating and preserving life 
(209). Sex is acceptable as long as it produces something positive, therefore sex between 
men is unacceptable because nothing is produced, and sex between a straight woman and 
a gay man is not acceptable, for fear of reproducing the “abnormality” of homosexuality. 
Thus, by performing “abnormal” in this context, Gaga is demonstrating the 
constructedness of morality and how that morality is normalized and expressed through 
the body.  
Ultimately, however, religious Gaga cannot fully engage in these practices. As 
mentioned above, central to the men’s performances of normality is largely centered on 
acts of channeling their sexuality through other means. Because religious Gaga is not a 
gay man, she cannot ever fully inhabit this space or these practices, and she is rejected.  
She is consequently confined to the room where the audience first encountered the 
soldier with the strings attached to his body. She is shown lying on a bed, also with 
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strings attached to her body. Her white latex habit has been replaced with a red habit, 
also latex. This replacement is highly significant, given the ways in which the colors 
have been inverted: whereas religious Gaga began with an all-white habit with red 
accents, she is now seen with an all-red habit with a white hood. The red on the habits 
can be understood as markers of where power and control have the most effect. Wearing 
the white habit, the red appears around her face (the way she looks), on the back of her 
head (the way she thinks), her arms (the way she acts), down the middle of her torso (the 
way she moves) and between her legs (the way she expresses her sexuality). Wearing the 
red habit, however, her body is under complete control of the systems of normalization 
she is navigating. Having experienced the possibilities of existing outside these systems, 
she is aware of the control being pushed onto her body and resists it, hence the all-white 
hood. This resistance ultimately costs her, however, as it is understood as an incapability 
of performing the able-bodiedness expected of her, and she dies. Ultimately, religious 
Gaga’s fate is due to her inability to “fit in” with the men, determined by her “lacking,” 
that is, lacking the body of a male and the ability to perform normalcy in the male-
centric space; furthermore, her choice to try and “fit in” with the men – consequently 
highlighting her “abnormalities” as both a woman among the male subjects, and as a 
woman who resists her designated role – renders her as responsible for this fate, her 
confinement and death serving as the punishment for her choices.  
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Activist Gaga 
The character that motivates the plot is activist Gaga, who creates a space for 
religious Gaga to rebel and who is presented as in stark opposition to queen Gaga
27
. 
Activist Gaga is shown primarily in black and white and separate from the settings of 
Gaga’s other characters. The significance of her scenes in the video are twofold: by 
demonstrating a resistance to the system of normalization placed onto bodies, she 
identifies exactly what that system looks like, but also what a successful resistance to it 
looks like as well. The audience is introduced to activist Gaga in the opening frames of 
the video, largely a reference to the Broadway musical Cabaret
28
. Although not seen 
directly, as the camera pans across a dark cabaret filled with sleeping Nazi soldiers, her 
legs are visible as she stands on the stage. Most of the soldiers are in full uniform, 
however the shot of the cabaret begins by focusing out and moving away from one 
soldier in particular, who is passed out wearing fishnet stockings and heels. Only one 
soldier is awake, staring into the distance, and is shown just before the scene fades into a 
dark warehouse. This placement of activist Gaga among the Nazi soldiers in the opening 
of the video frame the oppressive structures through which the three Gagas will 
                                                 
27
 Because of this insistence on “opposition,” i.e. activist Gaga is “good” and queen Gaga is “bad,” as the 
video plays out, it becomes clear that queen Gaga and activist Gaga are, in fact, representatives of different 
parts of each other – their existence depends on one another. In this way, the video opens with queen Gaga 
and activist Gaga as binaries, and the story of religious Gaga then deconstructs this binary.  
 
28
 Much of the video can be interpreted as an homage to the musical, including a dance number dedicated 
to choreographer Bob Fosse, the director of the film version of Cabaret, as well as Gaga’s black-and-white 
sequence where she is seen in a blonde bob and an outfit similar to one of Liza Minnelli’s performance 
costumes. Indeed, the story of Cabaret is set in 1931 Berlin, just as the Nazis are rising to power. Though 
the actions and progress of the Nazis are only mentioned occasionally, the characters’ own changing 
actions and attitudes are meant to reflect the changing attitudes of the nation; indeed, in the film version of 
the show, the cabaret’s audience at the end of the film is dominated by Nazi party members.   
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simultaneously perpetuate and navigate throughout the video. These opening scenes 
suggest that despite the uniformity of this oppressive structure, the lines between normal 
and abnormal are blurred: in this scene, “normal” is solidified through repetition, that is, 
to be “normal” is to be asleep, since that is what the majority of the soldiers are doing. 
The soldier in the fishnet stockings and the lone soldier who is awake are not normal in 
this context, one because he does not look “normal” (not in uniform) despite performing 
normality (sleeping), and the other because he is not performing normality (he is awake) 
despite looking “normal” (he is in uniform). Thus these men – or versions of these men – 
appear throughout the video as examples of what are not wanted: they become 
enfreaked, standing in as the ultimate examples of “abnormal,” and thus vulnerable to 
expulsion. Indeed, the video can be understood as the story of the expulsion of 
“abnormal.”  
Although Gaga is not shown in the scenes that immediately follow this opening 
sequence, activist Gaga’s relationship to the men that are shown is crucial in 
understanding the movement of the plot. These men – her dancers, wearing high-waisted 
shorts and matching bowl haircuts – are the subjects of the system that queen Gaga looks 
over and controls. The men march forward in sharp military fashion holding large, metal 
pieces of religious imagery, most notably the Star of David. Because this scene 
immediately follows the soldiers sleeping in the cabaret, this scene can be understood as 
another performance of performing normalcy among those who are not officially 
required to enforce it, as the soldiers are. Then men look similar – some wearing hats, 
some covering their face – and they are moving their bodies to the same rhythm in the 
 158 
 
same direction. Again, “normal” becomes established through the actions of the 
majority: although they may look different individually, they are moving as one, giving 
the illusion of sameness. Just as in the cabaret scene, there are varying versions of what 
it means to be considered “normal” in this context: although then men perform “normal” 
in varying ways, they are all moving towards the same direction, or the same goal. The 
Star of David represents the enfreakment of what is “abnormal,” literally holding up the 
symbol of what is “abnormal” and unwanted within a context of Nazi Germany, but also 
allowing themselves to be led by this reminder of the “abnormality” that they must 
eradicate. These men are also shown performing in front of queen Gaga and will later 
attempt to help religious Gaga escape her designation as a religious figure. For activist 
Gaga, these men are key to enacting a resistance to the norms put on their body, thereby 
serving as a representative of the bodies that are caught between systems of 
normalization and the resistance that has the potential to free them of those systems.  
The first time the audience fully sees activist Gaga, she is dancing alone in a 
black and white sequence. Wearing black pants and a vest reminiscent of Liza Minelli’s 
in Cabaret, one of the most significant things about this scene among audiences and fans 
of Lady Gaga’s is the fact that this is the first time Gaga is shown wearing pants in a 
performance. Although seemingly trivial, this move is significant, given her reason as to 
why she does not wear pants: "I feel freer in underwear, and I hate fucking pants. Plus, 
it's easier to dance,” she says in a 2009 interview with Rolling Stone. She continues: 
“But really, my grandmother is basically blind, but she can make out the lighter parts, 
like my skin and hair. She says, ‘I can see you, because you have no pants on.’ So I'll 
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continue to wear no pants, even on television, so that my grandma can see me” (qtd. in 
Scaggs, 39). For Gaga, then, not wearing pants helps her feel free and less constricted 
when moving her body, but more significantly, it makes her visible to her grandmother 
with low-vision. In this way, not wearing pants becomes a rhetorical move: making 
herself literally more visible also makes her more accessible to audiences that would 
typically not have that access to her. Not wearing pants elicits stares and attention, and 
while Gaga has that attention, she forces her audiences to confront what she is saying 
about normalization and the impact it has on the body. For those in her audience who 
feel marginalized and dis/abled from social participation, these confrontations and 
conversations open up new avenues of accessibility for them to begin their own 
conversations about what systems of normalization do to their own bodies.  
Wearing pants in the activist Gaga sequence, then, signals the level of visibility 
that activist Gaga has and wants.
29
 Not only is this scene in black and white, but Gaga is 
standing in front of a black screen, wearing black pants and a black vest. She is dancing 
alone at first, and is quickly joined by uniformed soldiers with the same bowl haircut as 
the men featured in the opening of the video and dance alongside her. The scene cuts to 
color, where she is shown in a similar outfit – the same black pants but instead of a vest, 
she is wearing a bra with gun rifles attached. Here the uniformed men surround her in a 
circle as they dance, her skin and hair the only light hue in the otherwise dim scene. 
                                                 
29
 This also opens up a space for Gaga’s critique of activist Gaga, namely that the attempt to remain 
invisible or to “blend in” within a system limits the accessibility and far-reaching potential to a select 
group of (privileged) people, in this case, the high-ranking men who work for queen Gaga. Indeed, 
religious Gaga’s attempt fails because activist Gaga’s call assumes privilege that religious Gaga does not 
have.   
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Activist Gaga does not want to be highly visible, instead choosing to “blend in” amongst 
the subjects and soldiers who heed her call for revolution. The more men that surround 
her, the more visible she becomes. Thus we can understand these two scenes as activist 
Gaga first gathering the men interested in working alongside her, and the following 
scene as an enactment of this work together. Gaga’s position in the middle of the men 
and not in front of them suggests that the revolution she called for requires a new 
system, built from elements (soldiers) from another system (queen Gaga’s system of 
enforcement) with her at the center (capable and willing to change). In other words, 
activist Gaga is demonstrating the need for bricolage. The movement that occurs within 
this system thus does not always require a lineage back to a fixed center (i.e. the men do 
not have to look like Gaga in order to be in the system, and some of her choreography is 
slightly different from the men’s’); rather, it is the variation of movement away from the 
idea of a fixed center that makes this system work (the “revolution” activist Gaga wants 
to initiate is one that resists normalization and uniformity). 
This scene is expanded at the end of the video. Activist Gaga is shown on stage 
in the dark cabaret, holding a microphone and standing in front of a cross, representative 
of one of the oppressive structures she is working within. Intercut are scenes of religious 
Gaga heeding activist Gaga’s call. Activist Gaga is wearing sunglasses and a leather 
jacket, singing as the soldiers sleep. She opens her jacket to make herself visible, then 
takes off her sunglasses to see which soldiers remain asleep, that is, which soldiers are 
receptive to her message. Only one soldier is awake, the same one shown at the opening 
of the video. The audience sees the soldier watching the men dance in front of queen 
 161 
 
Gaga, his image superimposed on a video of a riot. He takes his hat off, demonstrating 
his desire to remove the oppressive structures that are placed on his body, similar to the 
way that religious Gaga is disrobed. Activist Gaga’s role within this system is to be 
“invisible” and work from within; she disguises her radical performance in the cabaret 
(the uninterested soldiers “sleep” and are oblivious to her call), and then works with the 
soldiers who are closest to the enforcement of norms to deconstruct those systems. Yet 
her incapability of working outside of her privilege, namely her relationship with queen 
Gaga’s soldiers, limits her message, and proves detrimental to those outside that 
privileged system, including religious Gaga.  
We can thus read Gaga’s three characters as representing three different bodies 
moving through these deployments of eugenicist power, each susceptible to the 
dis/abling of unwanted bodies and practices that occur in these deployments. Queen 
Gaga is responsible for enforcing the norms, but her body resists the terministic screen 
required to enforce this power. Thus she must rely on technologies that literally put the 
screen in front of her, dis/abling her from the ability to see outside of these screens. 
Religious Gaga’s body is similarly unwilling to perform the “norm” that is required of 
her as a woman, and attempts to step outside this norm and join the male subjects. But 
religious Gaga is attempting to trade in one norm for another; in this way, her response 
to activist Gaga’s call is inadequate, as activist Gaga seeks to build a new system 
entirely, and not reinforce another oppressive system. Because religious Gaga does not 
have the ability to perform the “norm” in either system, she is hidden away and strings 
are attached to her body to assist her in performing normalcy, or ability. Her body resists 
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this designation put on her – largely as a “lesson” to those trying to step outside their 
designated performances – and becomes consumed by the expectations put on her, and 
dies. Lastly, activist Gaga is actively trying to resist these systems, attempting to play the 
bricouler in constructing new systems that resist normalcy. Whereas religious Gaga 
attempted to “front” a new system, activist Gaga centers herself in the new system, 
resisting norms put on her body (she even puts phallic gun barrels over her breasts). This 
system works for her and the soldiers she is working with, but is limited because of her 
unwillingness to make herself more visible and thus more accessible.   
Conclusion 
Gaga’s video for “Alejandro” thus presents a complex look at some of the ways 
in which eugenicist logic is central to systems of power, and how that logic manifests 
through the body. Using Nazi systems of power to represent the presence of eugenics in 
the quest for normalization, Gaga is not only calling attention to the potential severity of 
eugenicist logic, but the ways in which Nazi eugenics becomes understood as something 
separate from other forms of eugenics. Indeed, the presence of Nazi systems of power in 
the video are entangled with politics, religion, and social practices; each is clearly 
connected to the Nazi presence in the video, but can also exist outside this presence. 
Thus Gaga is not using a Nazi framework to comment on Nazi eugenics, but rather to 
contextualize the ways in which even Nazi eugenics were perpetuated by other systems 
seemingly separate from Nazi politics. In this way, religion and social practices are just 
as culpable in perpetuating eugenicist logic as the Nazis are; the difference is the fact 
that they manifest in different forms, and in the process, they take on different names.  
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Garland-Thomson argues “modern culture strictly prescribes our behavior, 
appearance, and our relations with one another, even while we celebrate freedom and 
choice. Stareable sights break the rules we live by, which is what makes them unusual. 
We may want to see the unusual but perhaps not be the unusual. Novelty, in this context, 
is both what we seek and avoid” (Staring 32). Gaga, presenting herself as a visible, 
stareable sight, breaks the rules of normality that society depends on, and wholly accepts 
her position as “unusual.” Eliciting stares wherever she goes, her audience finds novelty 
in her unusualness and comfort in their “normalness,” that is, the element that 
distinguishes themselves from her. Yet as Garland-Thomson reminds and Gaga 
demonstrates, “staring…makes things happen between people” (33). For every version 
of Gaga to be stared at, there is something of her that her audience can find a bit of 
themselves in.  
This chapter has argued that Lady Gaga's work relies heavily on the image of 
disability and the disabled body to challenge systems of oppression that sustain ideas of 
normality. For Gaga, not only must the body must always be remembered and respected, 
but this respect can only occur with a recognition of the disabled body. Challenging the 
ableist conceptualizations of the body in myriad forms of meaning-making, Gaga's 
adoption of disability symbols and representations centers the disabled body as the 
element of meaning-making that makes all meaning possible.  Most importantly, Gaga 
brings disability to the fore in order to confront the oppressing structures that assign 
values to bodies, demonstrating in the process how ableism is entwined with other forms 
of oppressing structures, most of which are dependent on eugenicist logic that seeks to 
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eliminate unwanted bodies. Gaga’s adoption of elements associated with eugenics, 
disability and the freak show – including the contemporary freak show, the medical one 
– allows her the space to argue that the labels of “freak,” “monster,” or “abnormal” are 
constructions, and that everyone should embrace the very thing that sets them apart – in 
other words, she seeks to be a bricoleur of an ever-changing system that is sustained by 
difference. She posits her work and performances as a place to begin identifying what is 
assumed to be “natural” or “static” through the use of images of “abnormality” that 
surround us. Thus by subverting the visual tropes of disability through her performances, 
she challenges her critics to consider their own level of culpability in the quest to expel 
“abnormal.” She makes people look, and by inviting people to stare at her, she is inviting 
them to consider what it is about her that makes them uncomfortable. She posits her 
work and performances as a place to begin identifying these images of “abnormality” 
that surround us, and asks us to consider what it means to be “normal,” “abnormal,” or 
just “born this way.” 
My final chapter will consider the challenge to another kind of normalizing 
system: the academy. Drawing on analyses of previous chapters, I will examine some of 
the disciplinary and pedagogical implications of the presence of eugenics in dominant 
forms of meaning-making.  In doing so, I will demonstrate the enfreakment of language 
as an essential component in understanding the relationship between the body and 
meaning making, and offer a challenge to think about the ways in which the enfreakment 
of language can open up new avenues of accessibility in disciplinary and pedagogical 
practices.  
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION: TOWARDS AN ANTI-EUGENICIST PEDAGOGY AND 
DISCIPLINE 
 
Throughout this dissertation I have confronted the ableist assumptions that are 
fundamental to dominant, Western Euro-American approaches to meaning-making. I 
have focused on one aspect of this ableism, namely the reliance on the concepts of 
“wholeness” and “completeness” to establish and maintain validity in acts of meaning-
making. This “validity” is determined by norms that establish what is “normal” and what 
is “abnormal.” At play are two distinctly ableist logics, the logic of enfreakment, and the 
logic of eugenics, respectively identifying and removing  all that is considered 
“abnormal.” What this dissertation demonstrates is that eugenics continues to have a 
presence in our everyday organizational principles, informing the ableist worldview that 
continues to disregard the reality of human variation, a worldview that permeates 
dominant approaches to meaning-making and organizational principles.  
Central to the practice of positioning and determining “abnormality” are the 
linguistic, discursive, and cultural processes of enfreakment and eugenics. Identifying 
this logic and how it works at the level of language is essential, given the fact that the 
erasure of bodies can and often does begin at the level of language. Thus the move from 
language to practice is not a significant shift in practices, but rather a different version of 
the same practice. Western, EuroAmerican modes of communication thus provides the 
model for accomplishing eugenicist practices: those practices are rehearsed in order to 
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control bodies – that is, through the designation of languaged terms such as normal or 
abnormal. Attacking language is attacking the body; removing language is the beginning 
of the removal of bodies. Ignoring the implications of a system of meaning-making 
governed by this removal is to not only reject the relationship between language and the 
body but is also a step towards rejecting unwanted bodies. Thus, this dissertation has 
shown two things: that meaning-making and the body cannot be disconnected from one 
another, and that eugenics is a tool deployed to maintain systems of power by attempting 
to detach meaning-making from the body. In the context of this project, ableist systems 
of power depend on eugenicist logic to accomplish this detachment.  
Eugenicist logic reproduces what is determined as “normal,” and removes that 
which is “abnormal.” Because the degree to which “normal” can be reached is highly 
dependent on the ability to perform normality, these criteria for “normal” are found 
outside of the body, despite the veneer of “natural” that comes with the designation of 
“normal.” As I have outlined in Chapter 1, ableism operates as a system wherein the 
nondisabled body serves as the consistently “present” center. Because a version of the 
nondisabled body is always central to this system, it is assumed to be unchanging and 
thus a natural part of the system. Yet, as this dissertation has demonstrated, this assumed 
static and “natural” center  is constantly in flux in order to maintain desired versions of 
“normal,” or in this case, nondisabled. In order to respond to the changes in the system, 
eugenicist logic is deployed so as to maintain the version of “normal” required of 
elements within that system.  What is “normal” is reproduced, and what is “abnormal” is 
pushed to the periphery, seemingly removed. 
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The fact that these unwanted elements are not removed entirely lies at the heart 
of this project. First, given the fact that, as I demonstrated in Chapter 1, meaning 
assignment occurs through the process of designating what an element is not, these 
discarded elements are essential to the process of meaning assignment. Ableist systems 
are sustained through the identification of elements that are either useful or not, and this 
identification can only occur through the process of enfreakment – an example of what is 
not useful must always be present in order to maintain what is useful. In this way, 
“abnormality” is only regarded as valuable insofar as it can provide something to the 
“useful” or “normal” elements to the system. Disability becomes the limit of ability, 
serving as the example of what “ability” is not. Because of this positioning, meaning-
making becomes something that can only be obtained outside of the body; ability, then, 
serves as the degree to which this obtainment is possible. Indeed, the practice of 
enfreaking undesirable bodies for the profit – both literally and figuratively – of 
nondisabled people reflects the desire to maintain the illusion of “normal” through 
displacement and distance from whatever the viewer is not. The repeated practices of 
moving what is not considered “normal” to the periphery establishes a pattern that 
sustains an ableist system: those bodies that cannot “keep up” are not worthy of being a 
part of that system, and are therefore removed from view. Yet the presence of those 
bodies are required for the system to work: without them, the system of differences that 
maintain ideas of “normal” collapses.  
This is not to say that every language user is a eugenicist, or that every act of 
meaning-making is a eugenicist act. Rather, this project aims to show that despite the 
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consistent attempts to remove or hide unwanted bodies, these bodies never fully 
disappear, and will not disappear as long as heruistics such as the enfreakment of 
language allows us to uncover the underlying attempts at erasure. For every absence 
there is a presence; for every removal there is an addition. Eugenicist logic posits the 
removal of unneeded or unwanted elements as an integral part of development. Yet this 
idea of always moving towards something larger, that something can in fact be fully 
achieved or completed, runs counter to the ways in which Western, EuroAmerican forms 
of communication understand how meaning is made. If we continue to allow eugenicist 
logic to thrive at the foundations of understandings of communication and meaning-
making, we risk further displacing materiality in favor of the illusion of the impossible 
goal of “completeness.” Bodies will continue to become effaced and forgotten, allowing 
language and communication based on eugenicist logic to construct our ideas about 
difference, human variation, and disability.  
Indeed, as Chapter II demonstrated, the reliance on text-based language and 
communication that is dependent on eugenicist logic creates spaces in which eugenicist 
practices not only thrive, but are essential to the functioning of the structure posited by 
ableist systems. Eugenicist practices become reflections of the communication practices 
used to sequester and hide unwanted bodies. Yet, as Chapter III shows, even when trying 
to avoid or confront eugenics or eugenicist logic, this very reliance on eugenicist logic in 
language is inevitably reflected in practices. Chapter IV demonstrates one way to 
confront this reliance and work towards working within systems sustained by eugenicist 
logic and practices through bricolage.  
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This final chapter asks how an understanding of meaning-making tied to 
processes of enfreakment and eugenics affects pedagogical and disciplinary practices, 
and how the concept of bricolage is useful in working towards an anti-ableist and anti-
eugenicist pedagogy. An anti-ableist and anti-eugenicist understanding of accessibility in 
relation to composition, pedagogy, and the discipline of rhetoric itself helps us to 
recognize its reliance on the illusion of completeness and acknowledge the spaces 
created out of the implications of eugenics disguised as something other than eugenics. 
Ultimately, ableism emerges as a preventative measure against flawed bodies making 
flawed rhetoric.  
Furthermore, this chapter will interrogate ableist and eugenicist logic as it exists 
in the systems and structures in higher education. I will first examine the attempts to 
make higher education more accessible to students with disabilities, demonstrating how 
these attempts are consistently deployed in an ableist framework. I will then consider the 
implications of this framework in the writing classroom, ultimately asking what an anti-
ableist and anti-eugenicist understanding of pedagogy looks like. Lastly, I will consider 
how the field of rhetoric can become refigured to accept those histories and bodies that 
have been erased. Through such growth, bodies emerge as the essential component to all 
forms of meaning-making, allowing for continued challenges to the tradition while 
simultaneously challenging what it means to have a “tradition” in the first place. In 
doing so, I hope to challenge the reliance on the illusion of “completeness” so as to 
acknowledge the spaces created out of the implications of eugenics disguised as 
something other than eugenics.  
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The Field and Discipline of Rhetoric as a System 
  Just as I have argued throughout this project that the desire for wholeness is 
indicative of the desire for control, the similar desire for what the field of rhetoric “is” 
and “means” is indicative of the desire to maintain control over what is meant when 
rhetoric (as a discipline) is invoked. Casie C. Cobos notes that “rhetoric’s deep 
commitment to a single lineage certainly assumes a commitment to colonized ideologies 
that situate themselves deep in a Euro-American understanding of who produces 
knowledge and how” (5). Moreover, Malea Powell calls attention to the ways that 
rhetoric as a discipline has been and continues to be complicit with the 
imperial project of scholarship in the United States. I believe that rhetoric 
as a discipline does not see the foundation of blood and bodies upon 
which it constitutes itself…I believe that scholarship in America can 
never be stake forth on neutral ground. I believe that even as the 
marginalized and radical ‘anti-disciplinary’ and/or ‘cross-disciplinary 
discipline, rhetoric takes for granted its originary relation to Greece and 
Europe – its fundamental relationship to imperialism – and gives little 
critical thought at all to the geographical space in which it now exists. 
(11)  
To acknowledge the field of rhetoric’s complicity and relationship to imperialism and 
colonialism requires a simultaneous acknowledgement of the ways in which eugenics 
has, and continues, to motivate and accomplish the goals of imperialism and colonialism 
in the field. This complicity reflects the level of control that continues to be asserted 
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over not only who produces knowledge and how, but also who is allowed and able to 
produce knowledge. In her examination of the role of Bizell and Herzberg’s rhetorical 
history anthology, The Rhetorical Tradition, Cobos argues that “working as many 
anthologies do, this text assumes a central position of all-encompassing canon from 
which other texts and practices can support, stem, and stray” (6). In this way, Bizell and 
Herzberg’s anthology serves as a reminder of the ways in which as a discipline, rhetoric 
is regarded as a system with a static center, and its commitment to imperialism and 
colonialism reveal the very nature of what this so-called “center” of rhetoric is. Quite 
literally, Greek and European understandings of making meaning serve as the static 
center of this system, serving as what Bizzell calls “buttresses for what we might call the 
‘traditional tradition’” (110). Bizzell argues that this is largely due to the fact that the 
preferential treatment of Greek and European texts reflect, among other things, cultural 
factors related to gender, race, and social class (110). I wish to extend this list and 
include ability; indeed, Walter Ong explains that the early teachings of rhetoric in the 
United States was understood to be for men only, who were subjected to a series of 
agonistic competitions and indoctrinated via corporal punishment (135).  Thus this 
supposed “center” of the “rhetorical tradition” – or in Bizzell’s words, the “traditional 
tradition” – is marked by rhetoric’s relationship to the body, as both a subject to be 
studied and a practice to perform.  
Yet the relationship between rhetoric and the body is nothing new. The authors 
listed under “Classical Rhetoric” in Bizzell’s and Herzberg’s The Rhetorical Tradition 
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overwhelmingly situate and define rhetoric in relation to the body. For example, Gorgias 
argues that  
the effect of speech upon the condition of the soul is comparable to the 
power of drugs over the nature of bodies.  For just as different drugs 
dispel different secretions from the body, and some bring an end to 
disease and others to life, so also in the case of speeches, some distress, 
others delight, some cause fear, others make the hearers bold, and drug 
and bewitch the soul with a kind of evil persuasion. (46) 
Furthermore, for Plato, Aristotle, and Cicero in particular, rhetoric can only be 
performed by privileged bodies – that is, those bodies who are “born well’ and/or those 
who can imitate those “born well,” as well as those who have access to the education 
that will provide the skill and study needed to become a highly regarded orator. Implicit 
in each of these approaches to defining what rhetoric is – either by way of who can “do” 
rhetoric or what rhetoric “does” – is the need to construct these definitions around the 
bodies of those determined as unwanted or ineligible for participation. As discussed in 
Chapter II, Plato
30
 used overt eugenicist theories to define who can “do” rhetoric; his 
definitions of what rhetoric “does” similarly calls on eugenicist theories by invoking the 
body. J.M. Edie provides a brief catalogue of Plato’s use of reproductive metaphors:  
                                                 
30
 Scholars such as Schiappa and Wilcox have argued that Plato himself coined the term “rhetoric,” thus 
solidifying his place as a central figure in “pillars” of the “rhetorical tradition.” This bears a similarity to 
the way that eugenics is understood to have begun with Galton, who termed it, and who remains the face 
and father of “good” eugenics.  
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This is no exhaustive list of the passages in which this metaphor occurs, 
but in the event that the reader may feel I am exaggerating Plato’s 
reliance on the image of physical intercourse, or has been misled by 
Victorian translations from the Greek, an examination of the terminology 
of these passages should be sufficient. In the Republic…Plato applies the 
metaphor to the knowledge of reality: the soul is moved by “passion” 
[erôs] for being; it “approaches and marries”…’ through this union it 
“begets”…knowledge and is finally freed from the pains of travail”…..In 
the Symposium all men are declared to be “pregnant” (…206c), 
overflowing with desire “to beget and bring forth” (…206d); they 
approach “the beautiful one” in order “to engender and beget in the 
beautiful” (…206e). The soul is “set on fire” (…209c) and 
“consorts”…with the fair one in order to “conceive”…, “bear”…and 
“give birth”…(209c). Such words as …”to encounter,”…”to come 
together,” and “intercourse” also occur frequently in this sense. Thus 
there is a “pregnancy of the soul” (…209a) which results from the 
marriage of the soul with truth (beauty, goodness) and whose fruit is 
virtue and knowledge (212a). (555-56 fn 26; see also Symposium 206c-
207b; 208e-209c; 212a) (qtd in Ballif 13-14).  
Ballif further contextualizes Edie’s catalogue: “Thus the male logos gives birth, 
reproduces, by ejaculating the logos of the sperm. Yet as Plato is quick to warn us, the 
generative seeds should be planted in ‘suitable ground’ (Phaedrus 276b) because, of 
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course, the quality of the offspring, indeed the legitimacy of it, will depend on the 
ploughing of legitimate fields” (14). This insistence on positive eugenics – reproducing 
the “good” kinds of bodies – is intimately tied with Plato’s understanding of the function 
of rhetoric. In Gorgias, Plato contextualizes rhetoric by naming its subject, that is, “the 
greatest of human affairs, and the best” (90). The rhetorician is powerful because he has 
access to Truth, and can lead those he deems worthy to the Truth: “the endeavor, that is, 
to make the citizens’ souls as good as possible, and the persistent effort to say what is 
best, whether it prove more or less pleasant to one’s hearers” (123). Because Plato relies 
on metaphors of reproduction to build an understanding of how to arrive at Truth (and 
how to determine those who are worthy of arriving at Truth), eugenics is understood (for 
Plato) as an essential tool in producing any kind of “legitimate” meaning-making: it 
constitutes the continual surveillance of how rhetoric is produced so as to make the 
distinction between “legitimate” and “illegitimate” rhetoric. In this way, Plato 
understands rhetoric as a eugenicist program designed to eliminate undesirable bodies 
making undesirable meaning.  
Rhetoric and Semiotics  
What does it mean that one of the pillars of the rhetorical tradition that scholars 
of rhetoric are expected to know and refer their own work back to functions as a 
eugenicist program? One implication is the positioning of rhetoric in relation to the 
body, specifically the assumption (among many assumptions) of the able-bodiedness – 
and thus “worthiness” – of the rhetor. One way to recognize the reliance on eugenics is 
to acknowledge of the role the body plays in language and meaning-making. When 
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rhetoric is developed in response to the metaphorical body – either the “acceptable” 
body who can produce rhetoric or the “unacceptable” body that can only be “fixed” by 
rhetoric – eugenics and eugenicist logic is invoked. For example, Burke argues that 
rhetoric is “rooted in an essential function of language itself, a  function that is wholly 
realistic, and is continually born anew; the use of language as a symbolic means of 
inducing cooperation in beings that by nature respond to symbols” (43). Rhetoric is 
grounded in language, that is, a Saussurean model of language that relies on symbols 
operating within a system. More significantly, rhetoric is only accessible to a particular 
kind of intelligence: intelligence is determined by the extent to which an individual 
interacts with symbols. Rhetoric, then, is the process or interaction of intelligence with 
symbols, specifically in a way that will elicit responses from other individuals.  In other 
words, the function of rhetoric for Burke is to name situations in such a way that the 
audience can and will respond appropriately, combining the properties of a situation and 
the meaning that the rhetor attaches to it. In this way, the audience will agree with the 
rhetor’s understanding and respond in the way the rhetor intends.     
Like Derrida, Burke argues that the function of language is continuously 
redefined – “born anew” – but unlike Derrida, Burke believes that any redefinition of 
language is always within a strict understanding of language as the means through which 
cooperation and identification can emerge. Through consubstantiation, agreement is 
reached through the process of a mutual recognition of respective places in symbolic 
systems. Intelligence is the means though which identification occurs, and this 
identification is essential to bridge the inherent alienation that exists between people.  
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  Part of what defines intelligence for Burke is the ability for an individual to have 
an understanding of his or her place in relation to the place of others within a system of 
symbols. Burke’s conception of identification and consubstantiality assumes a kind of 
intelligence that cannot always be inhabited by all peoples of varying levels of cognitive 
ability and accessibility to language. This implies that those without such accessibility 
have little to no ability to perform acts of rhetoric, but more significantly, that those 
people will always be in a state of alienation. 
Furthermore, Burke’s conception of identity through language also opens spaces 
for systems of oppression to enforce contextual and cultural requirements for 
participation within that system. Power emerges through language, whereupon the 
language tied to those systems of power are regarded as a uniform truth. Foucault’s 
argument regarding the relationship between language and power becomes extremely 
relevant here, with particular regard to the ways in which normalization enforces what is 
acceptable and unacceptable in systems: “In every society the production of discourse is 
at once controlled, selected, organized, and redistributed by a certain number of 
procedures whose role is to ward off its powers and dangers, to gain mastery over its 
chance events, to evade its ponderous, formidable materiality” (1461). For Foucault, 
language is the means through which power is deployed. This power serves to create an 
ordered, teleological, and constant history, one that renders and insists upon a whole, 
centered notion of the human subject. As such, history is always tied to this idea of a 
wholeness of humanity, rendering histories of subjugated peoples as unimportant and 
irrelevant to the ordered, “correct” history. In short, it ignores the different perceptions 
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that come together to create that “correct” history. Recognizing the subjective nature of 
history, then, takes into account what has been absented from linear accounts of history, 
rendering history as much a construct as nature itself.  
We can extend this discussion of history to include the history of rhetoric and the 
ways in which classical rhetoric serves as the reference point for all things considered to 
be “rhetoric.” The ordered, “correct” history and understanding of rhetoric always 
demonstrates a clear lineage back to privileged names such as Plato and although not 
considered classical rhetoric, Burke as well, implying an inherent commonality that 
unites what is believed to be “rhetoric.” Yet the commonality that emerges is bound by 
eugenicist logic: the foundational texts that serve to control what happens within the 
field (system) of rhetoric largely promote a eugenicist program that serves to eliminate 
those texts and practices that cannot be accepted as “rhetoric.” Those whose bodies are 
determined as not having or capable of producing rhetorical value become effaced in the 
process. Furthermore, this eugenicist system requires the field to be continuously 
deployed within a eugenicist framework, positing the practice, study, and production of 
rhetoric as something that is inaccessible to those unwilling or unable to work within the 
designated system of “rhetoric.”   
Ableist Discourses 
Similar logics are deployed in the spaces where the system of “rhetoric” is taught 
and learned. Central to understanding the presence of enfreakment and eugenicist logic 
in our disciplinary and pedagogical practices is the recognition of the ways in which 
ableist discourses function in these practices. More significantly, this requires an active 
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recognition of the ways in which the enfreakment of language affect bodes – particularly 
disabled bodies – in an effort to maintain “standard” disciplinary and pedagogical 
practices.  
To work towards this recognition, I will begin by considering the space of higher 
education in the context of Malea Powell’s urge to recognize the relationship between 
the narrative of the Academy and the narrative that constructs “America” and 
“American-ness”: 
A central component of this “American tale” is the settlers’ vision of the 
frontier, a frontier that is “wilderness,” empty of all “civilized” life. The 
settler is a brave individual who sets forth to pit his…skills of 
“civilization” against this vast wilderness; he tames the wilderness, 
domesticates it, and installs in it the icons of civilization…The un-seeing 
of Indian peoples, nations, and civilizations is obvious here. For the 
colonizers, it is a necessary un-seeing; material Indian “bodies” are 
simply not seen so that the mutilations, rapes, and murders that 
characterized this first-wave genocide also simply are not seen. “Un-
seeing” Indians gave (and still give) Euro-Americans a critical distance 
from materiality and responsibility, a displacement that is culturally 
varied and marked as “objectivity.” (3) 
The settler’s male, European body becomes the representative (and thus standard) of 
what the “civilized” – and by extension, normal – body looks like. Furthermore, this 
“American tale” situates the settler’s body as very able, embodying “civility” through 
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performances of ability and rehabilitation of the “uncivilized” land and peoples. In order 
to bring “civility” to this “wilderness,” unwanted and “abnormal” bodies – that is, those 
bodies that do not or cannot resemble the body and practices of the European settler – 
are removed from sight, or as Powell says, “un-seen.” This un-seeing is accomplished 
through eugenicist means: the murder of Indian bodies, and the reproduction and settling 
of “civilized” bodies in an effort to disregard the material Indian bodies and practices 
that disrupt the Euro-American establishment of a “norm.” What Powell is signaling to 
is the critical distance from materiality and responsibility that has not only informed “the 
ideological state and collective national culture” of how “America” came into being, but 
is also fundamental to the foundation of the Academy in the United States as we know it:  
The “rules” of scholarly discourse – the legitimizing discourse of the 
discipline of rhetoric and composition – require us to write ourselves into 
this frontier story…We are trained to identify our object of study in terms 
of its boundaries, its difference from other objects of study, and then to do 
everything within our power to bring that object into the realm of other 
“known” objects. In effect, we “civilize” unruly topics. And it is our 
distance from these topics, the fact of our displacement from the 
materiality of these areas of study, that lends legitimacy to our efforts. (3) 
Powell is signaling the ways in which colonial and imperial policies are mirrored in the 
discipline of rhetoric and composition, and continue to maintain a presence in the 
discipline through eugenicist and ableist logic. In this way, the Academy requires the 
(successful) scholar to inhabit the role of the Euro-American settler, treating the object 
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of study as the uncivilized wilderness in need of civilization.  Furthermore, as Powell 
argues, we are trained to identify our object of study in terms of its boundaries, that is, 
its limitations and difference from what is currently accepted as “legitimate” academic 
work. These limitations contextualize our objects of study as what they are not – that is, 
not yet “legitimate” – requiring the scholar to normalize these topics by consistently 
demonstrating our topics’ relationship to the central figures that constitute “legitimacy.”  
 “Legitimacy” becomes synonymous with “normal” within the context of the 
frontier story that Powell lays out, but even more, it calls on the presence of abelism and 
the avoidance of unwanted elements through processes of dis/abling. In Chapter II, I 
contextualized disability as a tool of imperialist and colonial systems of power, calling 
on the eugenicist practices associated with colonial conquest. Indeed, implicit in 
Powell’s assertion is the assumed ability of the settler figure, capable of diagnosing the 
land and its peoples as unfit and thus in need of “fixing.” Given the relationship between 
imperialism and the Academy as Powell emphasizes, higher education functions as a 
space subject to similar normalizing practices in the pursuit of standardization: just as 
colonial power seeks to control and normalize bodies and spaces through removal, the 
removal of unwanted traditions and practices largely constitute the realm of “legitimate” 
scholarship. Furthermore, unwanted traditions and practices are dis/abled, only existing 
at the periphery of “legitimate” scholarship, never fully a part of the “canon.” This not 
only creates a distance from the materiality of subjects and practices within the system, 
but the system becomes sustained by that distance. In this way, unwanted subjects 
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become enfreaked, and the eugenicist systems within which they exist are sustained by 
the detachment of  meaning-making from the body. 
Accessible Spaces of the University 
 This practice of detachment is reflected within the spaces of the university, 
despite the attempts to make these spaces more accessible – or, understood in this 
context, despite the attempts to work against the limiting spaces created out of eugenicist 
logic. One form that these spaces take is the “accessible” university, that is, the spaces of 
higher education that are sustained by removal (students must maintain a presence and a 
demonstrable aptitude in order to remain in the university) but carry the veneer of a 
system sustained by including all who wish to participate. In the context of this project, I 
am most concerned with the ways in which universities have worked towards becoming 
accessible to students with disabilities, with regard to their experiences both inside and 
outside the classroom. With the passage of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 
and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) in 1990, physical spaces are required to 
become accessible, primarily to those with mobility impairments, and accommodations 
are guaranteed to those students who require further assistance to navigate through their 
university experience. Accommodations that are granted largely do not disrupt or 
threaten the structures already in place, thereby leaving the structure of the institution 
unthreatened. It is telling, as Richard K. Scotch notes, that universities and colleges tend 
to have a particularly difficult time meeting the basic requirements of accommodation 
and reasonable accommodation required under the ADA, observing that “universities in 
particular, with their traditionally designed campuses and limited discretionary funds, 
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were to complain bitterly about the costs of opening even a portion of their facilities to 
disabled students” (74).  
Most interesting about accommodations and guidelines for these 
accommodations is the fact that they are based upon “adult dimensions and 
anthropometrics.”  Thus, even while attempting to retrofit and redesign existing or future 
structures, they are still based on the specifications of the normalized body, described 
here as “adult dimensions.” Furthermore, it is also based on anthropometrics, research 
methods used to map human variation through measurement of the body. Many 
eugenicists theories, including those of Francis Galton, rely on anthropometry. Many 
anthropometric practices were used to determine intellectual and moral capacity in the 
early 1900s, serving to diagnose difference, and often by extension, disability. In this 
way, the redesign of structures to accommodate persons with disabilities is not in service 
of accommodation for all, but rather in service of a different version of an able body. As 
noted above, these guidelines want to keep certain bodies out and a certain kind of body 
in. They also construct and promote a disabled body solely in relation to the nondisabled 
body. Essentially, in creating guidelines to be met under the ADA, ableism is reiterated 
in the construction of environments and the ideologies behind those constructions.  The 
university expects disability to come in a specific form, one that will give the veneer of 
inclusion, but does not threaten the structure of the institution.  
Thus this logic designed to increase accessibility simultaneously excludes certain 
bodies. In many ways, these efforts by the ADA to make spaces more accessible 
contribute to the mapping of human variation, designed, as all maps are, in terms of 
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exclusionary potential. Jay Dolmage explores this perspective of mapping by applying it 
to the university, arguing that we must begin to map out the university to see the 
potential not for exclusion, but for “constructing alternative modes of access” (16). He 
argues that “the university erects steep steps to keep certain bodies and minds out … The 
university is the place for the very able….[and] when the standards cannot be used to 
keep certain bodies out, they might be used to shape those bodies and minds that get up 
the stairs” (15-17). The metaphor of steep steps suggests the upward movement 
associated with a university education that is accessible to only a few. For those unable 
to make the climb up the stairs on their own, a student must obtain accommodation. For 
students with disabilities, they are responsible for identifying their disability, providing 
documentation, and requesting specific assistance to the university. In many ways, this 
requirement of self-identifying maintains the institutional structure of the university by 
demanding that students identify that they are incapable of climbing the steep steps as 
they are designed, but will allow them to attempt the climb when the student identifies 
an alternate way up the steps. Thus the eugenicist logics behind these policies continue 
to affect students whose mere presence challenges the institution of academia, including 
those with disabilities. As long as the students can reach the entrance at the top of the 
steps – an alternate entrance that does not disturb the existence of the steps –  s/he is 
allowed in. Ultimately, students with disabilities are expected to be able to climb the 
steps without help or alternative routes; accommodation exists only to help the student 
“keep up” with the pace of his or her nondisabled peers in the academy, what Dolmage 
calls the “primary enforcer of cultural norms” (18). 
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One way in which these norms are enforced and created in the academy is 
through what Margaret Price calls “kairotic spaces.” Price builds off of Cynthia 
Miecznikowski Sheard’s definition of kairos, a rhetorical term that typically refers to “an 
opportune moment.” Sheard’s definition incorporates multiple elements of context that 
cannot be separated, including time, physical space, and altitudes, asking us to consider 
kairos as “grounded in the traditions and institutions of culture, making communicative 
exchange possible and productive” (60, 306). If the meaning of kairos is multiple and 
infinite, the kairotic spaces that students work in must also be understood as infinite as 
well. Furthermore, if as Sheard argues, these spaces are comprised of the “traditions and 
institutions of culture,” it is important to acknowledge which traditions and whose 
cultures are privileged. Doing so can determine the nature of the communicative 
exchange and the degree to which this exchange is possible and productive and for 
whom. Price expands this definition, extending it to encompass 
the less formal, often unnoticed, areas of academe where knowledge is 
produced and power is exchanged. A classroom discussion is a kairotic 
space, as in an individual conference with one’s professor… peer-
response workshops, study groups, interviews for on-campus jobs, or 
departmental parties or gatherings to which they are invited…kairos 
carries ethical and contextual as well as temporal implications. (60) 
Price’s discussion of kairotic spaces is useful in considering the eugenicist and ableist 
structures in which students are expected to perform. For Price, a kairotic space is one 
constructed by expectations of ability and demonstration of that ability. The relationship 
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with demonstrable ability and spaces “where knowledge is produced and power is 
exchanged” suggests the very nature of those spaces: knowledge can only be produced in 
these spaces once the expectations of ability are met and demonstrated. Furthermore, the 
power that is exchanged is also ability-based, implying that power resides with the one 
who can demonstrate ability that is closest to or exceeds expectations. These 
expectations are in the service of the creation of a norm or a standard, or, in Dolmage’s 
terms, are the building blocks to the steep steps that the academy creates.  
The normalizing discourses that overpower these kairotic spaces that students are 
expected to move through require the student to perform multiple roles at a single time 
in order to achieve the illusion of “completeness,” that is, the appropriate performance 
the spaces require. These spaces simultaneously demand fragmentation and 
completeness, or understood in another way, it demands a constant state of becoming, a 
state of “progress.” These spaces thus create the conditions for eugenicist logic to thrive, 
expecting the student to procedurally determine the correct elements to fit the seemingly 
static context and remove the elements that do not “fit” the normalized context. These 
kairotic spaces create pressures for the student to reproduce the elements that interact 
positively within the given context, and remove the elements that deemed unnecessary or 
negative. 
The Enfreakment of Language in the Classroom 
Ableism and able-bodiedness is consistently linked to productivity and 
performance: ableist thought centers on how well someone can perform "normalcy," that 
is, acts that are considered standard and thus normal. If a person cannot perform these 
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tasks, then they are necessarily abnormal and disabled within that context. As long as the 
student can “keep up,” he or she will be successful in class. McRuer writes that 
“composition in the corporate university remains a practice that is focused on a 
fetishized final product, whether it is the final paper, the final grade, or the student body 
with measurable skills” (151). Grading to and teaching to a regulatory norm is bound up 
in ableist ideologies of wholeness and normalcy. It is important, therefore, to have an 
understanding of the way that eugenicist logic operates in understandings of teachers as 
“fixers,” that is, as figures of authority whose job is to correct students, repair their 
mistakes, and recondition their approaches to meaning-making. Indeed, as McRuer 
argues, the body of the student “is in some ways inevitably queer/disabled” in need of 
“correction” from the instructor (255). Central to this understanding is the “neutrality” 
that the teacher attempts to represent. Cobos observes,  
too often, as instructors we ignore our bodies and attempt to seem more 
neutral in order to seem more competent or to help our students learn. 
However, in doing so, we are also pretending that we do not have cultural 
centers from which we work, and then we are re-implementing an 
assumed center of neutrality. Not only are we re-instigating the Cartesian 
split and ignoring our bodies, we are teaching our students to do the same. 
(139) 
What Cobos is describing is a practice of neutrality based on eugenicist logic. 
“Neutrality” here can be read here as synonymous with “normal,” suggesting that the 
most effective way to reach our students is to perform “normalcy” in the classroom, that 
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is, the “normal” expected of classroom settings. Not only is there an assumed neutrality 
expected of the teacher, but there is an assumed neutrality expected of the classroom and 
the practices that occur within that classroom. Learning is expected to be achieved in 
standardized settings, for bodies that can accommodate to the structures designed to keep 
them still and focused. This neutrality of the classroom expects that everyone learns the 
same and will be responsive to the same practices, thereby carrying the air of 
“neutrality.” When a student does not respond to these practices, they are immediately 
marked out as “abnormal” and in need of “fixing.” Conversely, when a student exceeds 
the expectations of the classroom, they are marked out as examples. What Cobos is 
highlighting is the ways that the expectations around many pedagogical practices are 
centered around ideas of normalizing, ideas that are intimately tied to the power and 
privilege associated with the able body.  
Thus the constructedness of the “finished product” emerges as a reflection of the 
performance of “normal” in the classroom, and always already tied to the ableist systems 
dependent on wholeness and a functioning that serves a standard. Keeping this in mind, 
how much of an anti-eugenicst pedagogy would ask students not to “produce” and then 
remove what is not “presentable” for the “finished” product; but would rather ask 
students to value all elements and influences around the writing process – obvious or not 
– and recognize the value in those elements by teaching students to refigure and not 
rewrite?  McRuer argues for what he terms “critical de-composition,” which results from 
“re-orienting ourselves away from those compulsory ideals and onto the composing 
process and the composing bodies – the alternative, and multiple, corporealities – that 
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continually ensure that things can turn out otherwise” (246).  Similarly, Margaret price 
argues that privileging disability and Disability Studies in the classroom “brings forward 
the interplay of writing, ideology, and material life in fundamental and vivid ways” (57). 
Both McRuer and Price are calling for an active recognition of not only our bodies in the 
classroom, but the variation of these bodies. In doing so, the classroom becomes a space 
where disability is privileged and thus responded to.  
This is what the enfreakment of language can do to affect our pedagogy and our 
classrooms. The classroom becomes a space that is sustained by variation and the 
constant challenge to what is assumed to be “normal” or “typical.” Everyone’s value is 
acknowledged and valued, where contributions are, as bell hooks argues, resources: 
“Used constructively they enhance the capacity of any class to create an open learning 
community” (8). When the classroom is an open learning community, students and 
instructors are challenged to recognize and acknowledge their privilege, and, as Krista 
Ratcliffe urges, to listen with intent, and to stand under discourses, that is, “identifying 
the various discourses embodied in each of us and then listening to hear and imagine 
how they might affect not only ourselves but others” (206).  Ratcliffe continues: 
“standing under the discourses of others means first acknowledging the existence of 
these discourses; second, listening for the (un)conscious presences, absences, unknowns; 
and third, consciously integrating this information into our world-views and decision-
making” (206). Understood in the context of the enfreakment of language, this practice 
of standing under discourses acknowledges the practice of eugenicist systems, including 
the sequestering and removal of unwanted or undesirable elements. Once acknowledged, 
 189 
 
the classroom can be a space that critically engages this practice, continuously seeking 
out moments where “normal” is identified in relation to “abnormal,” where removal 
operates as the most viable option, and where “value” is understood in relation to 
“ability.” Thus to work through the lens of the enfreakment of language in the classroom 
means to actively interrogate the ableist systems of power that ask our students to 
identify and remove their experiences and knowledge bases that are deemed “useless” to 
the larger goals of standardization in the classroom. 
Conclusion 
I opened this dissertation with an analysis of Captain America to demonstrate 
how prevalent the relationship between eugenics, freakdom, and disability is in our 
everyday lives, specifically in the places where we least expect this relationship to exist. 
One way that I have attempted to confront this ableist worldview that creates and 
sustains the binaries of normal/abnormal and wanted/unwanted is by employing the 
heuristic of the enfreakment of language. The enfreakment of language has allowed me 
to uncover one of the links between the language around human variation and the 
practice of eugenics, the ways in which eugenicist systems rehearse these practices in 
varying contexts, and the unique challenges to these systems that the practice of 
bricolage offers. While I do not posit that employing the enfreakment of language as a 
heuristic will “fix” any of the problems that this dissertation has set out to uncover – 
indeed, by making such an assumption I would be giving in to the rhetorics of cure, 
another tool used in ableist and eugenicist systems – this does not, however, make the 
use of my heuristic any less necessary. As my opening analysis has shown, eugenics, 
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freakdom, and disability have become so embedded in the functioning of communication 
and meaning-making that it has largely become unrecognizable. What would it mean to 
recognize and understand the presence of eugenics in our everyday lives? 
My original intention with this conclusion was to list facts and figures to begin to 
answer my question. My reasoning behind this appeal to logos was to tie my three 
middle chapters together in that answer: it would mean that over 250,000 people would 
not have been refused admittance to the United States at Ellis Island after 1920 
(Fairchild), 11 million people would not have died in Hitler’s pursuit of racial hygiene, 
Anne Frank would have seen her sixteenth birthday, and Lady Gaga would be out of a 
job. I also intended to include other related figures, including the fact that recognizing 
and understanding eugenics in our everyday lives would mean that over 65,000 
individuals would not have been sterilized under state compulsory sterilization programs 
in the United States (Stoddard). Yet before I completed the sentence, I had to include a 
footnote, noting that his is only a recorded number of sterilizations under a recorded law, 
and that the true, exponentially larger number of people who have been sterilized 
without their knowledge or against their will cannot ever be known. And here lies the 
best evidence for the necessity of the use of the enfreakment of language: I will never be 
able to list an accurate number of people affected by eugenics, and even if I could, those 
numbers would only be used in the service of making my point that eugenics is and 
continues to be practiced in a variety of ways. Just as there is no single definition of the 
word “eugenics,” there is no single form that eugenicist practices take. Employing a lens 
that allows us to begin seeing the myriad of forms that eugenics takes allows us to begin 
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seeing the myriad of ways that we rely on, rehearse, and redeploy eugenics and 
eugenicist logic in our everyday lives, even when we are trying to call it out.  
While I have just demonstrated that I cannot fully answer my question as I 
originally intended, I offer another attempt to end this dissertation:  What would it mean 
to recognize and understand the presence of eugenics in our everyday lives? 
It would mean that bodies would not become erased on the basis of their inability 
or refusal to conform to idealistic, and often unachievable, standards of “normal.”  
It would mean that the lives of people who are designated as “useless” would be 
recognized as vital outside of a system of enfreakment.  
It would mean that every part of a person’s body and experience would be 
regarded as valuable as it truly is. 
It would mean that my big sister who was born with disabilities would have had a 
much different life.  
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